PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN RODNEY MCRAE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217052
Clare Circuit Court
LC No. 98-001151-FC
JOHN RODNEY MCRAE,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Hood and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us for the second time. In our prior opinion, we affirmed defendant’s
conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a). People v McRae,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued 01/12/2001 (Docket No.
217052). In that appeal, defendant challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence of a statement he allegedly made to his former neighbor, who was employed as a
reserve deputy sheriff, on the grounds that it violated his right against compelled selfincrimination and his right to counsel under the United States and Michigan constitutions.1 We
concluded that even if the trial court erred in admitting the statement, the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the evidence presented at trial. Defendant filed an
application for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the
Supreme Court determined that if the trial court erred in this regard, the error was not harmless,
and remanded the matter for our consideration whether there was error. People v McRae, 465
Mich 874 (2001). Having reviewed the case in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directive,
we find no error and affirm.
The alleged statement that defendant moved to suppress was made during a conversation
with his former neighbor, Dean Heintzelman, at the Clare County jail where defendant was
incarcerated awaiting trial. Heintzelman was employed as a reserve officer for the Clare County
Sheriff’s Department. Heintzelman had been defendant’s neighbor when defendant lived in the
area years ago, and Heintzelman described him as a friend that he knew “fairly well” at that time.
Heintzelman was aware that defendant was charged with first-degree murder and was being held
1
Defendant also raised other issues which we found to be without merit and on which the
Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
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at the jail. Heintzelman learned from his mother, who was also a reserve officer, that defendant
wanted to see him on the basis of a conversation she had had with defendant’s wife, and it was
his understanding that defendant wondered why Heintzelman had not come to see him.
Although Heintzelman did not know why defendant wanted to see him, he believed that
defendant “just [ ] wanted company.”
One night after Heintzelman had finished transporting a prisoner, he told the officer on
duty that defendant had been asking to see him, and Heintzelman asked the officer to take him
back to defendant’s cell. Heintzelman was wearing his sheriff’s uniform. Heintzelman remained
outside defendant’s cell. He and defendant shook hands and talked about their families.
Heintzelman asked defendant about his son, and defendant showed Heintzelman pictures of his
son’s wife and baby. At some point in the conversation, Heintzelman asked defendant about his
involvement in the charged offense. Defendant did not answer. They continued to talk about
defendant’s son. Again Heintzelman asked defendant, “[D]id you do it?” According to
Heintzelman, defendant hung his head and responded, “Dean, it was bad. It was bad.” That was
the end of their discussion and Heintzelman had no further contact with defendant. Heintzelman
later relayed the content of their conversation to another officer.
The prosecution notified defendant that it intended to introduce evidence of the statement
at trial. Defendant moved to suppress the statement on the grounds that its admission violated
his constitutional rights to counsel and against compelled self-incrimination because the
statement was elicited without the presence of counsel or the requisite warnings. The
prosecution argued that defendant waived his rights by requesting that Heintzelman come see
him and also that Heintzelman’s employment as a reserve officer was irrelevant in the context of
their meeting, which was a casual conversation between former neighbors.
At the Walker2 hearing, the trial court heard testimony about the circumstances
surrounding Heintzelman’s conversation with defendant. Heintzelman testified that he had been
defendant’s neighbor before defendant moved out of the area in 1987, and that at that time they
were good friends. Heintzelman learned from his mother that she had spoken with defendant’s
wife, Barbara McRae, and Barbara indicated that defendant would like to see Heintzelman.
According to Barbara, defendant “wanted to have a friendly conversation with our neighbors.”
Barbara claimed to be unaware that Heintzelman was associated with the Sheriff’s Department.
Heintzelman testified that he did not give defendant Miranda3 warnings because they were
“talking like friends.”
Defendant testified at the hearing. When questioned whether he had requested that
Heintzelman visit him in jail, defendant equivocated, “Not exactly.” Defendant denied knowing
that Heintzelman was associated with the sheriff’s department. Defendant stated that
Heintzelman immediately asked him: “John, John, now did you do it? Didn’t you do it? Do
you remember what happened? Did you forget it?” Defendant “was trying to be very cautious
as to what [he] said.” Defendant testified that he shook his head and said, “No, not anything at
all like they’re trying to make it out to be.” They then proceeded to talk about their families.
2
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
3
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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Defendant testified that he had previously been given Miranda warnings, and that he had
invoked his right to remain silent. At the time of the conversation, defendant was represented by
counsel. Previously, defendant had told the police that he did not wish to answer any questions
and he wished to consult with an attorney. He testified that he never communicated to the
sheriff’s department that he had changed his mind and that he wanted to talk about the matters
that brought him there.
Kerry Kocsis was in the same wing of the jail as defendant and overheard the
conversation between defendant and Heintzelman. He testified that they talked about
defendant’s son, and defendant’s son’s children, and how defendant was doing in the jail. Kocsis
heard Heintzelman asked defendant “Did you do it?” Kocsis first stated that defendant did not
answer. Later he said that defendant responded “No.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made the following findings and ruling:
. . . [I]t seems pretty evident to the fact that [Heintzelman] was back there at the
request of the Defendant. He wanted to talk to him. The Defendant did. And so
he’s the one who initiated the conversation. And the fact that it got into
culpability relative to this particular situation does not mean or does not change
the fact as to what the requirements of the law are as far as what the police officer
had to do.
The trial court determined that Miranda warnings were not required and denied defendant’s
motion to suppress the statement.4
We review a trial court’s findings of fact regarding a motion to suppress evidence for
clear error, and review the trial court’s ultimate decision on the motion de novo. People v
Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 319; 614 NW2d 647 (2000); People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App
356, 366; 592 NW2d 737 (1999). See also MCR 2.613(C). Clear error exists if we are left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. People v Manning, 243 Mich App
615, 620; 624 NW2d 746 (2000); People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 119; 575 NW2d 84
4
We note as an aside that defendant’s motion to suppress was somewhat problematic, inasmuch
as defendant sought to challenge the constitutionality of the circumstances surrounding the
elicitation of a statement that defendant did not admit to making. The Walker hearing testimony
offered four versions of what transpired between Heintzelman and defendant. Heintzelman
testified that when asked about his culpability, defendant said: “Dean, it was bad. It was bad.”
This is the alleged statement defendant sought to have suppressed. However, defendant testified
that he responded to Heintzelman by saying that it was “not anything at all like they’re trying to
make it out to be.” Kocsis gave conflicting testimony; Kocsis first stated that defendant said
nothing in response to Heintzelman’s question, but later testified that defendant said simply,
“No.” The trial court proceeded to rule on the motion despite defendant’s contradictory
testimony on this point at the hearing. We now engage in the somewhat paradoxical task of
reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress when defendant’s own testimony contradicts that he
made the statement that he sought to have suppressed.
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(1997). “An appellate court must give deference to the trial court’s findings at a suppression
hearing.” People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 29; 551 NW2d 355 (1996).
“In Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), the United
States Supreme Court created a set of prophylactic safeguards to insure protection of the Fifth
Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination during custodial interrogation.”
Cheatham, supra at 10. “[T]he police must advise a suspect before custodial interrogation that
the suspect has the right to remain silent, that anything the suspect says may be used against him,
and that the suspect has a right to the presence of retained or, if indigent, appointed counsel
during questioning.” People v Dennis, 464 Mich 567, 572-573; 628 NW2d 502 (2001). See
Const 1963, art 1, § 17. “Miranda protects defendants against governmental coercion leading
them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that.”
Cheatham, supra at 11, quoting Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 170; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed
2d 473 (1986).
It has become axiomatic that Miranda warnings need only be given in cases involving
custodial interrogations. People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 532; 531 NW2d 780 (1995);
People v Hoffman, 205 Mich App 1, 8; 518 NW2d 817 (1994). This Court has recognized that
“Miranda must be strictly enforced, but only in ‘those types of situations in which the concerns
that powered the decision are implicated.’” Id., quoting Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 437;
104 S Ct 3138; 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984). Accordingly, in the case at bar the issue to be resolved is
whether defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation to trigger the requirements of
Miranda. Anderson, supra at 532. “Custodial interrogation” means questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody. Anderson, supra, citing Illinois
v Perkins, 496 US 292, 296; 110 S Ct 2394; 110 L Ed 2d 243 (1990). “‘Interrogation,’ as
conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond
that inherent in custody itself.” Anderson, supra, quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291,
300; 100 S Ct 1682; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980). See People v Coomer, 245 Mich App 206, 219; 627
NW2d 612 (2001).
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as the Michigan
Constitution guarantee the right to counsel. US Const Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. The
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at or after the initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings against the defendant, People v Johnson, 215 Mich App 658, 664; 547 NW2d 65
(1996), and applies to all critical stages of the prosecution. People v Crusoe, 433 Mich 666, 685;
449 NW2d 641 (1989). “A critical stage of the proceedings includes government efforts to elicit
information from the accused concerning the charged crime.” People v Riggs, 223 Mich App
662, 677; 568 NW2d 101 (1997) (Smolenski, J.), citing Michigan v Jackson, 475 US 625, 630;
106 S Ct 1404; 89 L Ed 2d 631 (1986).
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time of Heintzelman’s conversation with
defendant, defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda. Nor is it disputed that
Heintzelman did not give defendant Miranda warnings. Also, because formal proceedings had
commenced, defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. Johnson, supra at
664.
The trial court correctly identified the threshold issue, i.e., “why was Mr. Heintzelman
back there. Was he back there as a police officer on police duties at that point in time, or was he
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back there at the request of the Defendant[?]”. This is the relevant inquiry in this case because
“constitutional protections apply only to governmental action.” Anderson, supra at 533. “A
person who is not a police officer and is not acting in concert with or at the request of the police
is not required to give Miranda warnings before eliciting a statement.” Id.
Defendant advances arguments that are interesting but unsupported by the record.
Defendant argues that Heintzelman’s employment as a reserve sheriff’s deputy placed him in the
status of a police officer for purposes of his conversation with defendant despite Heintzelman’s
claim that he visited defendant at defendant’s request and on the basis of their friendship.
Although defendant asserts that Heintzelman visited defendant “during the course of his duties as
a reserve police officer,” the record establishes only that Heintzelman visited defendant after he
had finished transporting a prisoner, he thought it was a good time to visit defendant, and
defendant had been asking to see him. Although the nature of Heintzelman’s duties as a reserve
officer is pertinent to this determination, see, e.g., Anderson, supra; People v Robledo, 832 P 2d
249 (Colo, 1992), the record is void of any evidence regarding the specific duties the job entails
other than the transportation of prisoners. The record provides no indication of whether the
position comprises any investigatory responsibilities. See Anderson, supra at 534.
Nor does the record support defendant’s contention that Heintzelman used his friendship
with defendant to elicit an incriminating statement or that Heintzelman was seeking information
at the behest of investigating officers. On the contrary, the evidence supported the trial court’s
finding that Heintzelman visited defendant at defendant’s request. Although the testimony
differed regarding the point in the conversation at which Heintzelman inquired about defendant’s
involvement in the charged offense, Heintzelman, Kocsis, and defendant all testified that the
conversation included talk of their families and defendant’s son, thus suggesting the social aspect
of the visit, as Heintzelman testified. In short, the record is void of any suggestion of the type of
police coercion against which Miranda was intended to protect. Cheatham, supra at 10-11 (“The
stated goal of Miranda is to protect against the inherently coercive nature of custodial
interrogation.”)
Defendant relies on cases involving security guards or off-duty police officers and
addressing whether they are state actors for purposes of Miranda. None of the cases defendant
cites address circumstances similar to those presented here in which the statement at issue was
made in the context of a conversation between former friends which, as the trial court in this case
found, was initiated by the defendant. Thus, they are not helpful to the resolution of the matter
before us.
We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in its findings, and that the court did
not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his statement.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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