IN RE SLAYBAUGH MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ALLEN SLAYBAUGH and
TRAVIS SLAYBAUGH, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 229257
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-110651-NA
MELISSA SLAYBAUGH,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
GERALD SLAYBAUGH, JR.,
Respondent.
In the Matter of ALLEN SLAYBAUGH and
TRAVIS SLAYBAUGH, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 229678
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-110651-NA
GERALD SLAYBAUGH,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MELISSA SLAYBAUGH,
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Respondent.
Before: Collins, P.J., and Murphy and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent Melissa Slaybaugh appeals by leave granted
from a family court order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Respondent Gerald Slaybaugh appeals by right from the same
order that terminated his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii). We affirm.
Docket No. 229257
With regard to respondent Melissa Slaybaugh’s sole issue on appeal, we find no basis for
reversing the order terminating her parental rights. The family court did not clearly err in finding
that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence.
MCR 5.974(I); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Further,
while the family court went beyond MCL 712A.19b(5) by affirmatively finding that termination
was in the children’s best interests, this does not warrant appellate relief, inasmuch as the
evidence did not show that termination of respondent Melissa Slaybaugh’s parental rights was
clearly not in the children’s best interests. Trejo, supra, p 357. Thus, the family court did not
clearly err in terminating respondent Melissa Slaybaugh’s parental rights to the children.
Docket No. 229678
Respondent Gerald Slaybaugh raises four issues; however, we do not find any issue that
requires reversal.
We first consider respondent Gerald Slaybaugh’s claim of evidentiary error. Specifically,
we address respondent’s claims that the evidentiary rules apply to the family court’s
jurisdictional ruling and that the family court’s determination that MCL 712A.2(b)(1) was
established lacked evidentiary support.
We hold that respondent has not established any basis for disturbing the family court’s
determination of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1). In re S R, 229 Mich App 310, 314; 581
NW2d 291 (1998); In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 476-477; 484 NW2d 672 (1992). The family
court’s statement that it acquired jurisdiction on the basis of respondent Melissa Slaybaugh’s plea
of admission accurately reflected what occurred in the case. The notice deficiency that was
found to exist affected only respondent Gerald Slaybaugh’s rights. See In re Terry, 240 Mich
App 14, 21; 610 NW2d 563 (2000) (notice of proceedings is a personal right). Moreover,
although holding a joint hearing for both respondents on the supplemental petition, the family
court indicated during the course of both the hearing and in its written opinion that it was
deciding the jurisdictional issue with respect to respondent Gerald Slaybaugh using a
preponderance of legally admissible evidence standard. Therefore, while acknowledging that the
rules of evidence apply to the jurisdictional question, MCR 5.972(C)(1), respondent Gerald
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Slaybaugh has not demonstrated that the family court used an incorrect evidentiary standard or
that there was an insufficient evidentiary basis for the court to acquire jurisdiction.
Next, the family court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Steve Simmons to provide
expert testimony in the field of family and child therapy. MRE 702 and MRE 703, and see
generally In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 50-51; 501 NW2d 231 (1993) (abuse of discretion
standard applies in reviewing evidentiary rulings); see also People v Gambrell, 429 Mich 401,
407; 415 NW2d 202 (1987).
Lastly, having considered respondent Gerald Slaybaugh’s claims concerning the evidence
of services in the case and the family court’s findings of fact with regard to the issue of
termination of his parental rights, we are not persuaded that the family court clearly erred in
finding that § 19b(3)(a)(ii) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I);
Trejo, supra, pp 356-357. Nor has respondent shown that termination of his parental rights was
clearly not in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra, p 354.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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