JAMES E PEASE V MARY JANE PEASE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES E. PEASE,
UNPUBLISHED
July 17, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 221364
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-073163-DO
MARY JANE PEASE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted the order amending the parties’ consent judgment of
divorce. We reverse.
At a hearing on September 14, 1998, both parties were sworn and entered on the record
the terms of a property settlement to be included in a consent judgment of divorce. Plaintiff
objected, however, to defendant’s request that a provision be included concerning defendant
leasing a car under the name of one of her children under Ford’s A-plan, which is a benefit of
plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff objected on the ground that defendant would not be eligible
after the divorce to participate in Ford’s A-plan.1 The trial court stated:
Well, it’s, I don’t think you can include that language.
But if she ends up having to pay more as a result of his malicious or
intentional interference with a contractual relation that would be an indication that
alimony should be increased.
On September 30, 1998, the parties and their attorneys signed a written consent judgment
of divorce that did not include a provision regarding the lease of a car.2 On January 15, 1999,
1
Defendant clearly recognized that she would no longer be eligible to purchase or lease a vehicle
under plaintiff’s A-plan as a benefit of plaintiff’s employment because she sought a provision
prohibiting plaintiff from interfering with her children leasing a car under the plan and then
providing the car to her.
2
Judge Kirsten Frank Kelly presided over the settlement hearing and entered the judgment of
(continued…)
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defendant moved to amend the consent judgment when plaintiff did not provide the parties’
children with the information necessary to allow them to lease a car for defendant under the Ford
A-plan as a benefit of plaintiff’s employment.3 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
amended the judgment of divorce in several ways, including adding a provision that plaintiff pay
defendant $112 per month toward the cost of leasing a car “as long as Mrs. Pease drives a motor
vehicle.” Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in amending the judgment of divorce to include
the provision that he pay defendant $112 per month as a contribution toward the cost of leasing a
car. He contends that the trial court lacked the authority to modify the property settlement
provisions of the parties’ consent judgment. We agree.
Property settlement provisions in a divorce judgment are typically final and cannot be
modified by the court. Quade v Quade, 238 Mich App 222, 226; 604 NW2d 778 (1999).
Modifications of property settlements in divorce judgments are disfavored and generally cannot
be ordered except under limited circumstances. Norman v Norman, 201 Mich App 182, 189; 506
NW2d 254 (1993). Absent fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, courts are bound to uphold property
settlements reached through negotiations and agreement by the parties in a divorce action.
Quade, supra at 226. The rule limiting the trial court’s authority to modify property settlements
applies whether the settlement is reduced to writing or is simply orally placed on the record with
consent. Bers v Bers, 161 Mich App 457, 464; 411 NW2d 732 (1987).
Here, the trial court amended the consent judgment of divorce without finding that the
judgment was the product of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake. Rather, the court found only that
plaintiff’s unwillingness to allow defendant to lease a car caused a change in circumstances
because defendant was unable to afford to lease a car. The only impropriety mentioned by the
trial court was that plaintiff had failed to follow the trial court’s previous oral order regarding the
lease.4 Because plaintiff’s actions were not in violation of any contract, promise, policy, or
enforceable order, his actions were not fraudulent and were not grounds for amending the
consent judgment of divorce.5 Hence, we conclude that the trial court erred by modifying the
terms of the consent judgment.6
(…continued)
divorce.
3
The motion to amend was heard by Judge Sheila Gibson Manning.
4
An agreement may be enforced only when it is reduced to writing and signed by the parties or
their attorneys or is made in open court. MCR 2.507(H); Fear v Rogers, 207 Mich App 642,
644; 526 NW2d 197 (1994). Oral statements of the court are not enforceable. Tiedman v
Tiedman, 400 Mich 571, 576; 255 NW2d 632 (1977).
5
There was nothing in the consent judgment of divorce providing that plaintiff was required to
allow defendant to lease a car with plaintiff’s employment benefits. Furthermore, plaintiff never
agreed on the record that he would allow defendant to lease a car. There is no evidence that
plaintiff interfered with any contractual relationship between defendant and Ford or defendant
and her children. Plaintiff merely did not supply his children with the necessary information for
(continued…)
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Plaintiff requests that this Court order that he be reimbursed for the fees and costs he
incurred in responding to defendant’s motion to amend the judgment of divorce because the
motion was groundless. Absent a statute or court rule authorizing the award of attorney fees,
each side is responsible for his own attorney fees. Radenbaugh v Farm Bureau General Ins Co
of Michigan, 240 Mich App 134, 152; 610 NW2d 272 (2000). Plaintiff does not argue a
meritorious exception to this rule based on statute, court rule, or contract. Id. Therefore, he is
not entitled to attorney fees.7
Reversed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
(…continued)
them to lease a car under the Ford A-plan for defendant’s benefit.
6
However, we note that the consent judgment provides that spousal support is nonmodifiable for
the first three years and that “subsequent to the three year period, either party may petition the
court for a modification of spousal support for substantial changes in circumstances.”
7
We also reject defendant’s request for sanctions and attorney fees under MCR 7.216 for filing a
vexatious appeal.
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