CITIZENS FOR FAIR HOUSING V CITY OF E LANSING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CITIZENS FOR FAIR HOUSING, WELLS
GOODSIR INVESTMENT, SARNIA
INVESTMENT GROUP, MICHAEL J. MORSE,
JAMES C. MULHOLLAND, JR., GREGORY
SPIRIDAKOS, EFFI SPIRIDAKOS, CHARLES
W. CROUCH, CELESTE M. CROUCH, DJH
REALTY COMPANY, JOHN A.
CLAUCHERTY, F. OWEN IRVINE, MELINDA
N. IRVINE, JIM HAGAN, L.L.C., and CHRISTA
ROBINSON,
UNPUBLISHED
April 20, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 219767
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 94-079225-CH
CITY OF EAST LANSING,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Markey and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion. The court
found that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant’s zoning
ordinances violated plaintiffs’ rights under the Michigan Constitution, the City Charter of East
Lansing, or the state zoning and civil rights statutes. Plaintiffs appeal the charter and
constitutional issues only. We affirm.
First, plaintiffs allege that defendant’s ordinances limiting the number of unrelated
persons who may reside in certain single- and family-zoned dwellings to two violate the city
charter’s prohibition of discrimination based on “marital or family status.” This Court reviews
decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456
Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there
is factual support for a claim and is reviewed to determine whether the affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, or any other documentary evidence establish a genuine issue of material fact to
warrant a trial. Spiek, supra at 337. This Court will give the nonmoving party the benefit of all
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reasonable inferences when determining whether summary disposition is appropriate. Betrand v
Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 618; 537 NW2d 185 (1995). Likewise, statutory interpretation is
considered de novo on appeal, as a question of law. Oakland Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs v Michigan
Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich 590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).
The rules of statutory construction apply to ordinances and city charters. See Gora v
Ferndale, 456 Mich 704, 711; 576 NW2d 141 (1998); Detroit v Walker, 445 Mich 682, 691; 520
NW2d 135 (1994). The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the Legislature. Frankenmuth Mutual Ins v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich
511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). Consequently, the first criterion in determining intent is the
specific statutory language – here, our focus is primarily on the city charter’s use of the phrase
“family status” as it relates to defendant’s ordinance definition of “family.” See In re MCI
Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). Each term in the
challenged provision should be given its plain and ordinary meaning unless a contextual or
technical meaning applies. MCL 8.3(a); MSA 2.212(1); Western Michigan Univ Bd of Control v
Michigan, 455 Mich 531, 539; 565 NW2d 828 (1997). Defendant’s ordinance § 5.5(19) defines
“family” as: “one person, two unrelated persons,” or persons within the first or second degree of
consanguinity, including stepchildren, adopted children, and those related by marriage. This
definition complies with our Supreme Court’s holding in McCready v Hoffius, 459 Mich 131,
145; 586 NW2d 723 (1998), partially vacated and remanded on other grounds 459 Mich 1235
(1999) (definition of “marital status” protected unmarried couple’s right to live together).
Defendant also provides a “domestic unit” category of family in § 5.5(19), in compliance with
Delta Charter Twp v Dinolfo, 419 Mich 253; 351 NW2d 831 (1984) (“functional family”):
“[I]ndividuals . . . whose relationship is . . . regular and permanent[,] domestic[,] or [has] a
demonstrable and recognizable bond where each party is responsible for . . . the other and all are
living . . . as a single housekeeping unit.”
A legislative body is deemed to know of other existing legislation on the same subject.
Walen v Dep’t of Corrections, 443 Mich 240, 248; 505 NW2d 519 (1993). Enactments that have
the same subject or a common purpose must be read together as one law, even if they contain no
reference to one another and were enacted on different dates. State Treasurer v Schuster, 456
Mich 408, 417; 572 NW2d 628 (1998), quoting Detroit v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 374 Mich
543, 558; 132 NW2d 660 (1965). This would include the civil rights act’s definition of “familial
status” in MCL 37.2103(e); MSA 3.548(100)(e). While it may appear that the intent of the city
charter was to preclude the specific type of discrimination allegedly promulgated by defendant’s
ordinances, “general language in a charter must yield to specific language.” Bivens v Grand
Rapids, 443 Mich 391, 398; 505 NW2d 239 (1993) (construing a municipal corporation city’s
charter). Therefore, a reasonable interpretation of the city charter’s definition of “family status”
and defendant’s ordinance definition of “family,” results in a finding that the specific ordinances
do not violate the charter’s general terms. Stated simply, defendant’s ordinances merely limit the
number of unrelated persons who may live together; they do not prevent landlords from renting
to “families,” including “domestic units.” See Stegeman v Ann Arbor, 213 Mich App 487, 493;
540 NW2d 724 (1995). Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary disposition on this
issue.
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With respect to plaintiffs’ second claim of error, we review de novo a due process
challenge to a zoning ordinance. English v Augusta Twp, 204 Mich App 33, 37; 514 NW2d 172
(1994). The standard used in considering plaintiffs’ claim regarding the constitutionality of these
zoning ordinances is the familiar rational relation test. Stegeman, supra at 492. The right to live
with one’s family is constitutionally protected, Moore v East Cleveland, 431 US 494; 97 S Ct
1932; 52 L Ed 2d 531 (1977), but the right to live with any number of individuals who are not
one’s “family” is not. Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1, 8; 94 S Ct 1536; 39 L Ed 2d
797 (1974). Belle Terre held that an ordinance like that challenged in Delta Charter Twp did not
require heightened scrutiny, nor did it violate federal due process concerning the eight college
students who illegally leased one house. A factually similar case to the one at issue, our Supreme
Court held in Delta Charter Twp that the zoning ordinance’s goals – “preservation of traditional
family values, maintenance of property values, and population and density control” – were
“rational” and “laudable” under the Michigan Constitution. Delta Charter Twp, supra at 270271. Nevertheless, the Delta Charter Twp Court struck down the ordinance because it would
even allow a restriction on a “functional family.” Id. at 272-273. However, as previously stated,
defendant’s ordinance contains a “domestic unit” designation, comporting with Delta Charter
Twp’s “functional family” category.
In Stegeman, supra at 489-490, we upheld a similar Ann Arbor ordinance that precluded
more than six unrelated individuals from living in a single-family house, in part because the Ann
Arbor ordinance did not attempt to regulate functional or biological families. Neither do
defendant’s. In Stegeman, we echoed Dinolfo’s reasoning that unrelated college students living
together are not protected by the “functional family” category of an ordinance. Id. at 491.
Because of this, and because defendant’s ordinances leave untouched other residential zones for
unrelated groups of persons, there is no due process violation.
Plaintiffs’ third claim, based on equal protection, also fails under the same rational
relation test. Stegeman, supra at 492. We rely on the reasoning set forth in Stegeman, in
particular, the following:
Arguably, the Ann Arbor ordinance’s restriction of functional family to no
more than six individuals plus their offspring may run afoul of the decision in
Delta Twp. This, however, depends upon the Delta Twp Court’s meaning of “a
rational limitation to the numbers of persons that may occupy a dwelling.”
[Dinolfo, supra] at 277 . . . . However, we need not interpret that phrase here
because there is no serious contention that the groups of students to whom
plaintiffs rent constitute the functional equivalent of families under the zoning
ordinance without regard to the number of such individuals that may constitute a
functional family. [Stegeman, supra at 491 n 1.]
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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