GOLDEN NUGGET RESTAURANT INC V CAMBRIDGE TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GOLDEN NUGGET RESTAURANT, STAGE
COACH STOP USA, INC., LAWRENCE
DOWLING, d/b/a DOWLING BUILDING,
BAUER MANOR RESTAURANT, MICHAEL
SAVCIE, ROSE SAVCIE, d/b/a SAND LAKE
RESTAURANT, CRUISE INN RESTAURANT,
and EVANS LAKE MOTEL,
UNPUBLISHED
June 15, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 216383
Lenawee Circuit Court
LC No. 97-007704-AW
CAMBRIDGE TOWNSHIP, CAMBRIDGE
TOWNSHIP SUPERVISOR, FRANKLIN
TOWNSHIP, and FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP
SUPERVISOR,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Whitbeck and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellants appeal as of right the trial court’s dismissal of their complaint for a writ of
mandamus. We affirm.
Appellants are property owners in either Cambridge Township or Franklin Township and
are subject to a special assessment levied by the townships to defray the cost of constructing a
new sewer system. Appellants filed a complaint which sought a writ of mandamus “directing
[appellees to] comply immediately with the provisions of the ordinance at issue and re-evaluate
the assessment applied to [appellants.]” 1 The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it
1
The ordinance reads:
The term “unit” or “units” shall be related to the quantity of sanitary
sewage ordinarily arising from the occupancy of a structure by a single family of
(continued…)
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lacked jurisdiction. The trial court concluded that appellants’ complaint amounted to an attack
on the special assessment, and therefore the tax tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction.
First, appellants claim that the matter was not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
tax tribunal because the assessments were based on water usage, not the value of property, and
therefore were not levied “under property tax laws.” We disagree.
The tax tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over a “proceeding for direct review of . . .
special assessments . . . under property tax laws.” MCL 205.731(a); MSA 7.650(31)(a).
“[S]pecial assessments levied against property owners for public improvements to realty which
especially benefit their property are special assessments under the property tax laws for the
purposes of the Tax Tribunal Act.” Wikman v City of Novi, 413 Mich 617, 636; 322 NW2d 103
(1982). We find the instant case to present such a situation. The fact that the special assessment
was not based on the valuation of property does not mean that it was not “under property tax
laws.”
Appellants also claim that the tax tribunal did not have exclusive jurisdiction over this
matter because appellants are not seeking direct review of the special assessment, but are seeking
to compel appellees to comply with the provisions of the ordinance which requires appellees to
update and revise the methodology used to calculate the amount of the assessments. While we
understand the distinction that appellants seek to make, “‘this Court will not be bound by a
party’s choice of label for its action where to do so would not only put form over substance, but
would invade the exclusive jurisdiction of the tax tribunal.’” Netherlands Ins Co v Bringman,
153 Mich App 234, 239; 395 NW2d 49 (1986), quoting St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co v Littky,
60 Mich App 375, 378-379; 230 NW2d 440 (1975). In our opinion, the essence of appellants’
complaint raises issues within the jurisdiction, and expertise, of the tax tribunal.
An attack on the methodology used to compute liability is a proper claim for the tax
tribunal, see Kostyu v Dep’t of Treasury, 170 Mich App 123, 129-130; 427 NW2d 566 (1988),
and the question of whether an assessment was levied in proportion to the benefit received is best
resolved by utilizing the experience of the tax tribunal. See Wikman, supra at 647. Further, the
tax tribunal has the authority to require an adjustment of the assessment against a petitioner’s
property. See Bates v Genesee Co Road Comm, 133 Mich App 738, 751; 351 NW2d 248 (1984).
(…continued)
ordinary size and the benefit derived therefrom and shall be defined or determined
from time to time by the Township Board after consultation with the consulting
engineers for the Township and the County. Said determination of units shall be
based upon the studies made relative to the quantity of sewage generated by and
the benefit derived from different types of use and occupancy of premises and
shall be kept up to date and revised as needed as new studies are made and
through experience gained by the Township and County in actual operation.
[Emphasis added.]
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On its face, appellants’ complaint seeks a writ of mandamus ordering appellees to revise
the methodology used to determine the amount of the special assessment levied on the property.
However, inherent in, and at the essence of, appellants’ complaint is the claim that there is a need
for a revision. Appellants contend that the need for a revision is evidenced by the fact that the
assessments are not in proportion to the actual benefit they received. In our opinion, whether this
contention is correct is best determined by the utilization of the tax tribunal’s expertise in this
area. A review of the methodology used to establish the amount of the assessment, and a
determination as to whether the benefit conferred corresponds to the assessment levied, are
questions for the tax tribunal.
Appellants further claim that their complaint was properly filed in circuit court because
they seek a writ of mandamus. We disagree.
First, the tax tribunal has the authority to issue “writs.” MCL 205.732(c); MSA
7.650(32)(c). Second, even assuming the tax tribunal could not issue a writ of mandamus, as
argued by appellants, the tax tribunal could find that the methodology used to compute the
assessment was improper, and order an adjustment. If for some reason, appellees refused to
comply with the ordered adjustment, appellants may then be able to seek equitable relief to
enforce the order. See Wikman, supra at 648. We are of the opinion that the tax tribunal affords
appellants an adequate remedy.
Finally, appellants claim that the assessment amounts to a tax that violates the Headlee
Amendment2 because it was not approved by the voters. Headlee Amendment claims may be
brought, at the option of the party commencing the action, in the circuit court, or as original
actions in this Court. See Wayne Co Chief Executive v Governor, 230 Mich App 258, 269-270;
583 NW2d 512 (1998). Appellants did not raise such a claim in the trial court. Therefore, the
claim has not been properly preserved below. Environair, Inc v Steelcase, Inc, 190 Mich App
289, 295; 475 NW2d 366 (1991). In addition, this is an appeal as of right from the trial court’s
dismissal of appellants’ complaint seeking a writ of mandamus. To allow appellants to raise a
Headlee Amendment claim in this manner would be to allow appellants to raise this issue
without properly initiating an original action. We decline to allow appellants to do so. This
issue has not been properly preserved or presented, and will therefore not be addressed.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
2
Const 1963, art 9, §§ 25-34.
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