PEOPLE OF MI V ARTHUR JACKSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 22, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217348
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 97-006165
ARTHUR JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and White and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was
sentenced to a term of thirty to fifty years' imprisonment for the murder conviction and a
consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm
defendant’s convictions but remand for modification of his sentences.
This case arose from the death of Shannon Keith Smith, whom the prosecution contended
was shot by defendant in an alley in Detroit on November 9, 1996. Smith was found by the
police on the front porch of a nearby home bleeding from a chest wound.
At approximately 9:35 p.m. on the evening in question, Detroit police officer Robert
Kosinski was called to the area of 11980 Racine in Detroit to investigate a shooting. On arriving,
he saw the victim lying on the front porch, bleeding from a gunshot wound to the chest.
Kosinski questioned the victim about who shot him, and the victim “just repeated ‘Tone’”.
Shortly after EMS arrived, Kosinski asked where “Tone” lived, and the victim pointed his head
north, in the direction of Barlow Street, where defendant lived.
Sharon Evans, who lived with defendant and was his girlfriend at the time, testified that
defendant went by the nickname “Tony” and that she was not sure if he also had the nickname
“Tone.” At trial, Evans admitted giving a previous statement that defendant went by “Tone.”
The prosecution also presented the testimony of Clarice Billops, who stated that she lived with
defendant at the time of the shooting and that defendant went by the nicknames “Tony or Tone.”
She also stated that she knew defendant owned a shotgun at the time of the shooting.
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Detroit Police Sergeant Anthony Woodford testified that he arrived at the scene around
10:30 p.m., noticed some blood in an alley that he traced to the porch where the victim was
found, surveyed the neighbors, and was directed toward defendant’s house. When Woodford
entered the house, he asked two women present whether they knew of an individual named
“Tone,” and they said he was in the house. Woodford’s observations triggered a request to the
homicide investigation technicians to perform a gunshot residue test on defendant. Detroit Police
technician Randy Richardson testified regarding the gunshot residue test that he told defendant
what he was going to do before swabbing defendant’s hands and forehead. Defendant did not
object to the residue test. The results of the residue test were placed into evidence at trial.
Erica Mohr, a nurse at St. John’s Hospital, testified that at approximately 6:00 p.m. on
November 11, 1996, she witnessed investigator Richard Ivy questioning the victim in his hospital
room. The victim’s condition was critical, but he could nod or shake his head to answer yes or
no questions. Mohr stated at trial that when Ivy asked the victim if Tony shot him, the victim
nodded his head affirmatively, and when Ivy asked the victim if Tony’s real name was Arthur
Jackson, he answered affirmatively.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself at
trial. We disagree.
The right of self-representation is implicitly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and explicitly guaranteed by Article 1, § 13 of the Michigan
Constitution. People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 366; 247 NW2d 857 (1976). See also MCL
763.1. However, that right is not absolute. Anderson, supra. Before a trial court may grant a
defendant’s request to proceed in propria persona, the court must substantially comply with the
requirements set forth in Anderson and MCR 6.005. People v Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich
702, 726; 551 NW2d 108 (1996). In Anderson, supra at 367-368, the Supreme Court set forth
the following three requirements that must be satisfied before a trial court may grant a
defendant’s request for self-representation: (1) the defendant’s request must be unequivocal; (2)
the court must determine whether the defendant’s request was made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily; and (3) the court must determine that the defendant will not unduly disrupt the court
while acting in propria persona. See also Adkins (After Remand), supra at 722. With regard to
the second requirement, “[t]he trial court must make the . . . defendant aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Anderson, supra at 368. The trial court must also
satisfy the requirements of MCR 6.005, which serve to inform the defendant of the risks of selfrepresentation. Adkins (After Remand), supra at 722.
Before trial, defendant requested to proceed in propria persona. The record reveals that
defendant was uncooperative with his appointed counsel, refused to sign the appointment form
and filed a number of grievances against at least two attorneys appointed to represent him. In
response to one of the grievances, one of the appointed attorneys moved to withdraw as counsel.
At the November 5, 1997 hearing on that motion, Wayne Circuit Court Judge Craig Strong
advised defendant of the charges pending against him and the maximum sentences the charges
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carried. At that hearing, defendant made one of his requests to proceed in propria persona. The
following colloquy transpired:
MS. REED [defendant’s counsel]: Mr. Jackson has written the Court and
indicated to the Court and to me that there’s a break down [sic] in our relationship
and he does not want me to represent him.
Based on that, I have submitted to the Court my motion to withdraw from the
case.
THE COURT: All right. Anything?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I have – I had axed to (phonetic) proceed pro se,
you know, as the defendant-lawyer representing myself, because I’ve been
violated my constitutional rights. It’s been improper bind over. I’ve been arrested
for this crime three times. And it’s to my understanding that defendant is to
inform the attorney of his counsel, and then in return, his counsel supposed to file
the necessary motion to suppress or whatever. And all attorneys seem to deviate
from that. So all of the court appointed assistance have been ineffective in my
behalf.
THE COURT: How many lawyers have you had thus far?
THE DEFENDANT: I’ve had Attorney Raymond Willis, and Attorney Donald
Cook, and Ms. – Attorney Susan Reed was kinda’ like imposed on me, forced on
me, after Judge Bradfield denied me of exercising my Sixth Amendment to
proceed pro se. Also—
THE COURT: Did you file a motion to that effect, about wanting to proceed to
represent yourself?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I haven’t filed a motion. I just stated it for the
record.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. DAWSON [co-counsel for the prosecution]: Your Honor—
THE COURT: You understand that if I allow you to represent yourself, you
would be held to the same high standards as though – as an attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You would have to become familiar with the Rules of Evidence.
The Michigan Rules of Evidence. You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
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THE COURT: Do you have a copy of them?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you have access to them?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. You understand that you would have to use the same
procedures as any lawyer would have to, and that you would have to be bound by
what I ruled as the Judge? You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: How far have you gone in school?
THE DEFENDANT: I been to the ninth, and then—
THE COURT: The ninth grade?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I’m a GED graduate.
THE COURT: Okay. So you’ve got your GED degree?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I went to other schools.
THE COURT: Have you studied the law before, or represented yourself in the
past?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I haven’t.
THE COURT: Why do you feel you’re qualified to do that?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I just figured that – you know, that I’m innocent and
I’m being treated unfairly. And I don’t think that I need a counsel to address the
truth or anything to hide behind, and in order to – and to address it in a
professional way.
THE COURT: Madam clerk, has this case been set for trial?
THE CLERK: No, sir. We were at the final conference level, and Ms. Reed had
filed motions.
THE COURT: All right. Schedule a trial date. And, Ms. Reed, I’m not going to
let you off the case.
You are familiar with the case?
MS. REED: Yes, your Honor.
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THE COURT: And you are prepared for trial in this matter?
MS. REED: I have some motions that I’ve filed that have not been heard since
Mr. Jackson had written the Court and indicated that he did not want me to
proceed, but –
THE COURT: Where are they?
MS. REED: Those are the motions that were filed.
THE COURT: All right. Sir, you understand that the charge in this case,
according to your letter, is murder in the second degree and felony firearm,
and murder in the second degree carries a maximum sentence up to life in
prison, and the felony firearm is a two-year mandatory sentence? You
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Your Honor, you think I can get you to look the
[sic] motion that I prepared in my own behalf?
***
THE DEFENDANT: It’s based on a motion for dismissal. A motion to squash
(as spoken), stating all the violations and the improper bind over and abuse of
discretion.
THE COURT: All right. You may present it.
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.
THE COURT: It won’t be argued today, though.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Attorney Reed later argued a motion in limine, motion to dismiss and motion to quash the
information on defendant’s behalf at a January 9, 1998 hearing. At the hearing’s conclusion a
trial date of April 27, 1998 was set.
At an April 8, 1998 hearing on defendant’s motion to represent himself before Judge
Strong the following transpired:
THE COURT: Sir, the Court notes that you’ve had many, many different lawyers
representing you in this case, as well as lawyers who have interviewed you in an
effort to be appointed to represent you in this case. At least a half a dozen or
more. . . .
***
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THE COURT: Well, see what – see, the law says that I have to make a
determination whether you can represent yourself. It’s just not that you can say I
want to represent myself and that’s the end of it. There has to be a determination.
And I have to make sure that, first of all, whether you, in fact, want to represent
yourself, or is the problem that the lawyers that you have had, you just don’t want.
The court denied defendant’s request to represent himself after extensive discussion on the record
with defendant:
THE COURT: . . . . You’re presenting the Court with a very difficult task, which
is trying to get a lawyer for you because of the disagreements you keep having
with them and your firing them. And this Court is just bending over backwards to
make sure that you get a lawyer. I’m trying to get a lawyer for you –
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: --because what you’re telling me on the one hand, you’re saying
you want to represent yourself. But on the other hand, you’re saying that you
don’t want the lawyers because you don’t feel that they’re representing you
properly.
***
THE COURT: . . . . And the Court is certainly concerned that you have adequate
representation, because it appears to this Court that your request to represent
yourself is equivocal; that is, not a complete request to represent yourself. You
just want a lawyer that will do what you want him to do, I think. I’m not sure.
But it’s clear to this Court that you want representation, so
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, if I can get right representation, sir, that would be
very much appreciated, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. We’re going to appoint the Defender’s then.
An April 17, 1998 hearing was held before then-Wayne Circuit Court Judge Brian Zahra.
Defendant, who was represented by a new attorney, again requested to represent himself. Judge
Zahra set a September 1998 trial date and denied defendant’s request to represent himself, asking
that defense counsel remain on the case. At a May 29, 1998 final conference hearing held before
Judge David Kerwin, defendant stated he did not wish to be represented, the court advised him to
file a motion, and a September 15, 1998 trial date was set.
Defendant’s motion to proceed in propria persona was heard by Judge Kerwin on August
27, 1998. Judge Kerwin appointed advisory counsel for defendant and allowed defendant to
represent himself. Defendant stated that he had motions in addition to the one to proceed in
propria persona, and the following colloquy transpired:
THE COURT: . . . . Do you want to represent yourself on those motions?
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.
THE COURT: Okay.
***
THE COURT: Okay. And why is it that you want to proceed representing
yourself?
THE DEFENDANT: I been incarcerated since December the 4th of 1996, arrested
three times.
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT: There have been three preliminary examinations.
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT:
frivolous motions.
And no motion has been filed of significance.
Only
THE COURT: All right, now here’s the thing. You know, this just got put on my
docket just recently.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: So, we’re going to have to give you some dates. And we’re not
going to able [sic] to proceed to trial, I don’t believe on the 15th—but you’re ready
to go on the 15th though?
MR. AGAINSKI [counsel for the prosecution]: Ready to go – I’d like to go on
the 15th.
THE COURT: You want to go on the 15th?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.
THE COURT: Okay, all right, here’s what I’m going to do. I’m going to allow
you proceed [sic] representing yourself.
I’ll excuse Mr. Fenner from further representation. But I’m going to have
someone else from the defender’s office serve as an advisor for you. You’ll
represent yourself. But I want to make sure – because sometimes there are
technical things that you might want to consult with somebody. I’ll [sic] be your
show. That’s what you want; right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
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THE COURT: Okay. But you don’t have a problem with having someone serve
as an advisor?
THE DEFENDANT: On standby?
THE COURT: Just as an advisor. You know, like sometimes you have a second
chair. Mr. Ralston here, he gets Mr. Againski to help him on cases. It’s like a
second chair, we call it.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You’ll be the one who’ll be arguing the case, cross examining the
witnesses but there might be procedural points or technical points that you’ll want
to ask their advice about. Okay?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. AGAINSKI: Your Honor, isn’t there a set of warnings you’re supposed to
give Mr. Jackson that it’s a dangerous process. Make sure he realizes it’s a tough
choice, and he’s has [sic] a right to make it, obviously. But aren’t you supposed
to make sure he’s aware of the risks.
THE COURT: I – you know, I think Mr. Jackson understands that.
You know, what Mr. Againski is referring to is me advising you that – well, two
things.
There’s an old saying in the law that anybody who represents themselves has a
fool for a client. Because there’s that belief that emotionally it’s better to have
somebody who’s not the defendant themselves [sic] representing you.
Also, in terms of the serious nature of the case, which you obviously understand
that, lawyers and Judges tend to believe that representation is going to be more
effective if you have an experienced lawyer representing you. You understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And nonetheless you would still prefer to represent yourself?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Any other inquiries?
MR. AGAINSKI: No, Your Honor, I think he understands it. And insofar as he
has not been disruptive and I think –
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THE COURT: (Interposing) I – hey, it’s his life.
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, also, I would like to keep September 15th.
Defendant stated at this hearing that he wanted a bench trial. Trial began the next day.
Although Judge Kerwin failed to make a proper record, and neglected to read the charges
and maximum sentences for the charged crimes, see MCR 6.005(D)(1), these omissions do not
compel reversal under the circumstances. See Adkins (After Remand), supra at 730-731.
Defendant had been informed earlier of the charges against him and possible punishment by
Judge Strong. Id. Judge Kerwin appointed advisory counsel for defendant, advised defendant
that given the “serious nature of the case” representation by an experienced lawyer would be
more effective than self-representation, and noted that there was an old saying in the law that
anybody who represents himself has a fool for a client. Judge Kerwin expressed the belief that
defendant was aware of the risks. That defendant had requested to represent himself a number of
times and had expressed displeasure with several different attorneys further supports the trial
court’s decision to allow defendant to represent himself. Id. at 725, 730-731.1 The record shows
that defendant’s assertion of the right of self-representation was voluntary, knowing and
unequivocal in that defendant’s repeated colloquies with the various judges established that he
was satisfied that the only way he would get the representation he desired was to represent
himself. It was apparent that defendant would not be satisfied with any competent counsel
appointed by the court. Under these circumstances, we conclude that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of Anderson and the court rule.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present the
results of gunpowder residue tests, which were performed on samples taken from defendant
without a warrant. We disagree.
Defendant sought to suppress the test results on the ground that they were not given to
him until shortly before trial. Because defendant did not challenge the admissibility of the test
results on the ground now raised on appeal, this issue is not properly preserved. People v Grant,
445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994); People v Connor, 209 Mich App 419, 422; 531
NW2d 734 (1995). Therefore, appellate relief is precluded unless defendant demonstrates plain
1
While evidence of manipulation or delay does not eliminate the need to explain the hazards of
self-representation, it “may serve to bolster a trial judge’s assessment that a defendant knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel” Id. at 729-730. We are mindful that this
Court should not allow a defendant to harbor error as an appellate parachute simply by asserting
the right to self-representation and then arguing on appeal that the right should not have been
afforded. “To permit a defendant in a criminal case to indulge in the charade of insisting on a
right to act as his own attorney and then on appeal to use the very permission to defend himself
in pro per as a basis for reversal of conviction and a grant of another trial is to make a mockery of
the criminal justice system and the constitutional rights sought to be protected. We would not
permit it.” Adkins, supra at 725, quoting People v Morton, 175 Mich App 1, 8-9; 437 NW2d 284
(1989).
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error that affected his substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 752-753; 597 NW2d
130 (1999); Grant, supra.
A warrantless search of an individual is proper where an officer has probable cause to
arrest that individual, has a “clear indication” that incriminating evidence may be found on (or in)
that person, and has a reasonable belief that an immediate warrantless search of the person's body
is necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 769;
86 S Ct 1826; 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966) (upholding warrantless withdrawal of blood from an
intoxicated defendant); see also People v Holloway, 416 Mich 288, 299; 330 NW2d 405 (1982)
(forcible search of defendant’s mouth for narcotics permissible under circumstances).
In the instant case, considering the statements of the victim and other witnesses at the
scene, the police had probable cause to believe that defendant committed the shooting. MCL
764.15(c); People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115; 549 NW2d 849 (1996); People v Russo, 439
Mich 584, 603-604; 487 NW2d 698 (1992); People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 631-632; 588
NW2d 480 (1998). This probable cause, coupled with the knowledge that gunpowder residue
remains on the skin of a person who has recently fired a firearm, provided the police with a
“clear indication” that defendant’s skin might contain incriminating evidence. See Holloway,
supra at 301. Additionally, the record reveals that gunpowder residue is continuously shed with
the passage of time and can be rubbed off, and generally remains detectable for only up to six
hours after a shooting. Considering this window of opportunity, the fact that defendant arrived at
the station approximately 2-1/2 hours after the shooting, and the fact that the arrest occurred at
12:10 a.m., the police reasonably could have concluded that the circumstances constituted an
emergency such that they needed to perform the test without waiting for a warrant for fear that
evidence would be destroyed or lost before a warrant was issued. Therefore, defendant has failed
to show plain error with regard to the gunshot residue test results.
II
Defendant also challenges the admissibility of several statements made by the victim
regarding the identity of the person who shot him. Regarding the statements made at the scene of
the shooting and while the victim was in the ambulance on the way to the hospital, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the statements were admissible as
excited utterances. The circumstances sufficiently showed that the statements were made
following a startling event, were related to that event, and were made while the victim remained
under the stress of excitement caused by the event. MRE 803(d); People v Smith, 456 Mich 543,
550, 553; 581 NW2d 654 (1998); People v Verburg, 170 Mich App 490, 495; 430 NW2d 775
(1988). Any error in the admission of the additional statement made by the victim while in the
hospital as a dying declaration under MRE 804(b)(2) would be harmless as the trial court
expressly stated that it did not find the testimony sufficiently reliable to credit.
III
Defendant also argues that prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial. Because
defendant did not object to the challenged conduct at trial, appellate relief is precluded absent
plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights. Carines, supra. First, viewed in context, it is
not plainly apparent that the prosecutor improperly expressed his personal belief that defendant
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was guilty. Second, although we find merit to defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly
elicited evidence of defendant's silence, it is clear from the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law that the challenged evidence did not play a part in the trial court's decision.
Therefore, defendant's substantial rights were not affected. Finally, we find no merit to
defendant's claim that the prosecutor knowingly presented false evidence. Simply because
testimony is inconsistent or contradictory does not render it perjured. People v Cash, 388 Mich
153, 162; 200 NW2d 83 (1972).
Next, after reviewing the circumstances of the offense and the offender, we conclude that
defendant’s sentence, which is within the sentencing guidelines recommended minimum range,
does not violate the principle of proportionality. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 661; 461
NW2d 1 (1990); People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 609; 560 NW2d 354 (1996).
As the prosecution concedes that defendant is entitled to additional sentence credit, MCL
769.11b, we remand for modification of the judgment of sentence to reflect an additional award
of sentence credit for time served. The court shall determine whether the proper credit is for 232
days or 235 days.
We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, and remand for modification of the
judgment of sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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