MICHAEL DEWALD V FREMONT MUT INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL DEWALD and SALLY DEWALD,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellants-CrossAppellees,
No. 224862
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 99-039673-CK
v
FREMONT MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee-CrossAppellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case involving an insurance coverage dispute, plaintiffs appeal by right from the
trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We
affirm.
Plaintiffs entered into a land contract to sell a house to Donald and Jacklyn McMillan.
The McMillans obtained insurance on the house through defendant. The policy listed the
coverage period as April 15, 1992, through April 15, 1995. At some point, the McMillans
ceased paying the insurance premiums, and, according to defendant, the actual last day of
coverage was May 13, 1994. Meanwhile, the McMillans also defaulted on their land contract
with plaintiffs.
In 1998, a fire destroyed the house. After defendant refused to pay the insurance
proceeds to plaintiffs, they filed suit. Defendant then moved for summary disposition, arguing,
inter alia, that plaintiffs were not entitled to the insurance proceeds because the insurance policy
had expired by its own terms before the date of the fire. The trial court agreed.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition. Nesbitt v
American Community Mutual Ins Co, 236 Mich App 215, 219; 600 NW2d 427 (1999). We
examine all relevant documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact on which reasonable minds
could differ. Id. at 219-220.
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On appeal, plaintiffs contend that they were entitled to the insurance proceeds because
they never received a notice of cancellation of the policy and because the policy stated in Section
IX:
This Company reserves the right to cancel this policy at any time as
provided by its terms, but in such case this policy shall continue in force for the
benefit only of the mortgagee (or trustee) for 10 days after notice to the mortgagee
(or trustee) of such cancellation and shall then cease, and this Company shall have
the right, on like notice, to cancel this agreement.
We disagree with plaintiffs’ contention. Indeed, the contract explicitly stated that it expired on
April 15, 1995, and “[t]he acceptance of appellants’ claim would result, in effect, in creation of
liability following the expiration of the policy as written, and would from a practical standpoint
be the equivalent of creating a new contract between the parties.” Munro v Boston Ins Co, 370
Mich 604, 612; 122 NW2d 654 (1963). As noted in Auto-Owners Ins Co v Churchman, 440
Mich 560, 566; 489 NW2d 431 (1992), insurance policies should be read as a whole and
meaning should be given to all terms. “Conflicts between clauses should be harmonized, and a
contract should not be interpreted so as to render it unreasonable.” South Macomb Disposal
Authority v American Ins Co (On Remand), 225 Mich App 635, 653; 572 NW2d 686 (1997).
Using these rules of construction, we conclude that the paragraph plaintiffs cite from Section IX
of the policy applied if defendant canceled the policy before the expiration date. The expiration
date of April 15, 1995, which was clearly stated in the policy, remained in effect without regard
to the issue of any cancellation notices. See generally Munro, supra at 612. No error occurred.
In light of our resolution of plaintiffs’ appeal, we need not address the issue raised by
defendant on cross appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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