PEOPLE OF MI V WALTER GILBERT MOORE III
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 8, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 225196
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-146091-FC
WALTER GILBERT MOORE, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Neff and B. B. MacKenzie*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction for conspiracy to deliver 650 or
more grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i). We affirm.
On appeal, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial when a witness asserted his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the jury’s presence. Defendant alleges
that constitutional and evidentiary errors resulted from the prosecution calling Duane Moten to
testify at trial because the prosecution could not have reasonably expected that he would testify.
We disagree.
An attorney may not call a witness to testify knowing that he will claim a valid privilege.
People v Gearns, 457 Mich 170, 193; 577 NW2d 422 (1998), overruled on other grounds People
v Lukity, 460 Mich App 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999); People v Giacalone, 399 Mich 642,
645; 250 NW2d 492 (1977). In this case, the record illustrates that the prosecutor had a
reasonable expectation that Moten would testify. See Gearns, supra at 201. Moten had an
agreement with the Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office that he would testify in exchange for the
assurance that he would not be charged in this case or with a drug offense. The prosecutor
denied that he knew that Moten was going to assert the privilege and had spoken with Moten
about a half an hour before the proceeding and Moten told him he was going to testify. Moten
admitted to the court that he did not inform the prosecutor that he intended to assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege. Moreover, Deputy Ciofu testified that he had been with Moten prior to
him being called to the witness stand and “had every indication that he [Moten] was going to
testify.” Although Moten may have been a reluctant witness, it was reasonable for the
prosecutor to believe Moten would testify and no evidentiary error occurred. However, even if
evidentiary error occurred, such error was harmless because defendant failed to demonstrate that
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative in light of the weight and
strength of the untainted evidence. See Lukity, supra at 495-496. Further, defendant’s
constitutional error argument premised on this alleged prosecutorial misconduct claim also fails.
See Gearns, supra at 192-193.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied his right to confront a witness by the trial
court’s admission of the preliminary examination testimony of Moten, an unavailable witness.
We disagree. A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Lukity, supra at 488; People v Adams, 233 Mich App 652, 656; 592 NW2d 794 (1999).
A witness who asserts a Fifth Amendment privilege as justification for not testifying is
“unavailable” for purposes of MRE 804(b)(1). People v Meredith, 459 Mich 62, 66; 586 NW2d
538 (1998). Consequently, preliminary examination testimony from the unavailable witness may
be introduced at trial if the party against whom it is offered had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony through cross-examination. MCR 804(b)(1); Meredith, supra at
66-67. Further, because MCR 804(b)(1) is a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the testimony
bears satisfactory indicia of reliability to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Meredith, supra at
71.
In this case, defendant argues that he did not have an opportunity to develop Moten’s
testimony at the preliminary examination because the magistrate in that proceeding limited his
opportunity to fully cross-examine the witness. The record does not support defendant’s
assertion. The magistrate’s only comment limiting the scope of the preliminary examination
occurred during the prosecutor’s direct examination of Moten and came in response to defense
counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s questions about Moten’s prior acts. At no time did the
magistrate attempt to limit defense counsel’s cross-examination of the witness. Consequently,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Moten’s preliminary examination
testimony. See Adams, supra at 659; Meredith, supra at 67.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by the trial court’s exclusion of the
grand jury testimony of two unavailable witnesses, Lavinia Peoples and Moten. Defendant
argues that the transcripts were admissible under MRE 804(b)(1) and, without explanation or
citation to apposite supporting authority, claims that their exclusion implicated his constitutional
right to call witnesses. A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Lukity, supra; Adams, supra. Defendant did not request the admission of Moten’s
grand jury testimony; therefore, this claim is not preserved and is reviewed for plain error that
affected defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-765; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). To the extent that defendant claims his constitutional rights were violated by the
exclusion of Peoples’ grand jury testimony, reversal is not warranted if the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 585; 629 NW2d 411
(2001).
Out-of-court statements offered for their truth are usually inadmissible hearsay. See
MRE 801(c); MRE 802; People v Chavies, 234 Mich App 274, 281; 593 NW2d 655 (1999). In
this case, defendant argues that the grand jury testimony was admissible under MRE 804(b)(1).
However, for such former testimony to be admissible under this rule, the party against whom it
was to be offered must have had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony.
See Chavies, supra at 284; see, also, United States v Salerno, 505 US 317; 112 S Ct 2503; 120 L
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Ed 2d 255 (1992). Here, although the prosecution had an opportunity to develop the testimony,
in light of the inculpatory nature of Peoples’ and Moten’s grand jury testimony, we cannot
conclude that the prosecution had the requisite motive to develop the testimony.
Further, although defendant does not indicate for what purpose he would have introduced
the grand jury testimony, it is apparent that, in light of the inculpatory nature of the testimony,
defendant’s motive was to attack the credibility of the witnesses, not to offer exculpatory
evidence. However, Peoples’ and Moten’s preliminary examination testimony was read to the
jury and contained substantially similar testimony as that given during the grand jury
proceedings. Further, during the preliminary examination, defendant impeached Peoples’
credibility on numerous occasions, including that she lied to the grand jury, lied to the police,
had a criminal record, and that she told police that she would do anything to get out of being
charged in the case. Consequently, the admission of the grand jury testimony would have merely
amounted to the presentation of cumulative evidence. See MRE 403. In sum, the exclusion of
Moten’s grand jury testimony was not preserved for appellate review. Further, the trial court
properly excluded Peoples’ grand jury testimony; however, even if the testimony was admissible,
reversal is not required because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because certain comments made by
the prosecutor during closing arguments amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree.
Appellate review of unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct is precluded unless the
defendant demonstrates plain error that affected his substantial rights. Carines, supra at 752753; People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 110; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). We review preserved
claims of prosecutorial misconduct in context to determine whether the defendant received a fair
and impartial trial. Id.; People v Reid, 233 Mich App 457, 466; 592 NW2d 767 (1999).
Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel by
commenting on the defense strategy of deeming a key witness a liar and improperly implied that
defense counsel had attempted to mislead the jury. Defendant failed to object to the comments,
therefore, these claims are not preserved. Further, a prosecutor’s arguments must be considered
in light of defense arguments. People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 181; 561 NW2d 463
(1997). Here, the prosecutor’s comments did not constitute a personal attack on defense counsel,
but were permissibly responsive to defendant’s repeated attacks on Peoples’ credibility. See
People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). In addition, the prosecutor
did not argue that defense counsel was intentionally attempting to mislead the jury but, rather,
responded to defense argument regarding the weight to be accorded to Peoples’ transcript
testimony by reminding the jury that the judge would provide them with the law on the issue.
See Watson, supra at 592-593. Consequently, defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error
affecting his substantial rights regarding these claims.
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he allegedly
misstated the law regarding the possible penalty that defendant faced if convicted. Defendant
refers to the comment, “[s]econd of all, trust me, you don’t know what the punishment is. There
ain’t nobody coming out in no box.” However, considered in context, this comment was in
response to the defense argument that Peoples testified against defendant only to avoid leaving
prison in a wooden box. The prosecutor’s comment could not reasonably have been interpreted
as referring to defendant’s likely sentence if convicted and did not deny defendant a fair and
impartial trial. See Aldrich, supra.
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Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s reference to Shannon Smoot apparently
having fled to avoid prosecution improperly interjected a fact that was unsupported by evidence.
Defendant objected to the statement and the trial court promptly instructed the jury that they
were to determine the facts of the case based only on the evidence presented at trial. This
instruction cured any possible prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s brief comment, and
defendant was not deprived of a fair and impartial trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
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