THOMAS TROMPETER V CATHOLIC FAMILY SERVICES SAGINAW DIOCESE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THOMAS TROMPETER,
UNPUBLISHED
September 25, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 221658
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 95-007773-NZ
CATHOLIC FAMILY SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Sawyer and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The trial court originally entered a judgment on the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff on
his wrongful termination claim in the amount of $648,317.92. Thereafter, the trial court granted
defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that it should have
granted defendant’s earlier motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff appeals, and defendant
cross appeals. We reverse and reinstate the original jury verdict.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant as the executive director for Catholic Family
Services of the Diocese of Saginaw (CFS). His employment was terminated in 1992 and in
1995, he filed the instant action, alleging wrongful termination/breach of contract and age
discrimination (plaintiff was sixty-one years old at the time of his termination). Defendant
moved for summary disposition, arguing that the employment manual compelled arbitration.
The trial court denied the motion, concluding that an arbitration provision is enforceable in an
employment contract only if the contract is mutually binding, relying on Heurtebise v Reliable
Business Computers, Inc, 452 Mich 405; 550 NW2d 241 (1996). The trial court concluded that,
because the employment manual in the case at bar could be modified at any time by defendant,
there was not a mutually binding contract and, therefore, the arbitration provision in the
employment manual was not enforceable.
However, after the trial court’s denial of summary disposition, this Court issued its
opinion in Rushton v Meijer, Inc (On Remand), 225 Mich App 156; 570 NW2d 271 (1997),
overruled in part on other grounds Rembert v Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc, 235 Mich App
118; 576 NW2d 208 (1999). In Rushton, we held that parties may be contractually bound to an
employment manual even where the employer reserves the right to unilaterally change the
manual. Id. at 163-164. Thus, in light of Rushton, the trial court concluded that it had
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previously erred in denying summary disposition and, therefore, granted defendant’s motion for
judgment NOV and concluded that the matter should have been submitted to binding arbitration.
On appeal, plaintiff raises a number of challenges to the arbitration issue, one of which
we find persuasive. Plaintiff argues that because the arbitration agreement contains no provision
for enforcement of the arbitration award in circuit court, it constituted common-law arbitration
rather than statutory arbitration and, as such, was revocable by either party at any time before the
announcement of an arbitration award. We agree.
This Court reviewed the differences between statutory and common-law arbitration in
Hetrick v David A Friedman, DPM, PC, 237 Mich App 264, 268-269; 602 NW2d 603 (1999):
According to this Court’s interpretation of the Michigan arbitration act
(MAA) [MCL 600.5001 et seq.], parties that want their arbitration agreement to
be a statutory arbitration agreement must “ ‘clearly evidence that intent by a
contract provision for entry of judgment upon the award by the circuit court.’ ”
Tellkamp [v Walverine Mut Ins Co, 219 Mich App 231, 237; 556 NW2d 504
(1996)], quoting EE Tripp Excavating Contractor, Inc v Jackson Co, 60 Mich
App 221, 237; 230 NW2d 556 (1975). Statutory arbitration agreements are
irrevocable except by mutual consent. MCL 600.5011; MSA 27A.5011.
In contrast, if the arbitration agreement does not provide “that judgment
shall be entered in accordance with the arbitrators’ decision,” the contract
involves common-law arbitration rather than statutory arbitration. Eattie v
Autostyle Plastics, Inc, 217 Mich App 572, 578 ; 552 NW2d 181 (1996) (citing
MCL 600.5001 et seq.; MSA 27A.5001 et seq.). Under the “unilateral revocation
rule,” when the agreement is for common law arbitration, either party may
unilaterally revoke the arbitration agreement at any time before the announcement
of an award, regardless of which party initiated the arbitration. Tony Andreski,
Inc v Ski Brule, Inc, 190 Mich App 343, 347-348; 475 NW2d 469 (1991).
The arbitration provisions in the employment manual in the case at bar do not provide for
an entry of judgment upon the arbitration award in circuit court. Therefore, under Hetrick, this
case involves a common-law arbitration agreement which plaintiff may revoke at any time
before the announcement of an arbitration award. Because no such award has been announced,
plaintiff has effectively revoked the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the trial court should
not have granted judgment NOV and ordered arbitration.
In light of our resolution of the above issue, we need not address the remaining issues
raised by plaintiff. It is, however, necessary to address the issues raised by defendant on cross
appeal.
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict
on plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Defendant claims that, because plaintiff admitted during
his testimony that there was no promise of guaranteed employment, plaintiff’s claim must fail.
We disagree.
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Defendant points to testimony by plaintiff which admits that no one made any promise of
a guaranteed job, that is, that plaintiff could never be separated or fired from his job as area
director for the Saginaw area. Defendant’s argument, however, is based on the assumption that
the basis for plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is that defendant agreed never to again combine
the positions of executive director and area director and, as part of that agreement, to never fire
plaintiff from the area director position. Plaintiff’s claim, however, is broader than that.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was a just cause employee and that he was discharged
without just cause. Indeed, defendant admitted that plaintiff was a just cause employee.
Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether defendant had made a promise not to again combine
the positions of executive director and area director, and whether plaintiff relied on such a
promise in 1989 when deciding to step down as executive director and continue on as area
director, is not dispositive of plaintiff’s claim. That is, plaintiff’s claim could be successful even
without a promise of a guaranteed job by defendant. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict on this issue. Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich
675, 681-682; 385 NW2d 586 (1986).
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying its request to give the
following supplemental instruction:
You are instructed that an employer has good cause to lay off or terminate
an employee where the employer lays off or terminates the employee because of
legitimate economic reasons. Moreover, although the economic reasons must be
legitimate to justify the layoff or termination, the economic reasons need not rise
to the level of necessity to justify the layoff or termination.
The trial court denied the request, concluding the point was adequately covered by the general or
standard instructions the court was going to give. In fact, the trial court gave the following
instruction on this point:
The defendant has the burden of proving that it had a good or just cause to
cease employing the plaintiff. In order to decide whether there was good or just
cause to cease employing the plaintiff, you must determine whether the defendant
had legitimate economic reasons for ceasing to employ the plaintiff and whether
those economic reasons where the actual reason for ceasing to employ the
plaintiff. If the defendant did not have legitimate economic reasons or if those
economic reasons were not the actual reason for ceasing to employ the plaintiff,
then there was not good or just cause.
Defendant’s requested instruction accurately stated the law, McDonald v Stroh Brewery Co, 191
Mich App 601, 608; 478 NW2d 669 (1991), and we are satisfied that the instruction given by the
trial court adequately and fairly instructed the jury. Id.
Finally, defendant argues that the damage award should have been limited to six (6)
months’ wages as provided for in the personnel policy manual. We disagree. The damage
limitation provision is part of the arbitration provisions of the manual. Therefore, revocation of
the arbitration agreement necessarily includes revocation of the damage limitation provision.
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Reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment on the jury
verdict as rendered. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff may tax costs.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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