PEOPLE OF MI V JABBAR NEWSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 1, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 218198
Wayne Circuit Court,
Criminal Division
LC No. 98-006029
JABBAR NEWSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Doctoroff and K.F. Kelly, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA
28.549, assault with intent to do great bodily harm, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The trial court
sentenced defendant as an habitual offender (second offense), MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to
concurrent terms of thirty-five to fifty years imprisonment for the second-degree murder
conviction and fifteen to thirty years imprisonment for the assault with intent to do great bodily
harm conviction. The court also sentenced defendant to two years imprisonment for his felonyfirearm conviction, to be served consecutively to the other sentences. Defendant now appeals as
of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that he was denied his right to confrontation when the trial court limited
his cross-examination of Yarnell Waller, a prosecution witness. We review constitutional
questions de novo. People v Conat, 238 Mich App 134, 144; 605 NW2d 49 (1999).
A primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution is the right of cross-examination. People v Adamski, 198 Mich App
133, 138; 497 NW2d 546 (1993). A limitation on cross-examination that prevents a defendant
from placing before the jury facts from which the jurors may infer bias, prejudice, or lack of
credibility of a prosecution witness constitutes a denial of the right of confrontation. People v
Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 644; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
However, neither the Confrontation Clause nor due process confers an unlimited right to
admit all relevant evidence or cross-examine on any subject.” Adamski, supra at 138. The
Confrontation Clause guarantees only “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
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People v Chavies, 234 Mich App 274, 283; 593 NW2d 655 (1999), quoting United States v
Owens, 484 US 554, 559; 108 S Ct 838; 98 L Ed 2d 951 (1988). Moreover, trial judges retain
wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns such as
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is
repetitive or only marginally relevant. Adamski, supra.
Here, defendant contends that his right to confrontation was denied when the trial
court did not allow defendant to cross-examine and impeach Waller about how and when he
injured his right hand. We disagree. Defendant argued that Waller framed him to avoid
prosecution for the crime. However, other than defendant’s speculation, there was no evidence
presented at trial supporting defendant’s claim that Waller committed the crime. More
importantly, there was no evidence at trial supporting defendant’s contention that the man that
entered the apartment with the gun either already had an injured right hand or injured his right
hand during the shooting. Defendant’s attempt to impeach Waller on this matter was irrelevant
and would have been confusing to the jury. A defendant does not have the right to cross-examine
a witness on irrelevant issues. People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 564; 496 NW2d 336 (1992).
We find no error in the trial court’s decision to prevent defendant’s proposed cross-examination.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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