PEOPLE OF MI V RANDOLPH WILSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 12, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226312
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-005569
RANDOLPH WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Zahra and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree retail fraud, MCL
750.356c, and was thereafter sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to
three to ten years of imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right and we affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel failed to communicate a plea bargain to defendant that he would have accepted had he
known of it. More specifically, defendant avers in an affidavit attached to his brief that trial
counsel told him during the trial that the prosecution had previously offered a concurrent
sentence if defendant pleaded guilty. Defendant did not otherwise move for an evidentiary
hearing or new trial on this basis below, and his motion to remand for an evidentiary hearing was
denied by this Court in an unpublished order entered on August 15, 2000. Consequently, our
review of this issue is limited to mistakes apparent on the existing record. People v Avant, 235
Mich App 499, 507; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
An attorney’s failure to advise a client of a plea bargain offer may constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel and a defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that a plea offer was made and that counsel failed to communicate it to defendant.
People v Williams, 171 Mich App 234, 241-242; 429 NW2d 649 (1988). A review of the
existing record does not reveal any plea bargain offer made by the prosecution or that counsel
failed to communicate such an offer to defendant. In fact, the final pre-trial conference summary
and firm trial date contract indicates that defendant rejected the final settlement offer and
requested a waiver trial, as indicated by defendant’s signature on the document. Defendant’s
affidavit, alleging that there was a plea bargain offer that was not communicated to him, was
prepared about six months after sentencing. Under these circumstances, defendant has not
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a plea offer was made and that counsel failed to
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communicate it to him. Accordingly, defendant has not shown that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to a consecutive
sentence to another sentence being served out of Sanilac County. Our review of this issue is
severely impeded since defendant has failed to provide us with his presentence investigation
report1 and does not clarify the exact chronological order of the crimes committed. Defendant
states in his brief that he had already been sentenced on his Sanilac County case when he was
sentenced in the present case. Further, the record only indicates that defendant was on bond at
the time the present offense was committed.
MCL 768.7b(2)(a) states that if a person has been charged with a felony, and pending
disposition of that charge commits another felony, then upon conviction of the subsequent
offense, the sentences imposed for both offenses may run consecutively. Here, the record
indicates that defendant committed a felony in the present case while he was on bond for the
matter pending in Sanilac County. The trial court had discretion under the clear terms of the
statute to sentence defendant to a consecutive sentence because the felony in the present case
was committed while defendant was on bond in a pending matter. Consequently, we reject
defendant’s contention that the trial court lacked authority to sentence him to a consecutive
sentence as MCL 768.7b clearly provided the trial court with that authority.
Further, we also reject defendant’s argument that even if the trial court had the authority
to impose a consecutive sentence, it abused its discretion in doing so because defendant’s
sentence had already been enhanced and defendant is not a threat to society. We cannot agree
with defendant that he is not a threat to society since his convictions date back to 1958 and he
has apparently accumulated eleven felony convictions in his lifetime. There is simply no
indication that the trial court abused its discretion in any way in sentencing defendant to a
consecutive sentence.
Lastly, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination to enhance
defendant’s sentence under the retail fraud statute and the habitual offender statute. Because of
defendant’s prior conviction of retail fraud, his current offense of second-degree retail fraud was
enhanced to first-degree retail fraud under MCL 750.356c. Further, defendant was charged as a
fourth-offense habitual offender under MCL 769.12 based on his numerous prior felony
convictions.
Defendant’s contention that this double enhancement constituted “piling on” in terms of
punishment and violates his right against double jeopardy was rejected by this Court in People v
Eilola, 179 Mich App 315; 445 NW2d 490 (1989). In Eilola, this Court held that the habitual
offender statute could be used to enhance the sentence of a defendant convicted of first-degree
retail fraud as long as the prior retail fraud conviction was not used both to enhance the retail
fraud conviction to first-degree retail fraud and to establish the defendant’s status as a habitual
1
MCR 7.212(C)(7) directs that “[i]f an argument is presented concerning the sentence imposed
in a criminal case, the appellant’s attorney must send a copy of the presentence report to the
court at the time the brief is filed.”
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offender. See id., pp 321-325. Here, the prior retail fraud conviction was used to enhance
defendant’s present conviction to first-degree retail fraud, but was not used to establish
defendant’s status as a habitual offender. Rather, six other prior felony convictions were used
under the habitual offender notice to establish defendant’s status as a fourth-offense habitual
offender. Consequently, there was no error when the trial court enhanced defendant’s sentence
under both the retail fraud and habitual offender statutes.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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