CITY OF DETROIT V 132 TEMPLE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CITY OF DETROIT,
UNPUBLISHED
October 19, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 220591
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-825055-CH
2942 CASS and CASS PARK, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
CITY OF DETROIT,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 220592
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-825058-CH
138 TEMPLE, CASS PARK, INC., JACK
HAGOPIAN and PEGGY P. HAGOPIAN,
Defendants-Appellants.
CITY OF DETROIT,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 220593
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-825060-CH
132 TEMPLE, CASS PARK, INC., JACK
HAGOPIAN and PEGGY P. HAGOPIAN,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and White and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
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Defendants appeal as of right orders granting plaintiff’s motions for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm but remand for entry of amended judgments of tax
foreclosure.
First, defendants contend that plaintiff’s procedures for collecting its real estate taxes are
not in conformity with the statutory requirements of the state general tax laws. We disagree.
Plaintiff is a home rule city with the power to levy taxes. MCL 117.1 et seq. Home rule
cities have power to make all reasonable provisions for the collection of these taxes. Detroit v
Walker, 445 Mich 682, 689; 520 NW2d 135 (1994).
However, defendants assert that plaintiff’s city charter cannot be enforced because it
conflicts with the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq. We disagree. MCL
211.107(1) states:
The requirements of this act relating to the amount and imposition of interest,
penalties, collection or administration fees, the procedures for collection of taxes,
and the enforcement of tax liens are applicable to all cities and villages if not
inconsistent with their respective charters or an ordinance enacted pursuant to
their respective charters.
MCL 211.107(1) plainly and unambiguously provides that if there is a conflict between the
GPTA and plaintiff’s city charter, the charter governs. “It is difficult to see how the Detroit City
Charter provisions can be inconsistent with an act which provides that charter provisions
override the provisions of the act.” Fink v Detroit, 124 Mich App 44, 53; 333 NW2d 376
(1983).1
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it held that defendants’ tax deeds
did not convey to defendants absolute title to the properties in question. Again, we disagree.
MCL 211.72 states:
The tax deeds convey an absolute title to the land sold, and constitute conclusive
evidence of title, in fee, in the grantee, subject, however, to all taxes assessed and
levied on the land subsequent to the taxes for which the land was bid off. This
title also is subject to unpaid special assessments and unpaid installments of
special assessments.
“The first criterion in determining legislative intent is the specific language of the statute.”
Howard v Clinton Charter Twp, 230 Mich App 692, 695; 584 NW2d 644 (1998). As the statute
states, the tax deed by which defendants claim an interest in the properties did not extinguish
1
Defendants rely on Magee v Detroit, 203 Mich App 228; 511 NW2d 717 (1994). However,
Magee did not consider MCL 211.107(1). Further, the decision was based, at least in part, on a
finding that the taxing authorities had violated the city charter by failing to properly record
payment of delinquent city taxes. Magee, supra at 232-233.
-2-
taxes for years after the tax year at issue at the tax sale, i.e., 1987. Defendants are therefore liable
for taxes assessed and levied for 1988 and following years. See, e.g., Ottaco, Inc v Guaze, 226
Mich App 646, 652; 574 NW2d 393 (1997).
Accordingly, plaintiff was entitled to foreclose on the liens on the properties for taxes
owed for the years 1988 through 1995. In accordance with the city charter, these properties were
deemed sold to the financial director and, after two years transpired, plaintiff was entitled to
bring a civil action to foreclose on the liens on these properties. Consequentially, the circuit
court did not err when it determined that defendants’ tax deeds did not extinguish the delinquent
city taxes on the properties in questions with respect to those tax years.
Nonetheless, defendants argue, and plaintiff concedes, that a relatively small amount of
the unpaid taxes that form the basis for the contested judgments was assessed and levied in 1987
or before. Under the statute, the tax deeds granted “absolute title” subject only to tax liability for
later years. We remand for entry of amended judgments of tax foreclosure limited to amounts
owing for taxes levied and assessed for 1988 through 1995.2 Further, the amended judgments
should provide defendants sixty days from the date of their entry to make payment, as required by
the city charter.
We affirm but remand for entry of amended judgments consistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
2
The precedents relied upon by our dissenting colleague to find pre-sale tax liability did not
consider the statutory language at issue here and, accordingly, we do not consider them authority
upon which to ignore the clear language employed by the Legislature.
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