YOLANDA LUDINGTON V ARMAND VELARDO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
YOLANDA LUDINGTON,
UNPUBLISHED
October 19, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 223086
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 99-001383-PP
ARMAND VELARDO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Saad and Whitbeck, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Pursuant to MCR 3.709, respondent Armand Velardo appeals as of right the trial court’s
order denying his motion to “terminate” the personal protection order (PPO) against him. We
dismiss this appeal as moot.
I. Procedural History
The parties to this action are former spouses. On March 11, 1999, the trial court issued
an ex parte PPO, effective until September 9, 1999, to petitioner Yolanda Ludington. The PPO
restrained Velardo from having any contact with Ludington or her children from another
marriage. On March 15, 1999, Ludington moved to extend the PPO so that it would be in force
for sixty years. Two weeks later, Velardo moved to set aside the PPO. On August 11, 1999, the
trial court entered an order extending the PPO until September 9, 2001. After hearing arguments,
but not evidence, on the motion to set aside the PPO, the trial court entered an order on October
4, 1999, denying Velardo’s motion. In doing so, the trial court relied on the knowledge it had of
the parties’ relationship from a separate equitable parenthood action.
II. Appeal
On appeal, Velardo substantively challenges the standards the trial court applied when
granting the ex parte PPO, the sufficiency of Ludington’s allegations in the petition, and the trial
court’s failure to hold a full hearing on his motion to set aside the PPO. The PPO in effect at the
time Velardo filed this appeal expired approximately one week before the panel heard oral
arguments in this case.
At oral arguments, the panel pressed Velardo’s attorney to articulate what remedy this
Court could order that the PPO’s expiration would not already provide. In effect, this Court was
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suggesting the possibility that this case was moot.1 We have now concluded that this case is
moot because we have no basis to conclude that we can “fashion appropriate and effective relief
to resolve the alleged controversy.”2 Velardo’s attorney nevertheless contended that this case
presents important questions of public interest.3 We do not agree. Further, we are confident that
if these issues arise again in the future, they will not continue to escape review and will arise in a
case where a remedy will be available.4 Thus, we conclude that it is unnecessary to address the
substance of Velardo’s claims.
Appeal dismissed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
See B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998).
2
School Dist of East Grand Rapids, Kent Co v Kent Co Tax Allocation Bd, 415 Mich 381, 391;
330 NW2d 7 (1982).
3
See Mead v Batchlor, 435 Mich 480, 487-488; 460 NW2d 493 (1990) (explaining public
interest exception to mootness doctrine).
4
See In re Closure of Preliminary Examination, 200 Mich App 566, 568; 505 NW2d 24 (1993)
(Even though it is moot, “we will review the issue raised because it is one of public significance
and is likely to recur in the future yet evade appellate review.”).
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