TITAN INSURANCE COMPANY V JACK L SEIFERT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TITAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 6, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
JACK L. SEIFERT and CINDY LYNN LaBELLE,
No. 230956
Houghton Circuit Court
LC No. 97-010227-CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Markey and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Titan Insurance Company appeals as of right a judgment entered following a
jury verdict declaring that it must defend and indemnify its insured defendant Cindy LaBelle in
an automobile negligence action filed by defendant Jack L. Seifert.1 We affirm.
I
Titan first argues that the trial court failed to follow the law of the case doctrine when it
instructed the jury on remand. We disagree. This Court reviews instructional errors de novo,
examining the jury instructions as a whole to determine if there is error requiring reversal. Case
v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000). This Court will reverse for
instructional error where the failure to do so would be inconsistent with substantial justice. MCR
2.613(a); Johnson v Corbet, 423 Mich 304, 326; 377 NW2d 713 (1985).
Titan’s argument is without merit. When this Court reverses a case and remands it for
trial because a material issue of fact exists, the law of the case doctrine does not apply because
the first appeal was not decided on the merits. Brown v Drake-Willock Int’l, Ltd, 209 Mich App
136, 144; 530 NW2d 510 (1995), citing Borkus v Michigan Nat’l Bank, 117 Mich App 662, 666;
324 NW2d 123 (1982). See also In re Forfeiture of $19,250, 209 Mich App 20, 30; 530 NW2d
759 (1995). The trial court did not err in directing the jury to make determinations additional to
those this Court required on remand.
1
This case was previously before this Court when Titan successfully appealed the trial court’s
June 17, 1998, order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Titan Ins Co v
Seifert, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 23, 2000 (Docket
No. 212840).
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Furthermore, we note plaintiff concedes that the following first special verdict question to
the jury was proper: “Did Ms. LaBelle intend and expect to collide her vehicle with that of Mr.
Seifert?” Because the jury answered “no,” error, if any, in giving the objected-to second
question was harmless. MCR 2.613(A); People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 485-486; 581 NW2d
229 (1998). As the Supreme Court reiterated in Graves, because jurors are presumed to follow
their instructions, there is no basis to assume that the jury’s verdict was a product of
compromise. On the basis that the jury’s answer to the first special verdict question resolved the
dispositive factual issue of the case, even if the second question was erroneous, error requiring
reversal did not occur. Id.
II
Titan next argues the trial court committed error requiring reversal in allowing Seifert to
testify briefly regarding his injuries. We disagree. This Court reviews evidentiary issues for an
abuse of discretion. Tobin v Providence Hosp, 244 Mich App 626, 638; 624 NW2d 548 (2001).
An abuse of discretion occurs only if an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the
trial court acted, would say that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made.
Roulston v Tendercare (Michigan), Inc, 239 Mich App 270, 282; 608 NW2d 525 (2000).
Only relevant evidence is admissible. MRE 402; Tobin, supra at 637. Relevant evidence
is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tobin,
supra at 637, citing MRE 401. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury. MRE 403; Roulston, supra at 282-283.
The main issue at trial was whether LaBelle intended and expected to collide her vehicle
into Seifert’s vehicle. LaBelle’s insurance policy specifically excludes coverage for any person
“intentionally causing bodily injury or property damage.” Seifert’s injuries were simply not
relevant in determining LaBelle’s coverage under the Titan insurance policy because those
injuries did not tend to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable.
However, when viewed in the overall context of this trial, the testimony regarding
Seifert’s injuries was brief and passing – consisting of only two pages of the trial transcript. In
addressing plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude any evidence regarding Seifert’s injuries,
Seifert’s counsel represented, “Your Honor, I think that the injuries which can be covered in a
fairly brief and summary fashion are part of the res gestae of the entire incident.” The trial judge
denied plaintiff’s motion but cautioned that personal injury damages were not at issue and
therefore should be addressed only briefly:
The Court: . . . Obviously, this trial isn’t one in which Mr. Seifert will be
getting any damages once the jury returns a verdict, so it’s certainly not necessary
to spend a half a day on it. But I think in fairness that you should have the
opportunity to explain to the jury what it is that occurred to him as a result of this
collision.
At oral argument in this Court, Seifert’s counsel further argued that in order for the jury
to understand why Mr. Seifert was a party defendant in the action between Titan Insurance
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Company and its insured, it was necessary for the jury to know that Seifert was alleging personal
injuries arising out of the automobile accident. Although Seifert’s injuries were technically not
relevant, we agree that some background information in this regard was helpful to the jury’s
understanding of the case. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court advisory committee
note to FRE 401 (which is identical to MRE 401) recognizes the admissibility of background
evidence: “Evidence which is essentially background in nature can scarcely be said to involve
disputed matter, yet it is universally offered and admitted as an aid to understanding.” Under
these circumstances, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion with regard to
this evidentiary ruling. Tobin, supra; Roulston, supra. In addition, because the personal injury
testimony was “covered in a fairly brief and summary fashion,” if error occurred, it was
harmless. MCR 2.613(A). Temple v Kelel Distributing Co, Inc, 183 Mich App 326, 328-330;
454 NW2d 610 (1990); Henson v Veteran’s Cab Co of Flint, 384 Mich 486, 494; 185 NW2d 383
(1971).
III
Plaintiff Titan also contends the trial court erred by not giving two requested jury
instructions. We disagree. Generally, this Court reviews claims of instructional error de novo,
Hilgendorf v St John Hosp & Medical Center Corp, 245 Mich App 670, 694; 630 NW2d 356
(2001). However, we review a trial court’s determination whether supplemental instructions are
applicable and accurate for an abuse of discretion. Stoddard v Manufacturers Nat’l Bank of
Grand Rapids, 234 Mich App 140, 162; 593 NW2d 630 (1999). After reviewing Titan’s
requested jury instructions, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the
requested instructions were not supported by the evidence. Hilgendorf, supra at 694-695.
IV
Finally, plaintiff Titan argues that the trial court erred when it failed to grant its renewed
motion for summary disposition. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s grant or denial
of summary disposition de novo. Pinckney Community Schools v Continental Casualty Co, 213
Mich App 521, 525; 540 NW2d 748 (1995).
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a
claim. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The evidence must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cole v LadBroke Racing Michigan,
Inc, 241 Mich App 1, 7; 614 NW2d 169 (2000). A party bringing a motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10) must specifically set forth the issues where no genuine issue of material fact is
alleged. MCR 2.116(G)(4). When this is done, the non-moving party must, by affidavits or
otherwise, set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Cole, supra at 7.
The non-moving party cannot merely rest on allegations or denials. Id. In determining whether
to grant summary disposition, the trial court must consider all affidavits, pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and other documentary evidence filed or submitted with the motion and answer.
MCR 2.116(G)(5); Roberson, supra at 324-325.
Summary disposition is rarely appropriate in cases involving questions of credibility,
intent, or state of mind. Michigan Nat’l Bank-Oakland v Wheeling, 165 Mich App 738, 744-745;
419 NW2d 746 (1988). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
we hold that the trial court did not err by denying Titan’s motion for summary disposition
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because there was contradictory evidence presented regarding whether Ms. LaBelle intended and
expected to collide her vehicle with that of Mr. Seifert.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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