PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS MILTON ROBERSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 27, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217666
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-160024-FC
THOMAS MILTON ROBERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Murphy and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant Thomas Roberson of first-degree murder.1 The trial court
sentenced Roberson to natural life in prison. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
This case involves a killing in March 1998 at a motel in Ferndale. At trial, the motel desk
clerk, Frank Shipley, testified that he noticed a “little man,” later identified as the victim, talking
to people in the lobby. The victim seemed distant, frightened, and “scared.” Shipley observed
Roberson enter the lobby and engage the victim in what appeared to be casual conversation.
After about ten or fifteen minutes, Roberson and the victim left the lobby and apparently went to
room 118.
The motel guest who was staying in room 116 at the time stated that, among other things,
she heard bumping and groaning coming from room 118 that persisted for approximately ten to
fifteen minutes. She also heard one voice saying that he wanted to hear the other person moan.
A motel guest staying in room 120 also heard sounds coming from room 118 that lasted between
seven and fifteen minutes. In particular, the guest from room 120 said, she heard a voice yelling
five or six times “be quiet” and “shut up,” she heard four or five knocks against her wall, and she
heard a person who sounded as if he had a pillow over his face and was being choked.
Shipley received a call saying that there was a fight occurring near room 120. About
twenty minutes later, Roberson approached the security window in the lobby and told Shipley
1
MCL 750.316.
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that he had just murdered somebody. At first, Shipley did not believe Roberson because he
thought that Roberson was drunk. Roberson told Shipley again that he had murdered somebody
and then became irritated when Shipley started questioning him. Shipley then contacted the
police to report Roberson’s crime.
The police arrived at the motel soon after Shipley’s call. According to Officer Andrew
Wurm, when he entered the motel, he noticed Roberson standing in the lobby facing Shipley,
who was on the other side of the security glass. As soon as Roberson saw him and Officer Tim
Andre, Roberson put his hands over his head and placed them on the security glass. Officer
Wurm then asked Roberson if he had killed somebody and Roberson said, “yes.” Officer Wurm
asked Roberson if he had used a gun or a knife and Roberson said, “no.” At that point, Roberson
became irritated with the questions, and Officer Andre, who was standing behind Officer Wurm,
handcuffed Roberson. Officer Wurm asked Roberson where the body was and Roberson
reportedly told him that the body was in one of the rooms, but that the key to the room was in his
pocket. When Officer Wurm searched Roberson for the keys, he found keys to rooms 118 and
123, but also several syringes. Roberson informed him that the syringes belonged to the man he
had killed. Though they were in close proximity during this interaction, Officer Wurm did not
notice if Roberson was intoxicated.
Officer Wurm then went to room 118 with several other officers where they found the
victim lying on the floor. Officer Wurm checked the victim to see if he was breathing or had a
pulse, but did not find any signs of life. He noticed that the victim’s clothes were torn and his
shirt had been pulled over his head, halfway down his arms. The victim’s pants were undone and
he had on red underwear that was pulled up and torn. Officer Wurm noticed trauma to the
victim’s head and back, as well as marks on several spots on his body.
Dr. Kanu Virani, Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for Oakland County, investigated the
cause of death. At trial he testified that the victim was thirty-seven years old, five feet three
inches tall, and he weighed 128 pounds. He believed that the victim died from a combination of
blunt force head injury and strangulation. Dr. Virani estimated that the victim was strangled
between twenty and thirty seconds and that the injuries to the victim’s back, shoulder, and
buttock areas were consistent with blunt force trauma. Although Dr. Virani did not know exactly
how many injuries the victim had sustained to these areas, he estimated that the victim sustained
at least ten such injuries. Further, Dr. Virani stated that he found injuries to the victim’s wrists
and arms and that these wounds were consistent with defensive wounds. He concluded that the
victim’s death was a homicide.
Detective Sergeant Thomas J. Thomson question Roberson after he was arrested, during
which time he provided a confession that was later the subject of a pretrial Walker2 hearing.
According to Detective Sergeant Thomson, before he interviewed Roberson regarding the
murder, he read Roberson his Miranda3 rights from a form that he used on a daily basis.
Roberson indicated that he was familiar with the Miranda rights and, in response to Detective
2
People v Walker, 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
3
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1601; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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Sergeant Thomson’s questions, Roberson said that he understood his rights, he did not wish to
speak with an attorney, and he waived his right to remain silent. Though Roberson expressed
concern that he was going to be harmed in some way, Detective Sergeant Thomson tried to
reassure Roberson that he was safe. At this point, according to Detective Sergeant Thomson, he
handed a written copy of the Miranda rights to Roberson and gave him an opportunity to read
and sign the consent form. Roberson asked that the interview be recorded and that Detective
Sergeant Thomson add the words “in my own writing” to the form. Sergeant Thomson added the
requested words, Roberson signed the form, and Detective Sergeant Thomson taped the
interview. Sergeant Thomson also informed Roberson that there would come a point when the
trial court would appoint an attorney to represent him.
Detective Sergeant Thomson said that, during the interview, Roberson described how he
murdered the victim, demonstrating how he knelt on the victim’s neck and, at the same time,
struck the victim with a coat hanger he found in the room. Despite police academy training
concerning social and scientific aspects of alcoholism and alcohol abuse, and extensive
experience arresting people who were under the influence of intoxicating liquor, nothing about
Roberson’s demeanor or communication led Detective Sergeant Thomson to believe that
Roberson was intoxicated even though he smelled of alcohol and had a blood alcohol level of
.133.
Detective Sergeant Thomson conducted a second interview with Roberson after he
examined evidence retrieved from the crime scene. Again, Roberson requested that the interview
be recorded and Detective Sergeant Thomson read him his Miranda rights. According to
Detective Sergeant Thomson, Roberson waived his right to remain silent and his right to an
attorney. During the course of this second interview, Detective Sergeant Thomson learned that
Roberson had broken a finger on his right hand and arranged to have Roberson taken in a patrol
car to the hospital. At no point in time did he notice anything unusual about the way Roberson
was walking, nor did he see Roberson stumble or fall. Further, according to Detective Sergeant
Thomson, Roberson never asked for an attorney and he was not aware of Roberson being
threatened.
In the course of these interviews, Detective Sergeant Thomson said that he made several
promises to Roberson. First, he promised Roberson that he would not be hung. Second, he
promised Roberson that he would be fair. Third, he promised Roberson that he would record the
interviews. Fourth, he promised Roberson that he would include the fact that Roberson was
cooperative in his report.
However, at the Walker hearing, Roberson presented a different version of events
surrounding his custodial confessions. Roberson claimed that his level of intoxication, coupled
with the fact that he was not taking his medication for his manic depression, made him incapable
of giving a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. Roberson argued
that his Miranda waiver was invalid because Detective Sergeant Thomson gained his confidence
by promising leniency and that the tape recording of the interviews had a gap, which excluded
Roberson’s request for an attorney. In fact, according to Roberson, he asked Detective Sergeant
Thomson for an attorney more than once and Detective Sergeant Thomson told him that he
would provide him with an attorney after he gave his statement.
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The prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing that, under the totality of the circumstances,
Roberson’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The
prosecutor asserted that whether Roberson’s confession was taken while he was under the
influence of drugs and alcohol was not dispositive. Further, the prosecutor stated that Roberson
fully understood his rights when he waived them and that he never asked for an attorney when he
was being questioned.
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court stated that the totality of the
circumstances indicated that Roberson had waived his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. The trial court rejected Roberson’s claim that his intoxication prevented him from
giving a valid waiver, reasoning that, because Roberson had good command of the language, was
responsive to questions, and was able to walk, he understood the Miranda warnings when he
signed the form. Regarding Roberson’s claim that his depression made the waiver invalid, the
trial court stated that it was satisfied that Roberson had the requisite level of comprehension
when waiving his rights.
At trial, Roberson moved for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecutor’s proofs
arguing that the prosecutor failed to show that the murder was premeditated. Consequently, he
contended, there was insufficient evidence to allow the jury to deliberate on the first-degree
murder charge. The trial court denied the motion, stating:
I think there was testimony that there was anywhere from 10, 11 minutes to 15 or
20 minutes. There was evidence that there could have been as many as 50 blows
or more to the victim. The Court finds that a jury could find that there was time to
rethink and the Court will let the matter go to the jury.
The jury returned a guilty verdict.
II. The Motion To Suppress
A. Standard Of Review
Roberson argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it denied his
motion to suppress the statements he made to the police. “In reviewing suppression hearing
findings, this Court will defer to the trial court’s findings of historical fact, absent clear error.”4
However, whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent presents a question of law, which this
Court reviews de novo.5
B. The Miranda Standards
In Miranda, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that
4
People v Mendez, 225 Mich App 381, 382; 571 NW2d 528 (1997).
5
People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629-630; 614 NW2d 152 (2000).
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before custodial interrogation, an individual must be apprised of (1) the right to
remain silent, (2) the accompanying explanation that anything said can and will be
used against him in court, (3) the right to consult with an attorney and to have one
present during interrogation, and (4) the right to appointed counsel before
questioning, if he cannot afford counsel.[6]
Once an accused asserts his right to counsel under Miranda, the police must cease all
interrogation “‘until counsel has been made available to him, [or] unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’”7 In this context,
“‘interrogation refers to express questioning and to any words or actions on the part of the police
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.’”8
Nevertheless, a defendant may waive his Miranda rights if, under the totality of the
circumstances, the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.9
Whether the waiver is valid involves a two-part inquiry. First, the waiver
must be a “product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception.” Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L
Ed 2d 410 (1986). Second, “the waiver must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences
of the decision to abandon it.” Id.[10]
C. Voluntary Waiver
Our first inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, Roberson’s waiver
was made voluntarily.11 Although there was testimony that Roberson believed that he would be
harmed, there was no evidence showing that he formed this belief based on the police officers’
actions. To the contrary, Detective Sergeant Thomson testified that he assured Roberson several
times that he would not be harmed. Additionally, when Detective Sergeant Thomson discovered
that Roberson had broken his finger, he had another officer take Roberson to the hospital in a
patrol car. Further, Roberson never testified that the police coerced or intimidated him. Hence,
we conclude that Roberson’s confession was not the product of coercion or intimidation.
6
People v Hoffman, 205 Mich App 1, 6; 518 NW2d 817 (1994).
7
People v Slocum (On Remand), 219 Mich App 695, 698; 558 NW2d 4 (1996), quoting Minnick
v Mississippi, 498 US 146, 150; 111 S Ct 486; 112 L Ed 2d 489 (1990), quoting Edwards v
Arizona, 451 US 477, 484-485; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981).
8
People v Marsack, 231 Mich App 364, 374; 586 NW2d 234 (1998), People v Anderson, 209
Mich App 527, 532-533; 531 NW2d 780 (1995), citing Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301;
100 S Ct 1682; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980).
9
Daoud, supra at 633.
10
People v Bender, 452 Mich 594, 604; 551 NW2d 71 (1996).
11
Daoud, supra at 634.
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At first glance, Roberson’s testimony at the Walker hearing suggested that he was
deceived into confessing. Specifically, Roberson said that he asked for an attorney and was told
that he would be given an attorney after he gave his statement. This request was not recorded on
the tape, Roberson explained, because he asked for an attorney before Detective Sergeant
Thomson began to record his statement. Notwithstanding Roberson’s apparent mistrust of
Detective Sergeant Thomson, Roberson admitted that he did not ask for an attorney once the
officer began recording the interview. In contrast, Detective Sergeant Thomson testified that
Roberson waived his right to an attorney and never indicated that he wanted an attorney. Given
the deference we accord to the trial court’s findings, especially because the demeanor of
witnesses and credibility are so vitally important to a trial court’s determination,12 there is no
basis for overturning the trial court’s finding that Roberson’s confession was voluntary because
of this dispute concerning his request for an attorney.
Roberson also contends that his heavy alcohol use rendered him incapable of waiving his
rights. However, intoxication is not dispositive of voluntariness.13 In the present case, other than
smelling alcohol on Roberson, Detective Sergeant Thomson had no other indication that
Roberson was intoxicated. According to Detective Sergeant Thomson, Roberson was articulate
during his interview and never had any problems walking. Moreover, there was no evidence
presented at the Walker hearing supporting Roberson’s contention that his mental illness affected
his intelligence.14 Roberson, who had graduated from high school, even testified that his mental
illness did not prevent him from understanding everything that he was asked. Therefore, we
conclude that Roberson’s waiver was voluntary.15
D. Knowing And Intelligent Waiver
The final inquiry is whether Roberson’s waiver was knowing and intelligent. Roberson
argues that because he had ingested large amounts of alcohol and did not take the medication
prescribed to control his mental illness, he was incapable of rendering a knowing and intelligent
waiver. Our focus in this analysis is on whether Roberson “understood that he did not have to
speak, that he had the right to the presence of counsel, and that the state could use what he said in
a later trial against him.”16 Detective Sergeant Thomson testified that, other than the smell of
alcohol, there was no other indication that Roberson was under the influence of either drugs or
alcohol at the first interview. Additionally, Roberson requested that his interview be taped, he
said that he understood his rights, and he signed a form indicating that he understood his rights.
Moreover, Roberson asked Detective Sergeant Thomson to add the words “in my own writing”
to the Miranda waiver form before he would sign the form, indicating that he understood what he
was doing and the consequences of this actions. Roberson’s testimony that, because he was
claiming self-defense, he wanted to tell his side of the story only supports this inference. Further,
12
See id. at 629.
13
People v Feldman, 181 Mich App 523, 530-531; 449 NW2d 692 (1989).
14
People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 541-542; 575 NW2d 16 (1997).
15
Daoud, supra at 635.
16
People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 29; 551 NW2d 355 (1996).
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Detective Sergeant Thomson noticed that Roberson was able to communicate well and was
aware that his statement would be used against him or in his behalf. As a whole, this evidence
shows that Roberson was coherent, he responded in a normal way, and he was not so intoxicated
that he was unable to waive his rights in a knowing and intelligent manner. Thus the trial court
did not err in denying the motion to suppress this evidence.
III. Motion For Directed Verdict
A. Standard Of Review
Roberson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. In
reviewing a claim from the denial of a directed verdict motion, this Court must review the
evidence up to the time the motion was made in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt,17 which requires review de novo.18
B. Premeditation
“‘First-degree premeditated murder requires proof that the defendant intentionally killed
the victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate.’”19 “Premeditation and
deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a second look.”20
“Premeditation and deliberation may be established by evidence of ‘(1) the prior relationship of
the parties; (2) the defendant’s actions before the killing; (3) the circumstances of the killing
itself; and (4) the defendant’s conduct after the homicide.’”21 “The length of time necessary to
‘measure and evaluate a choice before it is made is incapable of precise determination’; all that is
necessary is enough time to take a ‘second look’ at the actions contemplated.”22
In this case, the evidence suggested that Roberson manually strangled the victim for
twenty or thirty seconds, long enough for him to think twice about what he was doing.23 That the
attack lasted long enough for the victim to sustain wounds while trying to defend himself from
several blows was evidence of premeditation.24 The other motel guests’ testimony established
that this attack lasted much longer, up to twenty minutes, far in excess of the minimum necessary
17
People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 615-616; 591 NW2d 669 (1998).
18
People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112, 124; 600 NW2d 370 (1999).
19
People v Abraham, 234 Mich App 640, 656; 599 NW2d 736 (1999), quoting People v
Schollaert, 194 Mich App 158, 170; 486 NW2d 312 (1992).
20
People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 642; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
21
Abraham, supra at 656, quoting Schollaert, supra at 170.
22
People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 660; 509 NW2d 885 (1993), quoting People v
Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 599; 470 NW2d 478 (1991).
23
People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 733; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
24
Id.
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to premeditate and deliberate a murder.25 Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not
err in denying the motion for a directed verdict.
IV. The Testimony Of The Victim’s Daughter
A. Preservation And Standard Of Review
Roberson argues that the trial court erred when it permitted testimony that the victim’s
daughter was not able to say goodbye to her father before he was killed. He contends that this
testimony from the daughter’s mother was inadmissible because it was irrelevant,26 it should
have been excluded under MRE 403 because it was highly inflammatory, and that it should have
been excluded as hearsay.27 However, he failed to preserve this issue for appeal by objecting to
this testimony on these grounds.28 Thus, our review is for plain error affecting his substantial
rights.29
B. Harmless Error
Assuming that the trial court committed plain error in admitting this testimony, we
nevertheless conclude that the evidence was insufficiently prejudicial in light of the evidence as a
whole to warrant reversing his conviction.30 Roberson confessed that he killed the victim. To
say the least, this was strong evidence that Roberson murdered the victim. There was also other
overwhelming evidence from the motel guests and Shipley that Roberson murdered the victim.
There is no reasonable probability that this snippet of testimony referring to the effect of the
murder on the victim’s daughter made any difference in the outcome of this trial. Because the
testimony was harmless, Roberson is not entitled to a new trial on this basis.31
V. Photographic Evidence
A. Standard Of Review
Roberson argues that the trial court erred when it admitted a gruesome photograph of the
victim taken after his death, which was used solely to arouse the sympathies or prejudices of the
jury. The admission of photographs into evidence is within the trial court’s discretion, and this
Court reviews for abuse of discretion.32
25
People v Gonzalez, 178 Mich App 526, 531, 533; 444 NW2d 228 (1989).
26
MRE 401.
27
MRE 802.
28
People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000); MRE 103(a)(1).
29
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); MRE 103(d).
30
People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 421; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
31
MCL 769.26.
32
People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 188; 585 NW2d 357 (1998).
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B. Premeditation And Deliberation
At trial, Roberson objected to two photographs that were later admitted as exhibits 24 and
25.33 The trial court ruled that the probative value of the photograph, which depicts the serious
face and neck injuries the victim sustained, was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. When the photograph was admitted, Roberson stipulated to its admission
subject to the trial court’s earlier ruling. Though somewhat shocking, the photograph was clearly
relevant to proving premeditation and deliberation on the basis of the nature of the injuries.34
Because it was relevant, the photograph was not subject to exclusion solely because it accurately
portrayed the violent way the victim died.35 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
I concur in result only.
/s/ William B. Murphy
33
In Roberson’s brief on appeal, he does not make clear whether he is arguing that one
photograph was erroneously admitted or if more than one photograph was erroneously admitted.
Further, Roberson did not indicate which exhibit number or numbers in the trial court record
corresponded with the photograph or photographs he is now contending was or were erroneously
admitted. After reviewing the record and the briefs, it is this Court’s opinion that Roberson is
referring to one photograph, which was admitted as either exhibit 24 or exhibit 25.
34
People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 536; 531 NW2d 780 (1995); Abraham, supra at 656.
35
Ho, supra.
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