IN RE FRENCH MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of R.F. and M.F., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 223784
Calhoun Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-000855-NA
BRIAN FRENCH,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
AMY CUMMINGS,
Respondent.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Fitzgerald and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals by delayed leave granted from the trial court’s order
terminating his parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and
(j). We affirm.
Respondent-father first argues that he was denied due process because the trial court,
after hearing testimony that respondent-father had physically abused the children’s mother,
combined the July 1999 review hearing with a permanency planning hearing. While the trial
court acknowledged that respondent-father did not receive the required written notice that a
permanency planning hearing would be held, MCR 5.973(C)(3), it is apparent from the record
that the parties did not object to the combined hearing and that all parties received actual notice
of the subsequent hearing. At that hearing, the trial court afforded respondent-father the
opportunity to recall any witnesses and present any evidence that he had been unprepared to
present because of the lack of written notice. Under these circumstances, any error in failing to
provide written notice was harmless. MCR 5.902(A); MCR 2.613(A).
Respondent-father also argues that he was denied due process when the trial court refused
to call the children’s mother as a witness at the July 1999 review hearing, in order to dispute the
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allegations of physical abuse. We do not agree. The children’s mother is a legally incapacitated
person. There was evidence that she was afraid of respondent-father and that she was not willing
or competent to enter the courtroom or testify. The trial court acknowledged that the children’s
mother had made conflicting statements with regard to the alleged abuse, some of which were
consistent with respondent-father’s position, and informed counsel that the mother could be
called to testify at a later time if counsel deemed it necessary. The rules of evidence do not apply
at a dispositional hearing, MCR 5.973(A)(4)(a), and the trial court is given wide latitude in
evidentiary matters at a permanency planning hearing. MCR 5.973(C)(4)(a). We find no error.
MCR 5.974(I).
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for
termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433
Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The record indicates that despite the extensive services
offered to him, respondent-father had not improved his ability to parent or to provide the children
with an appropriate home. MCL 712A.19b(g). He failed to undertake the first-aid training
necessary to enable him to treat the seizures which afflicted both children, or to arrange for
appropriate “second person” child care when he could not be present to aid the children’s mother
in caring for the children. Respondent-father was also observed encouraging the children to
verbally abuse and disparage their mother. Moreover, as noted by the trial court, the instant
matter involves the second petition for termination brought against respondent-father, and
correctly reasoned that, “having been given two chances, there is no reasonable likelihood that
the conditions leading to the original adjudication will be rectified within a reasonable time,
considering the age of the children.” MCL 712A.19b(c)(i).
The evidence was similarly sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of a reasonable
likelihood that the children would be harmed if returned to respondent-father’s home. MCL
712A.19b(j). In addition to the evidence discussed above, petitioner presented evidence that
respondent-father had not installed child-safety locks on his cupboards, despite the fact that
another child, although not his own, had died of an aspirin overdose in the home. Respondentfather also admitted not knowing what medications his special-needs children were taking, and
refused to take responsibility for his failure to find a child care provider or to learn how to give
the children their medications.
Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights
was clearly not in the children’s best interest. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The children had been in a stable home with their grandparents
for most or all their lives, and they were thriving in that environment. Moreover, as petitioner
argued below, the treatment plan merely required that respondent-father not leave the children
alone with their mother, that he find out what medications the children need and be certain that
they receive it, that he install child-proof locks in the home, and that he find appropriate daycare.
Respondent-father, however, failed to complete any of these tasks. Thus, the trial court did not
err in terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to the children.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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