HORACE MANN INS CO V XUE WEN ZHENG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
XUE WEN ZHENG, XIU YAN LIU, and ZIQINE
YE,
No. 221731
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98-009587-CK
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Neff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiff sought a ruling that it did not owe a duty to
defend or indemnify its insured, defendant Ziqine Ye, in an underlying civil action brought
against Ye to recover for injuries sustained by a third party, defendant Xue Wen Zheng, during a
fight. Plaintiff appeals by leave granted the June 28, 1999, order denying its motion for summary
disposition. We reverse.
Review of a motion for summary disposition is de novo. Baker v Arbor Drugs, 215 Mich
App 198, 202; 544 NW2d 727 (1996). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis
underlying the plaintiff’s claim. This Court’s task is to review the record evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn from it, and decide whether a genuine issue regarding any material
fact exists to warrant a trial. Id.
I
Plaintiff argues that the injuries resulting from the fight do not constitute an “occurrence”
within the meaning of the policy, and as a matter of law, coverage is not triggered. Additionally,
plaintiff argues that the policy’s unambiguous exclusion of coverage for injuries resulting
directly or indirectly from the insured’s intentional acts bars recovery. Thus, based on either of
these theories, plaintiff asserts it has no duty to defend its insured, defendant Ye, in the
underlying action, and that summary disposition for plaintiff should have been granted.
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The insured, defendant Ye, argues that his actions were unintentional and that his conduct
did not result in any harm that he expected or intended, and that he was merely trying to defend
himself; accordingly, Ye argues, neither the occurrence requirement nor the intentional acts
exclusion should operate to bar coverage, and that at the very least there is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether he was acting in self-defense.
II
We find it unnecessary to address plaintiff’s first theory relating to whether the fight was
an “occurrence” because this case is controlled by Auto-Owners Ins Co v Harrington, 455 Mich
377, 385-386; 565 NW2d 839 (1997)1, where the Supreme Court held that “[t]o except injurious
action taken in self-defense from the intentional-acts exclusion would impermissibly disregard
the clear language of the exclusion in the contract between insurer and insured.” The Court also
made the following pertinent observation:
Indeed, while the Harringtons argue that acts taken in self-defense are not
“intentional” because they are reactionary and a justifiable response to
unwarranted aggression, this reasoning fails because the exclusion does not
qualify the injuries excluded from coverage with terms such as “wrongful” or
“unjustified.” [Id. at 385.]
The record clearly indicates that defendant Ye acted intentionally during his participation in the
fight with defendant Zheng. It is significant that the exclusion in the policy in this case applies
when the resulting injuries were intended or expected. See id. at 384, n 6. In order for an injury
to be “expected,” it must be the “natural, foreseeable, expected, and anticipatory result of an
intentional act by the insured.” Id. Under Harrington, the “intended or expected” language “bars
coverage for injuries caused by an insured who acted intentionally despite his awareness that
harm was likely to follow from his conduct.” Id. at 384.
Defendant Ye himself testified that at one point, the fight became a “mutual fight” and
that he “probably threw some punches” at Zheng. Ye also testified that he noticed that Zheng’s
nose “got bloody” and that he “tried to use left elbow, try to knock him out.” Thus, even relying
solely on Ye’s version of events as reflected in his own testimony, it is undisputed that Ye took
part in a fight and intentionally punched Zheng and tried to knock him unconscious with his
elbow. According to Ye, before the fight outside, a “big argument” had already begun inside the
restaurant where the parties had been meeting. Before the physical confrontation began, Ye even
handed his glasses to another man, and admittedly said, “this guy really want[s] to fight with me”
and expressed his disbelief. Ye could have left the restaurant, he could have called the police, or
he could have remained in the restaurant, but instead, he accepted Zheng’s offer to fight outside,
and the fight, resulting in injury to Zheng, ensued.
1
The pertinent portions of the insurance policy at issue in this case are, for all intents and
purposes, identical to the policy under consideration in Harrington.
-2-
Even giving Ye the benefit of the doubt and assuming for purposes of analysis that he
acted solely in self-defense, as noted above, the Michigan Supreme Court has rejected the
argument that actions taken in self-defense should not be characterized as intentional acts for
purposes of exclusions in insurance contracts. See id. at 377; There is nothing ambiguous about
the wording of the contract at issue, and there is no claim which “even arguably” falls within the
policy coverage. See Detroit Edison Co v Michigan Mutual Ins Co, 102 Mich App 136, 141142; 301 NW2d 832 (1980). Given the holding in Harrington, supra, it makes no practical
difference who threw the first punch. Summary disposition should have been granted to plaintiff.
Furthermore, neither defendants Ye nor Zheng can avoid the implications of the rules
regarding “intentional” conduct merely by pointing to language in the complaint disingenuously
characterizing defendant Ye’s participation in the fight as the negligent flailing of arms. See
Tobin v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 174 Mich App 516, 517-518; 436 NW2d 402 (1988)
(“[t]here is no duty to defend or provide coverage where a complaint is merely an attempt to
trigger insurance coverage by characterizing allegations of tortious conduct as ‘negligent’
activity . . . . The duty to defend is not limited by the precise language of the pleadings.”).
III
Plaintiff also argues it has no duty to defend or indemnify regarding civil conspiracy and
tortious interference with contractual relations claims because such claims require intentional
acts as necessary elements of their commission, which automatically invokes the intentional acts
exclusion within the policy. We agree.
Neither civil conspiracy, nor tortious interference, can occur accidentally or
unintentionally. Hutton v Roberts, 182 Mich App 153, 157; 451 NW2d 536 (1989); Feaheny v
Caldwell, 175 Mich App 291, 307; 437 NW2d 358 (1989). Thus, both claims are necessarily
barred by the intentional acts exclusion. Furthermore, Liu’s loss of consortium claim must fail
because Zheng and Liu’s primary claims fail. In Long v Chelsea Community Hosp, 219 Mich
App 578, 589; 557 NW2d 157 (1996), this Court held that “a derivative claim for loss of
consortium stands or falls with the primary claims in the complaint. Because plaintiff's other
claims failed, the loss of consortium claim must likewise fail.” Id. We conclude that because the
claims of negligence, tortious interference, and conspiracy fail; therefore the loss of consortium
claim must similarly fail.
Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of plaintiff. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
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