PEOPLE OF MI V JAMAL S ALLEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 23, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 218921
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-003030
JAMAL S. ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Cooper, JJ.
COOPER, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The trial court in this case failed to
define the meaning of reasonable doubt. The majority opinion opines that a trial court is not
required to define reasonable doubt and cites two cases from the 1920’s. The majority believes
these cases have never been overruled or modified.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47; 610 NW2d 551 (2000),
very carefully outlined the essential differences between structural and non-structural
constitutional error. Citing the United States Supreme Court, in Neder v United States, 527 US
1, 8; 119 S Ct 1827; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999), they emphasized that if the error is structural,
reversal is automatic.
Structural errors, as explained in Neder, are intrinsically harmful, without regard
to their effect on the outcome, so as to require automatic reversal. Such an error
necessarily renders unfair or unreliable the determining of guilt or innocence. As
the United States Supreme Court said in Rose v Clark, structural errors deprive
defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably
serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence. [Duncan,
supra at 51-52 (citations omitted).]
Most unpreserved claims of instructional error are reviewed for plain error that affect
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). However,
a structural constitutional error is automatically reversible and not subject to the harmless error
analysis of Carines. Duncan, supra at 57.
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In the examples referred to in Neder, as quoted in Duncan, the Michigan Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court specifically note that a defective reasonable doubt
instruction is structural error.
Defendant is constitutionally entitled to have every element of his criminal offenses
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275, 277-278; 113 S Ct 2078;
124 L Ed 2d 182 (1993). In order for a reasonable doubt instruction to pass scrutiny, “the
instruction, when read in its entirety, must leave no doubt in the mind of the reviewing court that
the jury understood the burden which was placed upon the prosecution and what constituted a
reasonable doubt.” People v Jackson, 167 Mich App 388, 391; 421 NW2d 697 (1988). In the
instant case the trial court simply informed the jury that each element of defendant’s crimes must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In Duncan, the Court held that a “wholesale failure to
define an offense for the jury” resulted in structural constitutional error that required automatic
reversal. Duncan, supra at 56.
The failure to provide the jury with any definition of reasonable doubt is clearly error
requiring reversal. The majority refers to the fact that the trial court read a preliminary
instruction to an unsworn venire prior to jury selection. However, in Duncan the Michigan
Supreme Court decided that instructions given to potential jury members during jury selection
were insufficient to fully instruct the later impaneled jury. Id. at 49-50. Consequently, the
Duncan Court did not permit these preliminary jury instructions to correct the erroneous
omission of an instruction before jury deliberations. Id.
Additionally, the Michigan Court Rules require that, absent the parties’ consent, the court
must instruct the jury as required and appropriate after closing arguments are made. MCR
6.414(F).
With an improper reasonable doubt instruction there can be no presumption that the jury
made findings of fact beyond a reasonable doubt upon which a reviewing court could rely.
Sullivan, supra. However, without any definition of reasonable doubt it would be virtually
impossible for this Court to comprehend what the jury believed constituted a reasonable doubt.
Irrespective of the amount of evidence, convicting defendant without a proper reasonable
doubt instruction would negate his constitutional rights to a trial by jury and due process.
Presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is the crux of criminal
jurisprudence and its importance should not be given mere passing reference when instructing
criminal juries. See In re Winship, 397 US 358, 374; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970),
People v Goss, 446 Mich 587, 639-640; 521 NW2d 312 (1994).
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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