STERLING BANK & TRUST V 21ST CENTURY FINANCIAL CORPORATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STERLING BANK & TRUST,
UNPUBLISHED
March 15, 2002
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellee,
v
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, LADYE A. LEPPEK, PAUL E.
HAMILTON, GAIL H. HAMILTON, and
UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
No. 223972
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 98-088427-CH
Defendants-Cross-Defendants,
and
LYNNE WOLENSKI,
Defendant,
and
F. RAYMOND STORAI,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-CrossPlaintiff-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Murphy and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant F. Raymond Storai1 appeals as of right the circuit court’s judgment for
plaintiff in this action to quiet title. We affirm.
1
For purposes of this opinion, “defendant” refers to defendant Storai. The other defendants are
not parties to this appeal.
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Defendant first asserts that the lower court erred in finding he had no legal or equitable
title to the property. Defendant presents two bases for a one-third interest in the property. First,
he contends he holds legal title by virtue of a quitclaim deed executed by the sole shareholder of
the now-dissolved corporation that possessed legal title to the property. Defendant relies on the
doctrine that a corporation’s assets pass at dissolution to its shareholders, subject to creditors’
claims. MCL 450.1855a; Weber v Enoch C Roberts Iron Ore Co, 270 Mich 38, 46; 258 NW 408
(1935). Thus, defendant argues, when the corporation dissolved, title passed to the sole
shareholder, Lynne Wolenski, who then passed a one-third interest to defendant through the
quitclaim deed.
Defendant’s argument fails for two reasons. First, defendant fails to address whether the
corporation had creditors with claims to the property superior to Wolenski’s. Because defendant
bears the burden of proving right or title superior to plaintiff’s, Beulah Hoagland Appleton
Qualified Personal Residence Trust v Emmet Co Road Comm, 236 Mich App 546, 550; 600
NW2d 698 (1999), he must show that his interest was not subject to claims by the corporation’s
creditors. Defendant has failed to meet that burden. Second, and more importantly, the
corporation was dissolved more than two years after Wolenski executed the quitclaim deed in
defendant’s favor. Thus, even assuming Wolenski acquired title to the property when the
corporation was dissolved, she did not have that title when she executed the quitclaim deed.
Defendant contends that a corporation’s dissolution ratifies the sole shareholder’s pre-dissolution
property transfers. However, defendant cites no authority for this proposition. An appellant may
not leave it to this Court to find support for his arguments. Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651,
655 n 1; 358 NW2d 856 (1984).
Second, defendant claims an equitable right in the property, insisting he is entitled to an
equitable lien because he advanced money to Wolenski in reliance on her verbal commitment to
convey a one-third interest in the property. Defendant’s assertion is not supported by the record,
which indicates Wolenski played no role in the sale of the interest other than signing the
quitclaim deed. In addition, the doctrine of equitable lien applies to protect a party’s identifiable
security interest where the intent to give the interest is clear and the party relies on that intent.
Schrot v Garnett, 370 Mich 161, 164; 121 NW2d 722 (1963). Here, neither party intended to
create a security interest through the transfer of the one-third interest. Thus, imposition of an
equitable lien in defendant’s favor would be inappropriate.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff held an
equitable mortgage on the property. As a preliminary matter, we note the trial court cited
equitable mortgage as an alternative ground for quieting title in plaintiff, relying primarily on its
equitable reformation powers for its holding. Thus, even if we find the trial court erred in
imposing an equitable mortgage in plaintiff’s favor, this would not constitute grounds for
reversing the trial court’s decision.
However, the trial court did not err in its holding. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted
Michigan law to allow imposition of an equitable mortgage where a party gives money in return
for a promise to give a mortgage interest that ultimately is not conveyed or is ineffectively
conveyed. Schram v Burt, 111 F2d 557, 561 (CA 6, 1940). Although Michigan courts have not
imposed equitable mortgages in similar circumstances, neither has our Supreme Court held that
doing so would be improper. Thus, while we are not bound to follow Schram, it provides
-2-
persuasive authority regarding this application of the equitable mortgage doctrine. Scheuneman
v General Motors Corp, 243 Mich App 210, 216 n 5; 622 NW2d 525 (2000).
Here, plaintiff forwarded money in return for a promise to convey a valid mortgage.
Plaintiff instead received a fraudulent mortgage. Thus, plaintiff was entitled to an equitable
mortgage on the property, and the trial court did not err in imposing it.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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