PEOPLE OF MI V FREEMAN EUGENE FRANKS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 17, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 222118
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000222-FH
FREEMAN EUGENE FRANKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of possession of less than twenty-five grams of cocaine, MCL
333.7403(2)(a)(v). At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel objected to the accuracy of a prior
felony conviction noted on the presentence investigation report (PSIR). The trial court neither
made a finding with respect to the report’s accuracy, nor determined such a finding unnecessary
because it did not intend to consider the challenged information in imposing sentence. The trial
court sentenced defendant to an enhanced term of sixty-four to ninety-six months’ imprisonment
on the bases of (i) defendant’s prior possession of a controlled substance conviction, MCL
333.7413(2), and (ii) his status as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11. Defendant appeals as
of right. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to either make a finding with
respect to the accuracy of the PSIR, or to determine such a finding unnecessary on the basis that
the inaccuracy was irrelevant to the court’s imposition of sentence. This Court reviews for an
abuse of discretion a trial court’s sentencing of habitual offenders. People v Reynolds, 240 Mich
App 250, 252; 611 NW2d 316 (2000). Even when this Court finds an abuse of discretion,
however, it will not order reversal of harmless errors. People v Harrison, 119 Mich App 491,
496-497; 326 NW2d 827 (1982).
Criminal defendants have the right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information.
People v McAllister, 241 Mich App 466, 473; 616 NW2d 203 (2000). A trial court has a duty to
respond to the defendant’s objections that the PSIR contains inaccurate information. Id. In
response to a defendant’s objection to sentencing information, the court may either hold an
evidentiary hearing to establish the veracity of the information in the PSIR, accept defendant’s
version of the relevant facts, or determine that the disputed information is not relevant to the
sentencing decision. People v Pierce, 158 Mich App 113, 117; 404 NW2d 230 (1987). The
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court’s failure to respond may be considered harmless error, however, when the alleged
inaccuracies would have no determinative effect on the defendant’s sentence. McAllister, supra.
“[R]esentencing is not mandated . . . where the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the inaccuracy would have no bearing on the ultimate sentence.” Harrison, supra at
497.
The instant record reflects that defendant challenged at the sentencing hearing the PSIR’s
inaccurate statement that he had three prior felony convictions, but that the trial court failed to
explicitly address defendant’s challenge. The trial court’s failure to address defendant’s
challenge constituted an abuse of discretion. Pierce, supra at 116-117.
Nonetheless, we decline to disturb the sentence because the error was harmless. Even
where error exists, a defendant has the burden of showing, more probably than not, that a
miscarriage of justice occurred. MCL 769.26; People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 493-494; 596
NW2d 607 (1999). Defendant did not carry this burden.
Defendant’s conviction of possession of less than twenty-five grams of cocaine carried a
four-year maximum term of imprisonment. MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v). According to MCL
333.7413(2), the trial court had the authority to sentence defendant, a prior drug offender, to
double this term for a maximum sentence equaling eight years’ imprisonment. Irrespective of the
Illinois conviction that defendant contested, defendant’s PSIR showed two prior felony
convictions, one of which constituted a controlled substance violation. Defendant did not dispute
this prior felony drug conviction. The trial transcript reflects that after the jury rendered its
verdict and was dismissed, the trial court inquired of defendant regarding his prior convictions.
Defendant then acknowledged to the court that in September 1988 he indeed had been convicted
of a felony drug possession charge. The undisputed existence of defendant’s earlier felony drug
conviction, in combination with his present conviction, fully supports the sentence imposed by
the trial court. The existence of the disputed Illinois controlled substance delivery conviction
would not have affected the sentencing. See MCL 333.7413(2) (providing for a doubling of
applicable penalties when “an individual [has been] convicted of a second or subsequent
offense”) (emphasis added).1
The sentence imposed by the trial court, sixty-four to ninety-six months, thus fell within
the statutorily authorized maximum term. A sentence within the statutory limits is not, standing
alone, evidence of a miscarriage of justice. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 521; 597 NW2d
864 (1999). Furthermore, the trial court properly ordered a minimum sentence of no more than
two-thirds the maximum term. People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 690; 199 NW2d 202 (1972).
The trial court correctly set the sentence between sixty-four and ninety-six months, which result
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We also note that irrespective of the challenged Illinois conviction, the record supports the trial
court’s enhancement of defendant’s sentence on the basis of his third habitual offender status.
MCL 769.11. As mentioned above, after the jury’s discharge the trial court questioned defendant
regarding his prior convictions. In addition to defendant’s acknowledgement of his 1988
possession of a controlled substance conviction, defendant admitted that he possessed a February
1995 conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon. Accordingly, defendant’s third habitual
offender status was established undisputedly regardless of the challenged Illinois conviction.
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would have pertained given the existence of one prior drug conviction, or two. Because the
undisputed record supported the trial court’s sentence within the legislatively prescribed limits,
we find harmless any error that occurred during the trial court’s imposition of sentence.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred because the sentence it imposed exceeded
the sentences that would have applied under the Supreme Court’s sentencing guidelines and the
new legislative guidelines. We are not persuaded by this claim, however, because neither set of
guidelines applies in this case. The new legislative guidelines plainly do not apply to offenses
committed before January 1, 1999. MCL 769.34(1), (2); Reynolds, supra at 253-254. Although
the Supreme Court’s sentencing guidelines generally apply to offenses committed before January
1, 1999, they do not apply to habitual offender convictions. People v Gatewood (On Remand),
216 Mich App 559, 560; 550 NW2d 265 (1996). Furthermore, a specific statutory provision
governs the calculation of sentences for repeat drug offenders. MCL 333.7413(2); People v
Williams, 205 Mich App 229, 231; 517 NW2d 315 (1994).
To the extent that defendant questions the proportionality of his sentence, even without
considering the Illinois conviction that defendant challenged we find ample evidence
demonstrating that the sixty-four to ninety-six-month term was proportionate to the
circumstances surrounding the instant crime and defendant’s criminal history. People v
Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Defendant’s instant conviction
constituted his third felony conviction, and defendant had three prior misdemeanor convictions.
As the trial court noted, defendant had a further, extensive history of prior arrests and charges.
The trial court’s additional findings that defendant exhibited no inclination to rehabilitate himself
and posed a danger to the community were supported by evidence that (i) several of defendant’s
convictions and many of his other arrests involved assaultive crimes, (ii) defendant did not
establish a history of stable employment, and (iii) defendant acknowledged an eighteen-year
addiction to alcohol and various controlled substances, and that he did not benefit from several
prior rehabilitation programs. The PSIR further noted that defendant blamed his addiction and
police harassment for his ongoing misfortunes. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing defendant’s sentence.
Defendant lastly asserts that the ameliorative sentencing provisions of the new legislative
guidelines indicate his entitlement to resentencing. This Court in Reynolds clearly rejected this
identical contention, and we are bound by the Reynolds panel’s conclusion. MCR 7.215(I)(1).
The Reynolds panel astutely set forth as follows the logic dispositive of defendant’s claim:
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative
intent. When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must honor the
legislative intent as clearly indicated in that language. We presume that the
Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed in the language used in the
statute.
Here, the statutory language is not ambiguous. On the contrary, the
statutory language clearly states that the Legislature intended that the statutory
sentencing guidelines have prospective, not retroactive, effect. MCL 769.34(1) . .
. unequivocally states that the “sentencing guidelines promulgated by order of the
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Michigan supreme court [i.e., the old judicially created sentence guidelines] shall
not apply to felonies . . . committed on or after January 1, 1999.” Thus, the
Legislature intended for the Supreme Court’s guidelines to continue to apply to
felonies committed before January 1, 1999. The statute further states that the new
sentencing guidelines apply to felonies “committed on or after January 1, 1999.”
MCL 769.34(2) . . . . Accordingly, there is no basis for defendant’s argument that
the Legislature intended the new statutory guidelines to apply to crimes
committed before January 1, 1999. [Id. at 253-254 (citations omitted).]
Because defendant committed the instant offense in August 1998, there is no basis for this Court
to apply the legislative guidelines’ ameliorative provisions to defendant’s sentence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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