IN RE PREVOST MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JOSEPH PREVOST and
KATHLEEN PREVOST, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 25, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
and
SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA
INDIANS,
Intervening-Appellee,
v
No. 234101
Chippewa Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-012261-NA
JACQUELINE G. TEEPLE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JOSEPH PREVOST, SR.,
Respondent.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and O’Connell and Zahra, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right the January 24, 2001, order terminating her
parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j). We
affirm. We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E)(1)(b).
Respondent-appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her second motion for
an adjournment. We disagree. We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an
adjournment for an abuse of discretion. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 28; 501 NW2d 182
(1993).
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We agree with petitioner-appellee that respondent-appellant’s appeal is moot.
Respondent-appellant’s purpose in seeking the adjournment was to enroll her children in the Bay
Mills Indian Community so that the Community could have her case transferred to a tribal court
pursuant to 25 USC 1911(b). This effort became futile when the Community and the Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians both withdrew their petitions for transfer. Indeed, the trial
court had been prepared to grant respondent-appellant’s requested relief and transfer the case
before the two tribes withdrew their petitions. Accordingly, the relief respondent-appellant
sought is no longer available.
In any event, we find nothing in either the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC
1901 et seq. or MCR 5.980 that entitles respondent-appellant to an adjournment in these
circumstances. Nor do we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
The trial court declined to give respondent-appellant a second chance because she had already
failed to effect the enrollment and there was too much uncertainty surrounding the outcome of
her efforts. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or thwart the
goals of the ICWA by denying the motion.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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