PEOPLE OF MI V JACKIE VERNON SAUNDERS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 221258
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-164146-FH
JACKIE VERNON SAUNDERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Saad and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury conviction of attempted second-degree home
invasion, MCL 750.110a(3) and MCL 750.92. He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender,
MCL 769.12, to six to fifteen years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant’s conviction arose out of an incident that occurred on December 21, 1998. On
that day, at about 2:00 pm, a Southfield police officer patrolling near West Hampton Street, was
approached by a woman. This woman then provided the officer with certain information that
resulted in the officer looking for a black male carrying a large black duffel bag and wearing a
three-quarter length coat and tan baseball cap. While looking for this individual, the officer
noticed sunlight hitting an open storm door of a home and, at the same time, heard the sound of
wood cracking from the same vicinity as the open storm door. On closer inspection, the police
officer noticed defendant, who matched the description given by the woman, standing between
the storm and front doors of the home, trying to gain entry into the home by prying off the
deadbolt of the front door. Instead of immediately approaching defendant, the officer called for
backup and proceeded to wait. However, while waiting for backup, the woman who originally
gave the officer information regarding defendant, pulled up in front of the house, honked her
horn and pointed at defendant. As a result, defendant ran from the scene, eventually being
arrested by another Southfield police officer in the parking lot of a nearby credit union. After
arresting defendant at the scene, officers searched the duffle bag, which contained three
screwdrivers, a ski mask, gloves, clothing, syringe, and a needle.
In furtherance of the investigation, the officer who initially noticed defendant and a K-9
Unit went back to the house where defendant was first observed by the officer. Once there, the
officer noticed that the area around the deadbolt lock of the front door had been chipped off to
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the point that one could actually see into the house. In addition, the K-9 Unit tracked scent from
the front door of the home to the credit union parking lot where defendant was sitting in a police
car. Defendant was then transferred to the police station, where he was advised of his Miranda1
rights and interviewed by the detective in charge of the case.
At trial, the detective testified that defendant admitted during questioning that he was
involved in an attempted breaking and entering on West Hampton and that he had used small
screwdrivers in an attempt to gain entry into the home, but that he had been “scared off” by the
police. The detective also testified that defendant informed him once inside the home, he
intended to get money for methadone. He further testified that defendant admitted he had also
tried to break into a home one street north of West Hampton on the day in question, but that “for
some reason he was spooked off.”2 In contrast, defendant testified that he had tried to break into
both homes but that he abandoned his attempts voluntarily after determining that “it’s not going
to work.” He also testified that he had been a heroin addict since shortly after graduating from
high school and that if he did not have heroin everyday he would get sick. Defendant further
testified that he had used heroin the day before and that if he had broken into either home he was
going to take money so that he could buy methadone.3
I
On appeal, defendant first argues that the prosecutor improperly used a peremptory
challenge to dismiss a potential juror because of her race in violation of Batson v Kentucky, 476
US 79, 96; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). We disagree. This Court’s review of a trial
court’s Batson ruling is for an abuse of discretion. See People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 184;
585 NW2d 357 (1998) and People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 534; 575 NW2d 16 (1997).
In deciding whether a defendant has made a prima facie case of discriminatory dismissal,
the trial court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether there is
a pattern of strikes against black juror, the questions and statements made by the
prosecutor during voir dire and in exercising his challenges, all of which may
support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. [People v Barker, 179
Mich App 702, 705-706; 446 NW2d 549 (1989), citing Batson, supra at 97.]
In bringing forth a prima facie case of discriminatory dismissal, the defendant must show
that: (1) the juror belonged to a recognized racial group, (2) a peremptory challenge was used to
excuse the juror, and (3) the facts and other relevant circumstances must provide an inference
that the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge in an effort to exclude the juror based on race.
Batson, supra at 80. Thus, as stated in Clarke v Kmart Corp (After Remand), 220 Mich App 381,
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
2
It appears as if defendant was charged with this first attempted home invasion separately.
3
Defendant testified that he was thirty-eight-years-old at the time of trial; however, according to
his Presentence Investigation Report (PSIR), defendant would have been forty-eight-years-old in
1999.
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383; 559 NW2d 377 (1996), “the race of a challenged juror alone is not enough to make out a
prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. See also Howard, supra at 536 n 3, citing People v
Williams, 174 Mich App 132, 137; 435 NW2d 469 (1989). In addition, if there is no prima facie
showing of purposeful discrimination, a prosecutor is not required to offer a neutral explanation
for the use of the peremptory challenge. Williams, supra.
Here, although the potential juror was African American and excused through the
prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge, the prosecutor did not ask any questions or make any
comments from which an inference could be made that the use of the peremptory challenge was
motivated by race. In addition, the prosecutor used a total of three peremptory challenges, only
one of which was used to excuse an African American juror, even though the record indicates
that there were at least two African American jurors on the panel. Therefore, because defendant
has failed to show any questions or statements made by the prosecutor that support an inference
of discrimination and since the record does not indicate a pattern of strikes against African
American jurors, defendant has failed to establish a prima facie showing of purposeful
discrimination. See Batson, supra at 97; Barker, supra; Howard, supra. Accordingly, because
defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination, we find that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it implicitly rejected defendant’s Batson challenge. Howard,
supra at 534, 536.4
II
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor made an improper community protection or
civic duty argument in her opening statement and that the argument prejudiced the jury to the
extent that he is entitled to a new trial. However, defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s
opening statement at trial; thus, this issue has not been preserved for appellate review. See
People v Conner, 209 Mich App 419, 422; 531 NW2d 734 (1995). Appellate review of
unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct is precluded unless the prejudicial effect could
not have been cured by a cautionary instruction or if the failure to consider the issue would result
in the miscarriage of justice. People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 626; 601 NW2d 393 (1999);
People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 46; 597 NW2d 176 (1999).
At trial, the prosecutor began her opening statement by saying:
A drug addict who invades the safety and sanctity of home owner’s home
to feed his habit. An individual who preys on home owners, the individual seated
in that chair, the defendant. . . . Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this case will
tell the story of [defendant] and what he does and what he does for a living.
4
Because no prima facie showing under Batson was made, the prosecutor was not required to
articulate a race neutral explanation for the use of the peremptory challenge. Nonetheless, we
note that the prosecutor claimed that she excused the potential juror because of her lower
educational level and her young age; thus, articulating a race neutral explanation for the
prosecutor’s use of the peremptory challenge. See Howard, supra at 534, 536.
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***
When [the victim] left [his] house he had given no one permission to enter
that house. He had given no one permission to pry the door on his house. But
during the course of that afternoon you’re going to learn that something happened
to his house. Something happened to his house at the hands of the man in this
chair, an individual who preys upon home owners. [Emphasis added.]
On appeal, defendant claims that by referring to defendant as an “individual who preys
upon home owners,” the prosecutor made an improper civic duty argument. We disagree. An
improper civic duty argument injects into trial issues broader than the guilt or innocence of a
defendant or encourages the jurors to suspend their powers of judgment. People v Bahoda, 448
Mich 261, 284; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325,
340; 553 NW2d 692 (1996). Here, the prosecutor’s reference to defendant as an “individual who
preys upon home owners” did not inject issues broader than defendant’s guilt or innocence nor
did it encourage the jurors to suspend their powers of judgment; instead, the prosecutor’s opening
statement was a characterization of defendant that was ultimately supported by trial testimony.
Thus, the prosecutor did not appeal to the jurors’ sense of civic duty to convict defendant or
improperly play upon their general fears and prejudices. People v Cross, 202 Mich App 138,
145; 508 NW2d 144 (1993); see also Bahoda, supra at 282-283. Accordingly, because the
prosecutor’s statements were not improper, they could not result in a miscarriage of justice. See
People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996).
III
Next, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed similaracts evidence at trial. Again, we disagree. We review a trial court’s decision to admit similaracts evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785
(1998); People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 715; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). An abuse of
discretion is found when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court
acted, would conclude that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made. Id.; People v
Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996).
MRE 404(b)(1) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case. [Emphasis added.]
In People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205
(1994), the Court clarified the test to be utilized in determining the admissibility of similar-acts
evidence:
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First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b);
second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third,
that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting
instruction to the jury.
It is insufficient for the prosecution to merely recite one of the purposes articulated in MRE
404(b); instead, the prosecution must demonstrate how the similar-act evidence is relevant.
Crawford, supra at 387-388. To this end, we note that:
Relevance is a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at
issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences that make a material fact
at issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. . . .
The logical relationship between the proffered evidence and the ultimate fact
sought to be proven must be closely scrutinized. [Id. (citation and footnote
omitted).]
In the instant case, defendant was charged with attempted second-degree home invasion,
MCL 750.110a(3) and MCL 750.92. In order to prove the attempt, the prosecution was required
to establish that defendant had the specific intent to commit the crime of second-degree home
invasion. See People v Strand, 213 Mich App 100, 103; 539 NW2d 739 (1995). Defendant’s
defense was that he had abandoned his attempt and thus, did not have the specific intent to
commit and complete the crime of second-degree home invasion. In this regard, the prosecutor
argued that defendant’s prior attempt at another home invasion on the same day was relevant to
the issue of intent and showed a planned scheme and system. Thus, the prosecutor articulated a
proper purpose under MRE 404(b). In addition, the similar-acts evidence was logically relevant
and probative. Defendant argued that he abandoned his first attempt at home invasion that day
because he had a change of heart. Yet, shortly thereafter and one street over, defendant again
attempted to break into a home in order to obtain money for methadone. At trial, defendant
argued that he also had a change of heart with regard to the second attempt. Hence, evidence of
the first attempt was relevant to the issue of whether defendant had the specific intent to break
into the second home. Accordingly, the evidence was highly probative of the issue of intent,
providing the jury with evidence that defendant was desperate to break into a home and get
money for methadone and that, after his first, failed attempt, his intention was to succeed in
entering the second home. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to
admit evidence of defendant’s first attempted home invasion and conclude that the danger of
unfair prejudice from the admission of the evidence did not substantially outweigh the highly
probative value of the evidence. See People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 57-58; 614
NW2d 888 (2000) and People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 741; 556 NW2d 851 (1996).
IV
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Defendant also contends that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of malicious destruction of property, MCL 750.377a,5 constituted error
requiring reversal. We disagree.
We first note that defendant never requested that the jury be instructed with regard to the
lesser included offense of malicious destruction of property. In addition, before the jury
instructions were read, defense counsel specifically indicated to the judge that he had no disputes
with the instructions and also indicated that after the judge instructed the jury that he had no
objections to the instructions as given. Thus, pursuant to People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 216;
612 NW2d 144 (2000) and People v Tate, 244 Mich App 553, 558; 624 NW2d 524 (2001),
defendant has waived review of this issue. See also People v Taylor, 159 Mich App 468, 488;
406 NW2d 859 (1987).
In any event, assuming defendant has not waived appellate review of this issue, we note
that this Court has previously indicated that a trial court has no duty to sua sponte instruct on
lesser included offenses. See People v Reese, 242 Mich App 626, 629; 619 NW2d 708 (2000)
and People v Kuchar, 225 Mich App 74, 77-78; 569 NW2d 920 (1997). See also People v
Stephens, 416 Mich 252, 261; 330 NW2d 675 (1982) (except for cases involving first-degree
murder, there is no duty to instruct sua sponte on lesser included offenses) and People v
Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 386, 403; 585 NW2d 1 (1998). Therefore, as a matter of law, a trial
court need not sua sponte instruct a jury on malicious destruction of property in a second-degree
home invasion case. Reese, supra; Kuchar, supra. In addition, we also note that defense counsel
informed the jury during her opening statement that defendant was not charged with destroying
property. Thus, defendant’s strategy appears to have been an “all or nothing” strategy. If the jury
believed defendant’s theory of the case, he would have been acquitted. With instruction on an
intermediary charge of malicious destruction of property, there was a greater chance that
defendant would have been convicted of at least one crime. Accordingly, because the trial court
had no duty to sua sponte instruct on the lesser offense, Reese, supra; Stephens, surpra, and since
defendant (1) informed the jury that defendant was not being charged with destruction of
property, (2) failed to request the malicious destruction of property instruction, and (3) indicated
on the record that he did not object to the instructions as given, we conclude that the trial court
committed no error in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of malicious
destruction of property. Cf People v Bulger, 462 Mich App 495, 569; 614 NW2d 103 (2000);
People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 520; 583 NW2d 199 (1998) (A defendant may not harbor
error as an appellate parachute.).
5
MCL 750.377a, at the time defendant committed this crime, provided:
Any person who shall willfully and maliciously destroy or injure the
personal property of another, by any means not particularly mentioned or
described in the preceding section, if the damage resulting from such injury shall
exceed $100.00, shall be guilty of a felony. If the damage done shall be $100.00
or less, such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
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V
Defendant also claims that the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of flight
constituted error requiring reversal. As stated previously, we ordinarily review a trial court’s
decision regarding the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Schutte, supra; People v
Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 419; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). However, because defendant failed to
object to the admission of the evidence about which he now complains, he has failed to preserve
the issue for our review. We therefore review the admission of “flight” evidence under the plain
error rule, People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), to determine whether
plain error occurred that affected defendant’s substantial rights. Id. In order to be plain, the error
must be clear or obvious. Id. In order to show that substantial rights have been affected, a
defendant is generally required to show that the lower court proceedings were affected by the
error, therefore causing prejudice to the defendant. Id. Further, if a defendant is able to show
these three requirements, we must exercise our discretion in deciding whether to reverse a
defendant’s convictions. Id. To this end,
[r]eversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the
conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error “‘seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings’
independent of the defendant’s innocence.” [Id., quoting United States v Olano,
507 US 725, 736-737; 113 S CT 1770; 123 L Ed 508 (1993).]
Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed officers to testify
that he was arrested after running from the crime scene, being chased by an officer, and after
failing to stop when ordered. This evidence is classic evidence of flight and, as such, was clearly
admissible:
It is well established in Michigan law that evidence of flight is admissible.
Such evidence is probative because it may indicate consciousness of guilt,
although evidence of flight by itself is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The
term “flight” has been applied to such actions as fleeing the scene of the crime,
leaving the jurisdiction, running from the police, resisting arrest, and attempting to
escape custody. [People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 4; 532 NW2d 885 (1995),
citing 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 532, p 608.]
Further, the trial court read the jury CJI2d 4.4,6 which properly instructed the jury that they were
allowed to consider the evidence of flight in determining whether defendant’s actions of fleeing
6
At trial, the trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CJI2d 4.4, as follows:
There has been some evidence that the defendant ran away after the
alleged crime or after the police tried to arrest him.
This evidence does not prove guilt. A person may run or hid for innocent
reasons, such as panic, mistake or fear. However, a person may also run or hide
because of a consciousness of guilt.
(continued…)
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the scene show that he had a guilty state of mind. Id.; People v Taylor,195 Mich App 57, 63-64;
489 NW2d 99 (1992). Accordingly, defendant has failed to show plain error affecting his
substantial rights. Carines, supra.
VI
Defendant next argues that his sentence appears to have been based, at least in part, upon
his failure to plead guilty. Sentencing decisions are reviewed by this Court for an abuse of
discretion. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 661; 608 NW2d 123 (1999).
While it is true that a sentencing court “may not consider a defendant’s refusal to plead
guilty” when imposing a sentence, People v Rabb, 112 Mich App 430, 432; 316 NW2d 446
(1982), nothing in the record of the trial or sentencing hearing supports defendant’s allegation
that the trial court improperly considered defendant’s refusal to plead guilty. Instead, defendant
supports his argument by way of an affidavit attached to his amended motion for a new trial. In
that affidavit, defendant states that he was informed by his counsel that he would receive a
maximum of two years’ imprisonment if he pleaded guilty. Despite this claim, there is no
evidence suggesting that the trial court was aware of any sentencing agreement negotiations
between the prosecutor and defense counsel. In addition, even if the trial court had been aware
of sentencing negotiations between defendant and the prosecutor, the court was not bound by
those agreements. See People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189, 206-207; 330 NW2d 834 (1982).
Thus, even if defense counsel discussed a certain sentence with defendant in exchange for a plea,
the trial court did not have to accept that sentence. Id. at 207. Therefore, we conclude that the
trial court was within its discretion when it sentenced defendant to six to fifteen years’
imprisonment. Noble, supra.
VII
Defendant also argues that his sentence was disproportionate and that the trial court
improperly sentenced him based on his past record without consideration of the seriousness, or
lack thereof, of the current offense. Again, we disagree. This Court reviews a sentence imposed
by the trial court under the habitual offender statute for an abuse of discretion. People v
Hansford (After Remand), 454 Mich 320, 326; 562 NW2d 460 (1997); People v Reynolds, 240
Mich App 250, 252; 611 NW2d 316 (2000). See also People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608,
621; 591 NW2d 669 (1998). A sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is
disproportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
offender. Id., citing People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636, 654; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). A
trial court does not abuse its discretion in sentencing an habitual offender within the statutory
limits when the offender’s underlying felony, in the context of previous felonies, indicates the
(…continued)
You must decide whether the evidence is true, and, if true, whether it
shows that the defendant had a guilty state of mind.
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defendant’s inability to conform his conduct to the laws of society. Reynolds, supra; Hanford,
supra.
At sentencing, the trial court first recognized that defendant’s record was “dismal,”
having been previously convicted of breaking and entering and being incarcerated for five to
thirty years as a result of that conviction. The court then indicated that because of this past
conviction, as well as discipline and punishment of defendant, protection of society, potential for
reformation, and for deterrence of others, she was sentencing defendant to prison for six to
fifteen years. In addition, having heard testimony in the case, the trial court was clearly aware of
the details of the crime, as evidenced in its decision to order restitution in the exact amount of the
victim’s insurance deductible. Further, the trial court was familiar with the Presentence
Investigation Report, which indicated that defendant had been convicted of eight felonies and
three misdemeanors, and that he was on parole at the time of the instant crime. Thus, because
the trial court articulated appropriate factors in sentencing defendant, see Rice, supra at 445-446,
and because defendant’s record indicates an inability to conform his conduct to the law,
Reynolds, supra; Hanford, supra; and since both defendant’s minimum and maximum sentence
are within the statutory guidelines for habitual offenders, we conclude that his sentence was
proportionate and that the trial court acted within its discretion in assessing a six to fifteen year
sentence. Id.; see also MCL 769.12 and 750.92(2).7 Moreover, because defendant’s sentence
was proportionate to the underlying crime and within the statutory guidelines, defendant’s
argument that his sentence is either cruel or unusual has no merit. Cf People v Poole, 218 Mich
App 702, 715, 555 NW2d 485 (1996); Launsburry, supra at 363.
VIII
7
MCL 769.12 provides, in part:
(1) If a person has been convicted of any combination of 3 or more
felonies or attempts to commit felonies . . . and that person commits a subsequent
felony within this state, the person shall be punished upon conviction of the
subsequent felony . . . as follows:
(a) If the subsequent felony is punishable upon a first conviction by
imprisonment for a maximum term of 5 years or more or for life, the court . . .
may sentence the person to imprisonment for life or for a lesser term.
To this end, MCL 750.92(2) provides:
If the offense so attempted to be committed is punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison for life, or for 5 years or more, the person convicted of such attempt
shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not
more than 5 years or in the county jail not more than 1 year.
Further, the statutory sentence for second-degree home invasion is any term of years up to 15
years. See MCL 750.110a(6).
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Finally, defendant contends that because his counsel failed to call the woman who
brought defendant to the attention of the police as witness, he was deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel. Because defendant never requested a Ginther8 hearing below, our review
is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566
NW2d 649 (1997). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a respondent must
show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, but for
counsel’s error, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have
been different, thus depriving respondent of a fair trial. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). In addition, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of
counsel regarding matters of trial strategy and counsel’s decision regarding whether to call a
particular witness is presumed to be matters of trial strategy. People v Rockney, 237 Mich App
74, 76; People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Here, because the witness alerted the police to look for defendant on the day of the crime,
she was obviously suspicious of defendant. Thus, after a thorough review of the record, we find
that counsel’s decision not to call the witness was not objectively unreasonable, see Rockney,
supra at 78, and therefore conclude that defendant cannot overcome the presumption that his
counsel’s failure to call the witness was sound trial strategy. Id. at 76; People v Tommolino, 187
Mich App 14, 17; 466 NW2d 315 (1991). As such, defendant has not met his burden of
demonstrating that his counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and so prejudicial as
to deprive him of a fair trial. Stanaway, supra; People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d
797 (1994).
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
8
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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