PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERTO MARTINEZ VILLA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 220751
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 99-020014-FC
ROBERTO MARTINEZ VILLA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and White and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged of safe breaking, MCL
750.531, possession of burglar tools, MCL 750.116, and receiving or concealing stolen property
over $100, MCL 750.535. He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender to three concurrent
terms of twelve to twenty years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the charged
offenses. We disagree. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could
find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable
inferences that arise from the evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the
crime. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). All conflicts in the
evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452;
569 NW2d 641 (1997).
First, regarding receiving or concealing stolen property, the evidence indicated that the
vehicle used in the offense, a mini-van with a fair market value over $3,500, was stolen from a
used-car lot. Defendant admitted in his statement to the police that he knew the mini-van was
stolen and that codefendant Hart had used a screwdriver to start the van, because the ignition was
missing. There was also evidence that the license plate on the stolen vehicle was registered to
defendant, which would support a finding that defendant participated in possessing or concealing
the vehicle. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find that defendant was guilty
of receiving or concealing stolen property over $100. People v Gow, 203 Mich App 94, 96; 512
NW2d 34 (1993).
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Second, the police found, inside the stolen mini-van, a flat-bladed screwdriver that was
identified as having made the mark on the ATM machine. A flat-blade screwdriver can be a tool
or implement adapted and designed for breaking and entering. See People v Olson, 65 Mich App
224, 229; 237 NW2d 260 (1975). Additionally, a witness testified that he saw one man bent over
the ATM machine, while another man shined a flashlight, thereby indicating that defendant and
codefendant Hart were coparticipants in the offense. The jury could reasonably conclude that
defendant shared constructive possession of the screwdriver, which was found between his
passenger seat and the driver’s seat in the stolen mini-van. See People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich
431, 436-440; 606 NW2d 645 (2000).
Third, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of safe breaking
because only the structure housing the ATM machine was damaged, not the ATM machine itself.
MCL 750.531 provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who, with intent to commit the crime of larceny, or any
felony, . . . shall attempt to break . . . or otherwise injure or destroy any safe,
vault or other depository of money . . . in any building or place, shall, whether he
succeeds or fails in the perpetration of such larceny or felony, be guilty of a
felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or any term of
years. [Emphasis provided.]
In People v DeVriese, 77 Mich App 737, 738; 258 NW2d 93 (1977), this Court stated:
In enacting MCL 750.531; MSA 28.799, the Legislature sought to protect
structures intentionally constructed to protect valuables. People v Ferguson, 60
Mich App 302; 230 NW2d 406 (1975). In our opinion this includes those
constructed by a manufacturer for sale or an individual for his own use so long as
the structure is one which is substantially impenetrable. People v Collins, 273 Cal
App 2d 1; 77 Cal Rptr 741 (1969). The issue of whether a depository is
substantially impenetrable so as to fall within the terms of the statute is a question
of fact. People v Collins, supra.
The evidence at trial indicated that the “kiosk,” which is the structure housing the ATM
machine, was part of the ATM’s security structure for money contained in the vault of the ATM.
There was sufficient evidence that defendant and codefendant Hart sought to break into the ATM
machine and steal money from the vault by first breaking through the outer security structure.
Specifically, the testimony indicated that “the rear door of the ATM machine had been pried
open causing damage to the locking mechanisms.” Thus, there was sufficient evidence to sustain
defendant’s conviction for safe breaking under MCL 750.531.
II
Next, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial
misconduct. We disagree. The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 342; 543 NW2d 342
(1995). Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing
court must examine the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks in
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context. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). The propriety of a
prosecutor’s remarks depends on all the facts of the case. People v Johnson, 187 Mich App 621,
625; 468 NW2d 307 (1991). Prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in
light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial.
People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
We find no merit to defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly diminished the
people’s burden of proof and improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant. Viewing the
challenged remarks in context, it is apparent that the prosecutor was responding to defense
counsel’s statements. We find no indication that the remarks improperly shifted the burden of
proof. Further, any prejudice that may have resulted was sufficiently cured by the trial court’s
instructions that defendant was presumed innocent, that the prosecution had the burden of
proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that what the lawyers said was not
evidence.
Defendant also alleges that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel during
rebuttal closing argument. Because defendant did not object to the challenged remarks, we
review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra at 761764, 774. Because we find nothing in the prosecutor’s remarks that could plainly be construed as
denigration of defense counsel, this issue does not warrant appellate relief.
III
Next, defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to give CJI2d 9.4 regarding
abandonment. We disagree.
The instructions must include all elements of the crime charged and must not exclude
consideration of material issues, defenses, and theories for which there is evidence in support.
People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000). “[W]hen a jury instruction is
requested on any theories or defenses and is supported by evidence, it must be given to the jury
by the trial judge. . . . A trial court is required to give a requested instruction, except where the
theory is not supported by evidence.” People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 245 n 14; 562 NW2d
447 (1997).
Here, the evidence indicated that defendant and codefendant Hart were thwarted in their
attempt to break into the ATM machine due to the arrival of the police, resulting in a subsequent
police chase. Such evidence does not support an abandonment defense. People v Cross, 187
Mich App 204, 206-207; 466 NW2d 368 (1991); People v Stapf, 155 Mich App 491, 495-496;
400 NW2d 656 (1986). Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on
abandonment.
IV
Finally, defendant argues that his double jeopardy rights were violated where he had
previously pleaded guilty in the 54-A District Court in Ingham County to prowling and
interfering with a police animal, contrary to Lansing city ordinances 660.01a and 602.08. We
disagree. Because neither the district court in Ingham County, nor the Eaton Circuit Court had
jurisdiction over all of the offenses, and because the criminal acts in question consist of different
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types of conduct subject to separate prohibitions involving laws intended to prevent different
evils, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss. People v Stiff, 190
Mich App 111; 475 NW2d 59 (1991).
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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