JOANN VALENTI V GKN AUTOMOTIVE INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOANN VALENTI,
UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 220035
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 90-387972
GKN AUTOMOTIVE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
JOANN VALENTI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 220204
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 90-387972
GKN AUTOMOTIVE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Hoekstra and Smolenski, JJ.
SMOLENSKI, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I conclude that the law of the case doctrine requires this Court to
hold that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim.
As this Court explained in Ashker v Ford Motor Co, 245 Mich App 9, 13; 627 NW2d 1
(2001):
The law of the case doctrine holds that a ruling by an appellate court on a
particular issue binds the appellate court and all lower tribunals with respect to
that issue. Thus, a question of law decided by an appellate court will not be
decided differently on remand or in a subsequent appeal in the same case. The
primary purpose of the doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid
reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing
lawsuit. . . . Whether law of the case applies is a question of law subject to review
de novo. [Citations omitted.]
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The decision of an appellate court is controlling at all subsequent stages of litigation, so
long as it is unaffected by a higher court’s opinion. McNees v Cedar Springs Stamping Co (After
Remand), 219 Mich App 217, 222; 555 NW2d 481 (1996); Reeves v Cincinnati, Inc (After
Remand), 208 Mich App 556, 559; 528 NW2d 787 (1995), citing Johnson v White, 430 Mich 47,
53; 420 NW2d 87 (1988). Furthermore, the law of the case doctrine applies regardless of the
correctness of the prior decision. Sumner v GMC (On Remand), 245 Mich App 653, 662; 633
NW2d 1 (2001); People v Herrera (On Remand), 204 Mich App 333, 340; 514 NW2d 543
(1994).
The first time this case came before this Court on appeal, we determined that the trial
court had erroneously granted defendant summary disposition on plaintiff’s invasion of privacy
claim. Valenti v GKN Automotive, Inc, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued February 4, 1997 (Docket No. 151613), slip op. at 2. This Court held that plaintiff had
presented sufficient evidence to establish the prima facie elements of such a claim, and held that
a reasonable jury could find in plaintiff’s favor. Id., slip op. at 3-4. Now this case returns to this
Court, after entry of a substantial jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor. In direct conflict with this
Court’s earlier opinion, the majority would hold that the facts were insufficient to establish a
prima facie invasion of privacy claim.
The majority contends, “reasonable jurors could not conclude that plaintiff proved that
defendant’s requirement that plaintiff undergo a psychiatric examination before returning to
work from a medical leave was a means to ascertain information about matters in which plaintiff
had a right to privacy.” Supra, slip op. at 2. However, in its prior opinion, this Court
specifically found a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether “defendant required
plaintiff to submit to a psychological examination in order to discover personal facts.” Valenti,
supra, slip op. at 4. The majority also contends, “it is beyond dispute that defendant had a
legitimate reason to require plaintiff to submit to a psychiatric exam. Further, no evidence was
presented at trial to show that there was any other motive for the exam.” Supra, slip op. at 2. In
contrast, this Court’s prior opinion enumerated specific evidence that could support a reasonable
jury in finding that “defendant required plaintiff to be examined by a psychiatrist for the purpose
of discovering private information.” Valenti, supra, slip op. at 3. Finally, the majority concludes
that “plaintiff waived her right to privacy.” Supra, slip op. at 3. However, this Court’s prior
opinion concluded that “plaintiff did not waive her right to privacy,” and found no “waiver by
plaintiff that would pertain to this factual situation.” Valenti, supra, slip op. at 3, 4.
“A legal question may not be decided differently where the facts remain materially the
same.” McNees, supra at 222; see also Webb v Smith (After Second Remand), 224 Mich App
203, 209; 568 NW2d 378 (1997). The majority does not contend that the facts presented at trial
differed in any way from the facts upon which this Court rendered its prior decision. Indeed, a
review of the record reveals that the same proofs previously recognized by this Court as
sufficient to maintain an action for invasion of privacy were submitted to the jury.
The majority discusses the law of the case in a single footnote. Supra, slip op. at 2, n 1.
In that footnote, the majority cites Brown v Drake-Willock Int’l, Ltd, 209 Mich App 136, 144;
530 NW2d 510 (1995), for the proposition that, “‘[w]hen this Court reverses a case and remands
it for a trial because a material issue of fact exists, the law of the case doctrine does not apply
because the first appeal was not decided on the merits.’” Id. I respectfully disagree that Brown’s
holding bars application of the law of the case doctrine to the instant appeal. This Court’s prior
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opinion directly addressed the sufficiency of plaintiff’s proofs regarding the invasion of privacy
claim, and specifically held that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence on that claim to reach
a jury. Applying the law of the case doctrine, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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