IN RE DASHNER MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of LD, JD, and PLD, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 3, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 229615
Monroe Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-014449-NA
PETER DASHNER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Saad and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM
Respondent Peter Dashner appeals as right from a family court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and
(j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) and (j). We affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings
This case first came to the attention of the Family Independence Agency (FIA) in May
1999 after the FIA became aware of the fact that the children had had head lice since March
1998. The petition also alleged that respondent was unable to provide the children with a stable
living arrangement and either refused or failed to protect the children from mistreatment by their
stepmother, Faith Dashner. Specifically, it was alleged that Faith (1) pulled LD by hair, grabbed
her chin, called her a b---- and pushed her to the ground, causing her chest to be crushed into her
book bag, (2) repeatedly hit PD on the back, causing bruising, (3) duct taped the children’s
mouths when respondent felt they talked too much and (4) confined the children to a bedroom
almost on a continuous basis. Following a preliminary hearing on the petition, the family court
authorized the petition, made the children temporary court wards, and placed them in the care of
relatives. In addition, respondent, pending further adjudication, was allowed supervised
visitation with the children at the relative’s home and had services provided by the FIA.1
1
On August 30, 1999 the court amended the original petition to include respondent’s and Faith’s
(continued…)
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In November 1999, respondent entered into a parent-agency agreement with the FIA that
required respondent to (1) find and maintain suitable housing, (2) attend and complete parenting
classes, (3) attend individual and family counseling through Community Mental Health (CMH)
and comply with CMH mental health services, (4) notify FIA within two working days of any
change in address or living arrangement, (5) regularly attend and participate in services provided
by Wrap-Around, (6) visit his children at least once a week, (7) remain free of head lice and
prevent re-infestation of the children and (8) not violate any civil or criminal laws. In addition,
on April 25, 2000, the court ordered respondent to complete a domestic violence course and to
submit a written budget to the FIA on a monthly basis, outlining the family’s bills and income.
On May 25, 2000, the FIA filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of respondent’s
parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) and (j) based on respondent’s lack of progress
in achieving the goals established in the parent-agency agreement. A permanency planning
hearing was scheduled for June 5, 2000, at which time the family court authorized the May 25
petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights.2 On August 23, 2000, following a termination
hearing, the family court terminated respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii),
(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) and (j).
II. Standard of review
This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings in an order terminating parental rights
for clear error. MCL 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); In re
Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 51; 501 NW2d 231 (1993). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if,
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Miller, supra. Deference must be accorded to the
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses before it. MCR 2.613(C); In re
Newman, 189 Mich 61, 65; 472 NW2d 38 (1991). Once the trial court finds a statutory ground
for termination by clear and convincing evidence, the court must terminate parental rights unless
it finds, based on the whole record, that termination is clearly not in the best interests of the
children. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341,
350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re Maynard, 233 Mich App 438, 450-451; 592 NW2d 751
(1999).
III. Analysis
(…continued)
newborn daughter, CD, born on August 19, 1999, and on November 23, 1999, respondent
admitted responsibility to the allegation that he had failed to provide a stable living arrangement
for the children. Faith and respondent released their parental rights to their child, CD, on
September 19, 2000. This release is not at issue in this appeal.
2
On June 29, 2000, this petition was further amended. The amendment alleged that respondent
had (1) physically abused the children, (2) committed retail fraud in the presence of the children
and (3) engaged in sexual relations with Faith in the presence of the children.
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Defendant contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights because the
petitioner failed to establish a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence
and, alternatively, that the trial court erred when it found that termination was clearly not against
the best interests of the children. We disagree.
Termination of parental rights is proper when the child’s parent caused, or had the
opportunity to prevent, physical injury to the child and the court finds that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the child will suffer physical injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in
the parent’s home. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(b); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b). Here, the record
clearly establishes that respondent failed to participate in domestic violence classes, had ongoing
domestic violence incidents, and had not resolved his mental health issues. In addition, LD
testified that respondent had thrown her against walls on numerous occasions. This testimony
was corroborated by JD, who testified that she had witnessed respondent throw LD against walls
on more than one occasion, and by respondent’s own testimony, when he admitted to throwing
LD against a wall while in Florida. Respondent also admitted during testimony that he knew
Faith duct taped the children’s mouths and that he did nothing to try to dissuade her from doing
so. LD also testified that Faith would force the children to lay on their back, with their arms,
legs, and head in the air for two hours at a time and that respondent was aware that Faith would
force the children to do this. Accordingly, termination of respondent’s parental rights under
subsections 19b(3)(b)(i) and (ii) was proper.3 Further, based on this evidence, we are not left with
the definite and firm conviction that termination was clearly not in the best interests of the
children. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Miller; In re Trejo, supra; In re
Maynard, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
3
Because the family court properly terminated parental rights under subsection 19b(3)(b) and
only one statutory ground for termination must be established in order to terminate parental
rights, we need not decide whether termination was also proper under the other subsections. In
re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
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