TERESA HINES V KMART CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TERESA HINES,
UNPUBLISHED
June 22, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 221418
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-541653-NO
KMART CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and White and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial in this trip and fall premises liability action, plaintiff was awarded
$78,220.58, plus costs, interest and attorney fees. Defendant appeals the judgment in plaintiff’s
favor and the denial of its motion for new trial. We affirm.
Testimony at trial established that plaintiff visited defendant’s store on November 1,
1996, walked from the parking lot to the main entrance, and tripped and fell over a raised
concrete slab in the sidewalk approaching the door. Plaintiff testified that she did not see the
uneven portion of the sidewalk before her fall. Defendant admitted negligence, in order to
preclude the introduction of evidence regarding a prior trip and fall and reports regarding the
defect, but did not admit liability for plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Plaintiff claimed she sustained a
serious neck injury requiring surgery. Defendant maintained that plaintiff’s neck problems were
the result of a preexisting condition and, therefore, the fall was not a proximate cause of her
injuries. The jury found in plaintiff’s favor and a judgment to that effect was entered.
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in precluding it
from presenting evidence of plaintiff’s comparative negligence and defending on the basis that
the dangerous condition was open and obvious. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant
raises the same issues on appeal.
A new trial may be granted if a verdict is contrary to law or if an error of law has occurred
in the proceedings. MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e) and (g). Moreover, a new trial may be granted based
upon the improper exclusion of relevant and admissible evidence. Petraszewsky v Keeth (On
Remand), 201 Mich App 535, 542-543; 506 NW2d 890 (1993). A trial court’s decision
regarding a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Meyer v Center Line,
242 Mich App 560, 564; 619 NW2d 182 (2000).
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The record does not support defendant’s argument that the trial court precluded it from
presenting evidence of comparative negligence. On the first day of trial, before testimony was
taken, defendant moved in limine to preclude plaintiff from raising a prior trip and fall incident
that occurred at the same location in 1995, or mentioning field reports prepared by defendant
regarding the defective condition. In response, plaintiff’s counsel agreed that if defendant was
admitting negligence - - that there was a hazardous condition of which it was aware and
nevertheless failed to remedy - - the evidence would be irrelevant. However, plaintiff’s counsel
stated that if defendant would be arguing comparative negligence, plaintiff would reserve the
right to re-address the issue because the evidence might then be relevant. The trial court stated
that if defendant brought up the issue of comparative negligence, plaintiff would be allowed to
present the evidence sought to be excluded. Defendant did not assert that the court’s reasoning
was somehow flawed. Later, before beginning his opening statement, defense counsel sought
clarification of the court’s position. The court made clear that if defendant argued comparative
negligence, it might give plaintiff the right to show that it happened before.1 Again, defense
counsel did not argue that the evidence would be irrelevant even if he raised the issue of
comparative negligence, and did not otherwise object to the court’s ruling. Thereafter, defendant
elected not to present evidence of comparative negligence. This was a tactical decision made by
defendant as a matter of trial strategy. Defendant may not assign error on appeal to a matter that
its own lawyer deemed proper at trial. People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 691; 580 NW2d 444
(1998). To do so would allow a defendant to harbor error as an appellate parachute. Id. Because
it was defendant who chose not to present evidence of comparative negligence, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for a new trial as to this issue. Moreover,
we are not persuaded that there is error in a ruling that if defendant raised the issue of
comparative negligence it would open the door to the introduction of the excluded evidence,
under the circumstance that the jury would then have been required to apportion fault by
allocating a percentage to plaintiff.
1
The colloquy was as follows:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay, Judge, just one, I wanna be clear on one issue
because I don’t wanna . . .
THE COURT: Mmhhmm.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
. . . run afoul of your Order. On the issue of
comparative negligence. You’ve indicated that if in fact I wanna argue
comparative negligence, then Plaintiff can introduce the . . .
THE COURT: Depending on whether he lays a foundation for it, sure. But it’s
potentially, it may come in. If you recall, the Motion in Limine was to prevent
any additional information regarding any other negligence with regard to this
location. That, if you go into comparative, it may conceivably give him the right
to show that it’s happened before. And then it’s not, your, your contention isn’t
reasonable. I don’t know what the evidence is gonna say. But, if you proceed on
that, you proceed at your own risk.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I gotcha.
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Defendant also argues that the trial court erroneously precluded it from pursuing a
defense based on the open and obvious nature of the danger presented. Defendant asserts that it
should have been permitted to argue this defense even though it admitted negligence. We
disagree.
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a
duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4)
damages. Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000); Ellsworth v Hotel
Corp, 236 Mich App 185, 194; 600 NW2d 129 (1999). Plaintiff was an invitee on defendant’s
property because her visit can reasonably be said to confer a business, commercial, monetary, or
other tangible benefit on the owner of the premises. Kreski v Modern Wholesale Elec Supply
Co, 429 Mich 347, 359 415 NW2d 178 (1987). A business invitor owes a duty to its customers
to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition and to exercise ordinary care and prudence
to keep the premises reasonably safe. Id. This duty does not extend to conditions from which an
unreasonable risk cannot be anticipated or to dangers so obvious and apparent that an invitee can
be expected to discover them himself. Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495,
500; 418 NW2d 381 (1988); Ellsworth, supra at 194.
The “no duty to warn of open and obvious danger” rule is a defensive doctrine that
attacks the duty element which a plaintiff must establish in a prima facie negligence case. Riddle
v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 95-96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992); Millikin v Walton
Manor, 234 Mich App 490, 495; 595 NW2d 152 (1999). Because defendant admitted
negligence, i.e., admitted owing a duty to plaintiff and a breach of that duty, evidence of the open
and obvious nature of the danger was irrelevant. Such evidence would only serve to undermine
plaintiff’s claim that defendant owed her a duty and had breached that duty, elements that
defendant already admitted. Therefore, evidence pertaining to the open and obvious nature of the
danger was properly excluded by the trial court, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial as to this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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