PEOPLE OF MI V BRIAN JAMES CHERRY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 8, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224544
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 98-011801-FH
BRIAN JAMES CHERRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his conviction by a jury of unarmed robbery, MCL
750.530.1 The trial court sentenced him as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to
two to thirty years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant’s conviction arose after he took a pair of shoes from Kohl’s Department Store.
After defendant left the store with the shoes, a security guard apprehended him in the parking lot
after a struggle, during which defendant grabbed the guard’s throat. Defendant contends that the
factual circumstances in this case did not sufficiently support a conviction for unarmed robbery
because his struggle with the security guard occurred after he had already taken the shoes. We
disagree. “When reviewing a claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
examines the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if a rational jury
could find that the essential elements of the offense were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v Joseph, 237 Mich App 18, 20; 601 NW2d 882 (1999).
In People v Newcomb, 190 Mich App 424, 428, 430; 476 NW2d 749 (1991), the
defendants wielded a hammer after entering the victim’s room and taking some unspecified
property. One of the defendants was convicted of armed robbery and argued on appeal that
“because the hammer was used after the actual taking was completed, the elements of armed
robbery were not met.” Id. at 430. This Court stated:
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The jury actually convicted defendant of unarmed robbery and first-degree retail fraud, MCL
750.356c. The trial court determined that the retail fraud conviction merged into the unarmed
robbery conviction and sentenced defendant only for unarmed robbery.
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. . . in the case at bar, even if the hammer appeared after the property was in the
Newcombs’ hands, the defendants had not yet left the victim’s room. The victim
was still considered to be in possession of her property and the armed robbery was
still in progress. The elements of armed robbery were therefore proven, and the
evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction. [Id. at 431.]
In the instant case, defendant took the shoes from Kohl’s and was still in the process of
absconding with them when he assaulted the security guard who followed him from the store.
We view this as substantially similar to the situation in Newcomb.
People v Velasquez, 189 Mich App 14, 15; 472 NW2d 289 (1991), issued before
Newcomb, provides even stronger support for upholding defendant’s conviction in the instant
case. In Velasquez, the defendant went on a test drive of a vehicle with an automobile salesman.
Id. at 15. The defendant and the salesman stopped at a store and went inside. Id. After they
returned to the vehicle, the defendant got into the driver’s seat, locked the doors, and attempted
to drive away without the salesman. Id. at 15-16. The salesman testified that he blocked the
defendant’s path but that the defendant drove toward him and hit his leg while attempting to get
away. Id. at 16. The defendant was convicted of armed robbery as a result of the incident. Id. at
15. On appeal, he argued that insufficient evidence supported his conviction and that the trial
court therefore should have granted his motion for a directed verdict. Id. at 16. This Court
ruled:
If, as it apparently did, the jury believed the salesman, there was sufficient
evidence to support defendant’s conviction. According to [the salesman],
defendant used the car as a dangerous weapon, to prevent [the salesman] from
regaining possession of it, and by “lurching” it toward [the salesman], not only
frightened him but also brushed against his leg, causing injury.
***
We further find that the fact that defendant did not assault [the salesman]
until after defendant had locked him out of the car and attempted to abscond with
it is of no import. Robbery is a continuous offense which is not complete until the
perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety. People v Tinsley, 176 Mich App
119, 121; 439 NW2d 313 (1989). Hence, the use of force or intimidation in
retaining the property taken or in attempting to escape rather than in taking the
property itself is sufficient to supply the element of force or coercion essential to
the offense of robbery. Id. Defendant’s motion was properly denied, because
there was sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury. [Velasquez, supra at
16-17.]
Velasquez clearly supports defendant’s conviction in the instant case. Indeed, by assaulting the
security guard, defendant was “us[ing] . . . force or intimidation in retaining the property taken or
in attempting to escape. . . .” Id. at 17. This was “sufficient to supply the element of force or
coercion essential to the offense of robbery.” Id.
In light of Newcomb and, especially, Velasquez, we affirm defendant’s conviction of
unarmed robbery. See MCR 7.215(I)(1) (stating that a panel of this Court “must follow the rule
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of law established by a prior published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after
November 1, 1990”). We acknowledge that in People v Randolph, 242 Mich App 417, 421; 619
NW2d 168 (2000), lv granted 465 Mich 885 (2001), this Court essentially contradicted
Velasquez. The Randolph Court, reviewing a factual circumstance similar to that in the instant
case, stated:
There was evidence presented at trial that defendant used force as a means
of escaping the store’s security guards; therefore, viewing defendant’s crime as a
whole larcenous transaction, defendant would have been guilty of unarmed
robbery if he had succeeded in his escape . . . . However, viewing the crime as a
whole larcenous transaction requires the conclusion that there was insufficient
evidence to support defendant’s conviction of unarmed robbery because
defendant was unsuccessful in escaping and thus he never completed the
larcenous transaction. Therefore, we conclude that there was insufficient
evidence to support defendant conviction of unarmed robbery. [Id.]
This analysis contradicted the specific holding in Velasquez that “the use of force or intimidation
in retaining the property taken or in attempting to escape rather than in taking the property itself
is sufficient to supply the element of force or coercion essential to the offense of robbery.”
Velasquez, supra at 17. As noted above, MCR 7.215(I)(1) requires that this Court “follow the
rule of law established by a prior published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after
November 1, 1990. . . .” When two post-November 1, 1990 cases conflict, we are to follow the
first decision on the issue. See Novak v Nationwide Mutual Ins Co, 235 Mich App 675, 689-690;
599 NW2d 546 (1999). Accordingly, Velasquez takes precedence over Randolph and, in our
opinion, requires us to affirm defendant’s unarmed robbery conviction.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court imposed a disproportionate sentence. We
review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v Alexander, 234
Mich App 665, 679; 599 NW2d 749 (1999). Defendant’s argument is so poorly developed that
we need not even address it. See, e.g., People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587; 629 NW2d
421 (2001). At any rate, defendant’s criminal history demonstrated an inability to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law, and his sentence was within statutory limits. Under these
circumstances, no abuse of discretion occurred. People v Hansford (After Remand), 454 Mich
320, 326; 562 NW2d 460 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
I concur in both the reasoning and result of this opinion and write separately to opine that People
v Randolph, 242 Mich App 417; 619 NW2d 168 (2000) was wrongly decided.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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