PEOPLE OF MI V GENE T FAVORS JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 28, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 215826
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 98-004497
GENE T. FAVORS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of kidnapping a child under the age of
fourteen, MCL 750.350, first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. The trial court
sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of forty to sixty years for the kidnapping
conviction, life imprisonment for the CSC I conviction, and six to ten years for the assault
conviction. The court also ordered defendant to pay a $5,000 fine for the assault conviction.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s kidnapping and CSC I convictions and
sentences, and also affirm defendant’s assault conviction, but vacate the sentence and fine for the
assault conviction and remand for resentencing on that offense only.
Defendant abducted a ten-year-old girl from a church in Detroit, led her to a nearby
abandoned house, made her undress, and forced her to commit an act of fellatio. He also beat the
victim with a stick and with his fist. The victim escaped by running from the house and back to
the church wearing only a pair of socks. Two men from the neighborhood had observed a man
and a young girl walking past them and then shortly thereafter observed the girl running naked
towards the church. The two men captured the fleeing defendant and took him to the church for
the victim to identify and to await the arrival of the police.
I
At trial, serologist Stefanie Turek testified for the prosecution that blood found on
defendant’s shirt was consistent with the victim’s DNA. Turek further testified that among
African Americans, a population that included both the victim and defendant, one out of every
1,660,000 individuals would have a DNA profile that matched the blood on defendant’s shirt.
Defendant first contends that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court admitted this DNA
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evidence without first ruling on the validity of the DNA testing procedures. Because this issue
was not preserved by a defense motion to suppress the evidence or by an objection at trial, the
issue is forfeited unless a plain error occurred that affected defendant’s substantial rights. People
v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Even when these requirements are met,
reversal is warranted “only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an
actually innocent defendant” or when an error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
Turek testified at some length about the procedures she used to identify the DNA in the
blood found on defendant’s shirt. Defendant does not suggest that any error occurred in these
procedures, but argues only that the trial court should have established that proper procedures
were followed before admitting the evidence. See People v Chandler, 211 Mich App 604, 611;
536 NW2d 799 (1995) (before the trial court admits DNA evidence, the prosecution must first
establish that generally accepted laboratory procedures were followed). Because defendant does
not point to any errors that occurred, however, he cannot establish that his substantial rights were
affected by the trial court’s failure to review the procedures used before admitting the DNA
evidence. We therefore conclude that defendant has forfeited this issue. Carines, supra.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court’s failure to give the standard jury instruction on
expert witnesses, CJI2d 5.10, or otherwise give a cautionary instruction specific to the testimony
of expert witnesses, denied him a fair trial. Defendant did not request a jury instruction regarding
expert witnesses at trial and did not object to the instructions as given. Therefore, this issue also
is forfeited unless plain error occurred that affected defendant’s substantial rights. Carines,
supra. Even if somewhat imperfect, jury instructions do not create error if they fairly presented
the issues for trial and sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights. Error does not result from
the omission of an instruction if the charge as a whole covers the substance of the omitted
instruction. People v Piper, 223 Mich App 642, 648; 567 NW2d 483 (1997). Over several pages
of the trial transcript the trial court instructed the jury concerning their duty to decide the
credibility of all the witnesses. This charge as a whole covered the substance of CJI2d 5.10, with
the exception of the advice to think about the expert’s qualifications. However, the facts that the
serologist was fairly new at her job, was testifying for the first time, was “very well supervised,”
and had been accompanied to trial by her supervisor who was prepared to testify if necessary
were clearly presented to the jury. Under these circumstances, we find that no plain error
occurred and that this issue likewise is forfeited. Carines, supra.
III
Defendant also claims that prosecutorial misconduct during opening and closing
arguments denied him a fair trial. Again, defendant failed to object at trial to the challenged
comments. “Appellate review of allegedly improper conduct by the prosecutor is precluded
where the defendant fails to timely and specifically object; this Court will only review the
defendant’s claim for plain error.” People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370
(2000). No error requiring reversal will be found if the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s
comments, if any, could have been cured by a timely cautionary instruction. “Prosecutorial
comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments and the
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relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial.” Id. at 721. “Otherwise improper
prosecutorial remarks generally do not require reversal if they are responsive to issues raised by
defense counsel.” Id.
A
Defendant first challenges instances during the prosecutor’s opening and closing
arguments where, according to defendant, the prosecutor interjected her personal opinion.
Defendant also complains of the prosecutor’s use of “I” and “we” throughout her closing
arguments. Although prosecutors may not make a statement of fact to the jury that is not
supported by the evidence, they are free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences
arising from it as they relate to the theory of the case. Schutte, supra. The prosecutor may not
“vouch for the credibility of his witnesses to the effect that he has some special knowledge
concerning a witness’ truthfulness,” People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276; 531 NW2d 659
(1995), and may not place the prestige of the prosecutor’s office behind a witness. People v
Reed, 449 Mich 375, 398; 535 NW2d 496 (1995). Nonetheless, use of the words “we know” or
“I know” or “I believe” does not necessarily reflect an attempt to vouch for witnesses or place the
credibility of the prosecutor’s office behind the case. The propriety of the prosecutor’s
comments “does not turn on whether or not any magic words are used.” Id. at 399.
We have examined closely the comments challenged by defendant and find that they
show a recitation of the evidence presented at trial as part of the prosecutor’s argument to the
jury that she had proven the elements of the charged offenses. The prosecutor merely was
arguing the evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence as they related to her
theory of the case, which is permissible. Schutte, supra. Accordingly, we find that this portion
of defendant’s argument does not present any plain error.
B
Defendant further asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on his
nontestimonial demeanor at trial. Defendant often sat with his back to the witnesses during trial,
a fact that drew several comments from the prosecutor in her efforts to have the eyewitnesses
identify him. During her closing argument, the prosecutor commented that defendant made it
difficult for the young victim to identify him during trial, which he would not have done were he
innocent. Because the identity of the victim’s attacker was the primary issue at trial, the
prosecutor was obligated to ask the victim whether she recognized defendant as her attacker. The
prosecutor also was free to refer during her closing argument to the victim’s in court
identification of defendant as the man brought back to the church after she was attacked, as well
as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from this testimony. Schutte, supra. We therefore
conclude that the prosecutor’s proper comments did not impermissibly infringe on defendant’s
right to be present at trial.
C
Defendant lastly claims as prosecutorial misconduct the prosecutor’s comment in her
closing statements on his failure to testify, which would be impermissible. MCL 600.2159.
However, prosecutorial arguments are considered in light of defense arguments. People v
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Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 353; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). Defense counsel during his closing
argument asked the jury to consider how they would feel if they went jogging, were apprehended
by two citizens, and were wrongly accused of a crime. In her rebuttal closing argument, the
prosecutor commented that the jury had heard no testimony that defendant wore jogging clothes
because he had been jogging the day of the crime. Because the prosecutor’s comment directly
rebutted defense counsel’s suggestion to the jury, we find the remark proper.
We conclude that defendant has not shown any plain error during the opening or closing
statements of the prosecutor, and that he has forfeited his unpreserved claims of prosecutorial
misconduct. Carines, supra.
IV
Defendant next contends that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Because defendant has not preserved this issue for appellate review by raising his claim in a
motion for new trial or an evidentiary hearing, we limit our review to the existing lower court
record. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Snider, 239
Mich App 393, 423; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must demonstrate that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing norms, and that a reasonable probability exists that, but for
counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. People v Pickens, 446
Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 592; 569
NW2d 663 (1997). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Pickens, supra at 314, quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694; 104
S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
A
We first address the prosecutor’s argument that defendant waived this issue by electing to
represent himself at trial. At the beginning of trial, defendant’s court-appointed counsel advised
the court that defendant had filed a grievance against him and refused to talk to him. Counsel
asked to withdraw from the case. Defendant told the court that counsel had not filed a motion for
an independent DNA expert. Defendant also complained that a private investigator hired by
counsel had not come to the prison to see him about possible defense witnesses. After the court
ordered the trial to continue with defense counsel in place, defendant asked if he could represent
himself but stated that he wanted defense counsel to remain to assist him. The court allowed
this, and the trial proceeded with defense counsel questioning prospective jurors and all
witnesses and making opening and closing statements.
While the right of self representation is secured implicitly by US Const, Am VI and
explicitly under Const 1963, art 1, § 13, the right is not absolute. People v Anderson, 398 Mich
361, 366; 247 NW2d 857 (1976). A defendant has either a right to counsel or a right to proceed
in propria persona, but not both. People v Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich 702, 720; 551
NW2d 108 (1996). A defendant must exhibit an intentional relinquishment of the right to
counsel, and the courts should “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver” of the
fundamental right to counsel. Id. at 721 (citation omitted). A request for self representation
must be unequivocal, and the defendant must assert his right to self representation knowingly,
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intelligently and voluntarily. Id. at 722. A request to waive appointed counsel and proceed in
propria persona does not qualify as unequivocal if conditioned with a request for standby
counsel. People v Dennany, 445 Mich 412, 446 (Griffin, J.), 458 (Boyle, J.); 519 NW2d 128
(1994).
Defendant did not unequivocally request to represent himself because he asked for
counsel to remain with him. Therefore, defendant did not waive his right to representation.
Moreover, defendant did not waive a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the
prosecution suggests, by responding positively to trial court questioning near the end of trial
regarding his satisfaction with counsel’s performance. “Because the appropriate inquiry is not
the client’s evaluation of counsel’s performance, but rather whether counsel is a reasonably
effective advocate, ‘we attach no weight to either respondent’s expression of satisfaction with
counsel’s performance at the time of his trial, or to his later expression of dissatisfaction.’”
People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 151 n 6; 560 NW2d 600 (1997), quoting United States v
Cronic, 466 US 648, 657 n 21; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984).
B
Consequently, we consider defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance. Defendant
claims several instances of ineffective assistance regarding the DNA identification of the
victim’s blood on defendant’s shirt. He first argues that his counsel ineffectively failed to make a
pretrial motion to suppress the DNA evidence. Defendant explains that his counsel had a duty to
demand a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the DNA report and the serologist’s testimony,
which concluded that the blood found on defendant’s shirt was consistent with the victim’s
blood. According to defendant, his counsel’s failure to move for such a hearing relieved the
prosecution of its obligation to establish before the serologist testified that she followed generally
accepted laboratory procedures.
As noted in our previous discussion regarding defendant’s first asserted error, defendant
does not make any claims that the forensic laboratory did not follow generally accepted
laboratory procedures. Defendant argues only that his counsel had a duty to move for a pretrial
hearing on the admissibility of this DNA evidence and that the “need for a showing on the testing
procedures before the DNA evidence is admitted is self-evident. Any scientific test is reliable
only if it is properly performed and analyzed.” Although the DNA evidence constituted an
important element of the prosecution’s case, defendant does not allege that the procedures
followed by the serologist likely lead to a tainted or unreliable result. Because defendant points
to no errors in the serologist’s procedures that were outlined at trial, we find that even if
counsel’s failure to move for a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the DNA evidence fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, defendant has not shown that counsel’s failure
prejudiced him or that the result of the proceedings would have been different had defense
counsel made this motion. Pickens, supra at 302-303.
C
Defendant also asserts that his counsel inexcusably failed to seek the appointment of an
independent DNA expert witness. Defendant maintains that he needed an expert to challenge the
prosecution’s DNA evidence. However, counsel’s failure to call a witness is presumed to
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constitute sound trial strategy. Mitchell, supra at 163; People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 508;
597 NW2d 864 (1999). This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of trial counsel in
matters of trial strategy. Avant, supra. Because defendant did not move for an evidentiary
hearing to develop his claim of ineffective assistance, we do not have defense counsel’s
testimony regarding this issue. In the absence of any record supporting defendant’s claim, we
cannot conclude that counsel’s decision to forego an independent DNA expert amounted to
ineffective assistance of counsel.
D
Defendant further contends that he advanced a misidentification defense, but his trial
counsel did not properly investigate and prepare the defense. In particular, defendant alleges that
counsel “failed to effectively challenge and discredit” the prosecution’s DNA identification
evidence. A defendant is entitled to have his counsel prepare, investigate and present all
substantial defenses. In re Ayres, 239 Mich App 8, 22; 608 NW2d 132 (1999). Contrary to
defendant’s representation, however, defense counsel did vigorously cross examine the
prosecution’s DNA expert witness. The fact that counsel’s challenge to the DNA evidence was
not successful, in that defendant was convicted of the charged offenses, does not render counsel’s
assistance ineffective. Id.
E
Lastly with respect to ineffective assistance, defendant argues that his trial counsel should
have objected to hearsay testimony that bolstered the victim’s in court identification of
defendant.1 Defendant acknowledges that the victim’s grandmother, who testified before her
granddaughter and before the two men who captured defendant, stated that when the victim saw
her alleged attacker brought into the church, “she started crying harder and shaking and saying,
‘That’s him. That’s him.’” Defense counsel immediately objected, but the trial court ruled the
statement admissible as an excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Therefore, the trial
court had expressed its opinion whether the victim’s statements made on first seeing defendant
were admissible through the testimony of eyewitnesses, and defense counsel’s later failure to
make a futile objection to the admission of these statements through the testimony of the two
men did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Sabin (On Second Remand),
242 Mich App 656, 660; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
Defendant also complains that counsel did not object to the hearsay testimony of Detroit
Police Officer Kevin Eaton. Eaton, who talked to the victim at the church, wrote a preliminary
complaint report describing the encounter. Eaton testified that he had not reviewed the report
1
We note that defendant also mentions in his brief on appeal that defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct throughout trial and
failing to request a cautionary instruction regarding expert witnesses. We find that defendant has
waived these arguments, however, because he failed to adequately brief them or cite any
authority supporting them. People v Hermiz, 235 Mich App 248, 258; 597 NW2d 218 (1999),
aff’d 462 Mich 71; 611 NW2d 783 (2000); People v Kean, 204 Mich App 533, 536; 516 NW2d
128 (1994).
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before trial, and was asked to testify without looking at the report. Eaton relayed to the jury what
the victim told him about the crime and noted, on questioning from the prosecution, that the
victim appeared to be nervous and upset and was crying when she talked to him. Although
defense counsel did not object to any of this testimony, we find that it also would have been
admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, MRE 803(2), and that
defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to make another futile objection.
Sabin, supra.
V
Defendant next raises two claims involving the sentences he received. This Court
reviews sentencing issues for an abuse of discretion. People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511,
525; 583 NW2d 199 (1998). A sentencing court abuses its discretion when it violates the
principle of proportionality. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
A
Defendant contends that the concurrent terms of forty to sixty years for the kidnapping
conviction and life for the CSC I conviction were disproportionately severe because the trial
court did not consider his potential for rehabilitation. Defendant asserts that the court wanted
only to punish him and remove him from society, and therefore did not “balance both society’s
need for protection and its interest in maximizing the offender’s rehabilitative potential.” People
v Triplett, 407 Mich 510, 513; 287 NW2d 165 (1980), quoting People v McFarlin, 389 Mich
557, 574; 208 NW2d 504 (1973).
Because the trial court sentenced defendant within the guidelines, his sentences
presumptively are neither excessively severe nor unfairly disparate. People v Kennebrew, 220
Mich App 601, 609; 560 NW2d 354 (1996). In sentencing defendant, the trial court considered
the permissible factors of the severity and nature of the crime and defendant’s prior criminal
record, including his poor disciplinary record during his previous incarceration. People v Oliver,
242 Mich App 92, 98; 617 NW2d 721 (2000). The court balanced these factors against the
danger defendant posed to the community and the need to protect the community from defendant.
People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 446; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). It was not
necessary for the court to articulate its consideration of defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.
Id. Moreover, given the nature of these offenses, defendant’s age and prior criminal history, and
his poor record during his previous incarceration, it appears highly unlikely that the court would
have considered defendant’s potential for rehabilitation a mitigating factor. We conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant for kidnapping and CSC I because
the sentences are proportionate. Milbourn, supra.
B
Defendant further maintains that the sentence he received for assault with intent to do
great bodily harm less than murder, a prison term of six to ten years and a fine of $5,000, was
invalid. The statutory maximum punishment for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less
than murder consists of “imprisonment in the state prison not more than 10 years, or [a] fine of
not more than 5,000 dollars.” A sentence that exceeds the statutory limits is invalid, People v
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Thenghkam, 240 Mich App 29, 70; 610 NW2d 571 (2000), as is a sentence based on a
misconception of the law. People v Thomas, 223 Mich App 9, 11; 566 NW2d 13 (1997).
Although the sentencing hearing transcript reflects some confusion regarding whether defendant
could receive both a term of years and a fine for the assault conviction, the judgment of sentence
plainly indicates that the trial court imposed both punishments. MCR 6.427; People v Williams
(After Second Remand), 208 Mich App 60, 64; 526 NW2d 614 (1994) (noting that the judgment
is the final record of a defendant’s conviction).
We conclude that the sentence imposed for defendant’s assault conviction exceeded the
statutorily authorized limits. “The remedy for a partially invalid sentence is a remand for
resentencing.” People v Jones, 168 Mich App 191, 196; 423 NW2d 614 (1988). Because the
trial court’s error did not extend to the sentences given for defendant’s other convictions, we
remand for resentencing only on defendant’s conviction of assault with intent to commit great
bodily harm less than murder.
VI
We next address defendant’s argument that he was denied his right to due process
because the state destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence. We review this unpreserved claim
of constitutional error for plain error that affected defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra
at 761-764, 774.
At defendant’s trial, the emergency room doctor who examined the victim testified that
he took both oral and genital cultures from her and sent them to a laboratory for analysis. The
doctor received lab results from the genital culture, but did not receive any oral swab results.
The manager of Detroit Medical Center University Laboratories testified that swabs and
specimens taken from rape victims were handled as patient specimens, with the laboratory staff
unaware that the patient had been a rape victim. The lab normally held specimens for
approximately forty-eight hours, after which they were taken to a landfill and burned. Before
trial the prosecutor called the manager and asked if he could track down the oral swab involved
in this case, but the manager could not because the specimen had been destroyed. Lab records
indicated that no testing of the oral swab ever occurred.
Defendant insists that (a) the oral swab’s loss deprived him of potentially exculpatory
evidence and (b) appears deliberate in light of the fact that the irrelevant vaginal swabs were
tested.
[W]hen the state fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory
evidence, the good or bad faith of the state is irrelevant to a claim based on loss of
evidence attributable to the government. Where, however, the state has failed to
preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have
been subjected to tests the results of which might have exonerated the defendant,
the failure to preserve the potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial
of due process unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the
police. [People v Leigh, 182 Mich App 96, 98; 451 NW2d 512 (1989), citing
Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58; 109 S Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988).]
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Defendant has not shown that testing of the oral swab would have yielded exculpatory results
because the evidence presented at trial indicated that the victim’s attacker placed his penis in the
victim’s mouth for only a short while and did not ejaculate. The serologist testified that if an
exchange of fluids had occurred an oral swab taken from the victim’s mouth might have provided
DNA identification of her attacker, but that if none of the attacker’s semen entered the victim’s
mouth DNA identification could not have been made from the oral swab. Under these
circumstances, the swab apparently would have provided no exculpatory or inculpatory DNA
evidence because the only DNA present would have belonged to the victim. Furthermore,
defendant has not shown bad faith on the part of the government in handling the oral swab.
Because the exculpatory nature of any test done on the oral swab is at best speculative and
because defendant has not shown bad faith on the part of the government, due process does not
require reversal of defendant’s convictions on the basis of the oral swab’s destruction. Leigh,
supra.
VII
Defendant lastly claims that the cumulative effect of trial errors deprived him of a fair
trial. However, we have identified no errors that affected defendant’s trial. Accordingly, we
reject defendant’s cumulative error argument. People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 16; 577 NW2d
179 (1998).
We affirm defendant’s convictions and affirm defendant’s sentences for kidnapping and
CSC I, but vacate the sentence and fine for assault and remand for resentencing with respect to
that offense. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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