PEOPLE OF MI V TRENT MAURICE CARR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 219074
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 98-003315-FC
TRENT MAURICE CARR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J. and Hood and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of first-degree premeditated murder,
MCL 750.316(1)(a), armed robbery, MCL 750.529, kidnapping, MCL 750.349, carjacking, MCL
750.529a(1), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“felony-firearm”),
MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for the first-degree premeditated murder conviction, fifteen to thirty years’
imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction, and twenty-five to fifty years’ imprisonment for
the kidnapping conviction, to be served consecutively to a term of two years’ imprisonment for
the felony-firearm conviction and a term of twenty-five to fifty years’ imprisonment for the
carjacking conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a separate trial
from codefendant Reginald White. We disagree. The decision to sever or join defendants is
within the discretion of the trial court. People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 331, 346; 524 NW2d 682
(1994), citing MCL 768.5 and MCR 6.121(D).
A defendant does not have an absolute right to a separate trial, and strong policy favors
joint trials in the interest of judicial economy. People v Etheridge, 196 Mich App 43, 52; 492
NW2d 490 (1992). Severance is mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only when a defendant
demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is the necessary
means of rectifying the potential prejudice. Hana, supra. Severance is required where the
defenses are mutually exclusive or irreconcilable, not merely where they are inconsistent. Id. at
349. In addition, severance is mandated only when a defendant provides the court with a
supporting affidavit, or makes an offer of proof, that “clearly, affirmatively, and fully
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demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is the necessary
means of rectifying the potential prejudice.” Id. at 346. The failure to make this showing in the
trial court, absent any significant indication on appeal that the requisite prejudice in fact occurred
at trial, precludes reversal of a joinder decision. Id. at 346-347.
Here, defendant and White’s joint trial involved numerous witnesses and substantially
identical evidence. To hold two trials on these substantially identical cases would have been
unnecessarily duplicative and excessive. As such, the interests of justice, judicial economy and
orderly administration clearly called for a joint trial. Further, each defendant had a separate jury
and each jury was excused when appropriate in order to avoid prejudice because of potentially
antagonistic defenses. We have approved the use of dual juries to avoid problems in joint trials
of defendants with antagonistic defenses. People v Greenberg, 176 Mich App 296, 304; 439
NW2d 336 (1989); People v Brooks, 92 Mich App 393, 396-397; 285 NW2d 307 (1979).
Moreover, defendant failed to submit an affidavit or make an offer of proof that persuasively
demonstrated that his substantial rights were prejudiced. In fact, defendant failed to sufficiently
explain, in the trial court or on appeal, what evidence caused him to suffer the type of prejudice
that necessitates severance. “Incidental spillover prejudice, which is almost inevitable in a multidefendant trial, does not suffice.” Hana, supra at 349 (citation omitted). Finally, the trial court
instructed defendant’s jury separately, and instructed the jurors concerning reasonable doubt and
the determination of guilt or innocence on an individual basis. Defendant is not entitled to a new
trial on the basis of the trial court's refusal to sever his trial from codefendant White’s.
II
Next, defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because
his statement was not voluntary, but induced by police threats and appeals to sympathy. Whether
a defendant's statement was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is a question of law that a court
evaluates under the totality of the circumstances. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 27, 44; 551
NW2d 355 (1996). Deference is given to the trial court's assessment of the weight of the
evidence and credibility of the witnesses, and the trial court's findings of fact will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752;
609 NW2d 822 (2000).
Statements of an accused made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless the
accused has voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights.
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602, 1612; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). The
prosecutor must establish a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. People v Abraham,
234 Mich App 640, 645; 599 NW2d 736 (1999). Whether a statement was voluntary is
determined by examining police conduct, while the determination whether it was made
knowingly and intelligently depends in part upon the defendant’s capacity. People v Howard,
226 Mich App 528, 538; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). In determining whether a statement was
admissible, this Court considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement to determine whether it was freely and voluntarily made in light of the factors set forth
in People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988).
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Here, the record does not support defendant's contention that his statement was not
voluntary. The officer who took defendant’s statement testified at the evidentiary hearing that
defendant was not threatened. The trial court believed the officer’s testimony, and there was no
evidence indicating the contrary. Defendant did not testify at the hearing, but indicated in his
statement that he was not threatened. There was likewise no evidence that defendant was abused,
or deprived of sleep, food, or drink. Although defendant was cuffed to a chair for over an hour
before his interview, there was no evidence that the particular restraint caused physical abuse.
Further, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights before he was questioned, and indicated
that he understood those rights. The interview was conducted in the interviewing officer’s office
and was not prolonged. The officer’s entire contact with defendant, including the time for the
interview and reviewing defendant’s statement, lasted approximately one and a half hours. With
regard to defendant's personal circumstances, the record shows that he was nineteen, had a
twelfth grade education, and that, although he became emotional and cried at times, he was not
extremely distraught such that he was not operating of his own free will. Viewing the totality of
the circumstances, the record does not leave us with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake
has been made. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant's motion to suppress
his statement given to the police.
III
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographic
evidence of the victim. We review a trial court’s decision to admit photographic evidence for an
abuse of discretion. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 76; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), modified 450 Mich
1212 (1995); People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 187; 585 NW2d 357 (1998). An abuse of
discretion is found only if an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court
acted, would say there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made. People v Beckley, 434
Mich 691, 711; 456 NW2d 391 (1990); People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 439;
597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Photographs that are calculated solely to arouse the sympathies and prejudices of the jury
may not be admitted. Howard, supra at 549. The question is whether photographs are relevant
under MRE 401 and, if so, whether their probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice under MRE 403. Mills, supra at 66. Here, the photographs were
relevant to show the method in which the victim was murdered, disposed of, and transported, as
well as being instructive in depicting the location, nature and extent of the victim’s injuries.
People v Williams, 422 Mich 381, 392; 373 NW2d 567 (1985); People v Flowers, 222 Mich App
732, 736; 565 NW2d 12 (1997). The fact that defendant did not dispute that the victim was shot
does not render the photographs inadmissible. See People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521, 534;
586 NW2d 766 (1998). Moreover, relevant photographs are not rendered unfairly prejudicial
simply because they are gruesome, vivid or shocking. Mills, supra at 76. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the photographic evidence.
IV
Next, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of
carjacking, kidnapping, armed robbery and first-degree murder. When reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence in a criminal case, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
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prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crimes were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508,
515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992); People v Vronko, 228 Mich App
649, 654; 579 NW2d 138 (1998). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of a crime. Wolfe, supra at 524-526.
With regard to the carjacking conviction, defendant claims that there was no evidence of
a taking by force, and that the intent to take the car was not formed until after the victim was
presumed dead. To prove carjacking, the prosecution must prove that the defendant took a motor
vehicle from another person; that the defendant did so in the presence of that person, a passenger,
or any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle; and that the defendant did so either
by force or violence, by threat of force or violence, or by putting another in fear. MCL 750.529a;
People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 691; 580 NW2d 444 (1998).
Here, the testimony, if believed, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the
necessary elements, including a taking by force or violence, were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. There was evidence that defendant shot the victim, struck him several times, placed him
into the trunk of a car, and closed the compartment, which supports a findings of force or
violence. There is no requirement that the force or violence be done with the intent of taking the
motor vehicle. See People v Davenport, 230 Mich App 577, 578-579; 583 NW2d 919 (1998).
Further, after defendant and White forced the victim into the trunk of his car, they drove the
victim’s car from Flint to Detroit. While en route to Detroit, they stopped, opened the trunk,
assaulted the victim further, left him in the trunk, and continued to their destination. Viewed in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient evidence was presented to allow a rational trier
of fact to conclude that the essential elements of carjacking were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
With regard to the kidnapping conviction, defendant contends that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that the movement of the victim was not merely incidental to the underlying
crime of murder because he “thought they were getting rid of a dead body.” A person can be
convicted of kidnapping if it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person wilfully,
maliciously, and without lawful authority forcibly or secretly confined or imprisoned any other
person within this state against the other person’s will. MCL 750.349. To establish the
necessary element of asportation, there must be some movement of the victim taken in
furtherance of the kidnapping that is not merely incidental to the commission of another
underlying lesser or coequal crime, unless the underlying crime involves murder, extortion, or
taking a hostage. People v Wesley, 421 Mich 375, 388; 365 NW2d 692 (1984); Green, supra at
697. An asportation of the victim incidental to an underlying crime of murder is sufficient
asportation for a kidnapping conviction. Wesley, supra. Thus, defendant’s claim is
unpersuasive.
With regard to the armed robbery conviction, defendant argues that the evidence was
insufficient because “[t]he $200 that was taken was money the deceased owed the Defendants.”
To prove armed robbery, the prosecutor must prove an assault, a felonious taking of property
from the victim’s presence or person, while the defendant is armed with a dangerous weapon
described in the statute. MCL 750.529. Armed robbery is a specific intent crime, and the
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prosecutor must establish that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of
property. People v King, 210 Mich App 425, 428; 534 NW2d 534 (1995).
Here, there was evidence that, while the victim was alive in the trunk, defendant reached
into his pocket, took $200, and later gave the money to White. This evidence, if believed,
established that defendant took the victim’s property without his consent and carried it away.
See People v Malach, 202 Mich App 266, 270; 507 NW2d 834 (1993). Further, defendant’s act
of giving the money to White shows an intent to permanently deprive the victim of his property.
Accordingly, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient evidence was
presented to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the essential elements of armed robbery
were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
With regard to the first-degree murder conviction, defendant argues that the evidence did
not establish premeditation and deliberation. First-degree premeditated murder requires proof
that the defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and
deliberate. People v Schollaert, 194 Mich App 158, 170; 486 NW2d 312 (1992). “Premeditation
and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a second look.” Id.
Premeditation and deliberation may be established by evidence of "(1) the prior relationship of
the parties; (2) the defendant's actions before the killing; (3) the circumstances of the killing
itself; and (4) the defendant's conduct after the homicide.” Id.
Here, evidence was presented at trial that defendant and White stated to a witness their
intent to rob the victim when he arrived to pay his wife’s drug debt. The witness actually heard
defendant say that he was going to shoot the victim. After defendant shot the victim, he was
observed punching the victim. Thereafter, he and White placed the victim in the trunk of a car
and attempted to dispose of the body. Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
sufficient evidence was presented to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of
premeditation and deliberation were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
V
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him for first-degree
premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder for the death of a single victim. Because
defendant did not raise this issue in the trial court, he must demonstrate a plain error that affected
his substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v
Kulpinski, 243 Mich App 8, 11-12; 620 NW2d 537 (2000).
The double jeopardy guarantees in the federal and state constitutions protect a defendant
from multiple punishments for the same offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15;
People v Torres, 452 Mich 43, 64; 549 NW2d 540 (1996). Where dual convictions of firstdegree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder arise out of the death of a single
victim, the dual convictions violate double jeopardy. People v Bigelow, 229 Mich App 218, 220222; 581 NW2d 744 (1998). In this case, however, the trial court did not sentence defendant to
imprisonment for both first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder. Rather,
the Judgment of Sentence provides that defendant was found guilty of first-degree premeditated
murder, and lists felony murder as an alternative to the first-degree murder conviction and
sentence. As such, the Judgment of Sentence reflects a single sentence for a crime that was
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supported by two separate theories. Defendant has not demonstrated a plain error that affected
his substantial rights
VI
Defendant’s final claim is that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to quash the
information on the charge of first-degree murder. We review a circuit court's decision to deny a
motion to quash de novo to determine if the district court abused its discretion in ordering the
bindover. People v Orzame, 224 Mich App 551, 557; 570 NW2d 118 (1997). A district court
must bind a defendant over for trial when the prosecutor presents competent evidence
constituting probable cause to believe that a felony was committed and that the defendant
committed that felony. MCL 766.13; MCR 6.110(E); People v Reigle, 223 Mich App 34, 37;
566 NW2d 21 (1997). A district court's determination that sufficient probable cause exists will
not be disturbed unless the determination is wholly unjustified by the record. People v Justice
(After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 343-344; 562 NW2d 652 (1997).
Here, defendant was charged with open murder. The prosecution was not required to
designate a degree of murder. People v Johnson, 427 Mich 98, 107-108; 398 NW2d 219 (1986).
It is established that the prosecution is not required to present evidence of premeditation and
deliberation during the preliminary examination to support a bindover on a charge of open
murder. People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 593-594; 470 NW2d 478 (1991). As such,
this claim is unpersuasive.
We affirm.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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