PEOPLE OF MI V MARTEZ DEMARIO STEWART
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 221310
Jackson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-88206 DL
MARTEZ DEMARIO STEWART,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and White and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, who was thirteen years old at the time, was charged with open murder, MCL
750.316; MSA 28.548, in connection with the stabbing death of fourteen-year-old Stacy Davis.
He pleaded guilty of that offense, leaving it to the family court to determine the degree of
murder. Following a two day bench trial, the family court found defendant guilty of seconddegree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, and defendant pleaded guilty of that offense. At the
disposition hearing, the court determined that it would sentence defendant as an adult, rejecting
the defense’s request for a delayed or blended sentence. The court sentenced defendant to
parolable life imprisonment.1 Defendant appeals as on leave granted. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court clearly erred in its factual determinations and
abused its discretion when it sentenced him as an adult. Defendant argues that he should have
received a blended sentence, that no evidence was presented that he planned this crime or of
previous juvenile delinquency. Defendant argues that although he was learning impaired, he was
in the appropriate grade for his age at school before the offense, and that he excelled
academically at the youth home while awaiting disposition for the instant offense. Defendant
argues he had a history of responding well to mental health treatment, and because of his young
age is malleable and more capable of permanently modifying his behavior.
1
Defendant’s appellate brief mistakenly argues defendant’s sentence was for non-parolable life
imprisonment. See MCL 791.234(6); MSA 28.2304(6).
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The prosecution argues that defendant consciously chose to commit the crime and did so
alone. It argues that defendant’s admission demonstrated that he “hunted down” the victim in
her own house and prevented her escape. The prosecution argues that defendant had engaged in
prior criminal behavior by committing thefts from stores, homes and automobiles and that
defendant had a history of repeated school suspensions beginning in third grade for fighting,
refusing to do school work, and intimidating female students. The prosecution argues that
defendant was involved in several incidents while in the youth home awaiting sentencing for the
instant matter and that sentencing defendant as a juvenile would be an entirely inadequate
punishment. The prosecution argues that, contrary to defendant’s assertions, a delayed or
blended sentence would provide no closure to the victim’s family and would not meet a primary
goal of sentencing, punishment.
A
This Court’s review of a trial court’s determination to sentence a minor as a juvenile or an
adult is bifurcated. People v Thenghkam, 240 Mich App 29, 41-42; 610 NW2d 571 (2000);
MCL 712A.18(1)(n); MSA 27.3178(598.18)(1)(n). We review the factual findings supporting
the court’s determination regarding each statutory factor for clear error, focusing on whether the
court made a required finding of fact and whether the record supports that relevant finding.
Thenghkam, supra at 41-42. “[T]he absence of a required finding of fact or a factual finding
without support in the record constitutes clear error.” Id. at 42. Our review of the ultimate
decision whether to sentence the minor as a juvenile or as an adult is for abuse of discretion.
This second part of the analysis scrutinizes how the court weighed its factual findings to come to
the ultimate sentencing decision. Id. at 42.
The prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the best interests of the juvenile and the public would be served by imposing a sentence as
though the juvenile were an adult offender. MCR 6.931(E)(2). MCL 712A.18(1)(n); MSA
27.3178(598.18)(1)(n) provides:
(1) If the court finds that a juvenile concerning whom a petition is filed is not
within this chapter, the court shall enter an order dismissing the petition. Except
as otherwise provided in subsection (10), if the court finds that a juvenile is within
this chapter, the court may enter any of the following orders of disposition that are
appropriate for the welfare of the juvenile and society in view of the facts proven
and ascertained:
***
(n) If the court entered a judgment of conviction under section 2d of this chapter,
enter any disposition under this section or, if the court determines that the best
interests of he public would be served, impose any sentence upon the juvenile that
could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense for which the juvenile
was convicted. . . . The court may delay imposing a sentence of imprisonment
under this subdivision for a period not longer than the period during which the
court has jurisdiction over the juvenile under this chapter by entering an order of
disposition delaying imposition of sentence and placing the juvenile on probation
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upon the terms and conditions it considers appropriate, including any disposition
under this section. If the court delays imposing sentence under this section,
section 18i of this chapter applies. If the court imposes sentence, it shall enter a
judgment of sentence. If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment, the
juvenile shall receive credit against the sentence for time served before
sentencing. In determining whether to enter an order of disposition or impose a
sentence under this subdivision, the court shall consider all of the following
factors, giving greater weight to the seriousness of the offense and the juvenile’s
prior record:
(i) The seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community protection,
including, but not limited to, the existence of any aggravating factors recognized
by the sentencing guidelines, the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, and
the impact on any victim.
(ii) The juvenile’s culpability in committing the alleged offense, including, but not
limited to, the level of the juvenile’s participation in planning and carrying out the
offense and the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors recognized by
the sentencing guidelines.
(iii) The juvenile’s prior record of delinquency including, but not limited to, any
record of detention, any police record, any school record, or any other evidence
indicating prior delinquent behavior.
(iv) The juvenile’s programming history, including, but not limited to, the
juvenile’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming.
(v) The adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile
justice system.
(vi) The dispositional options available to the juvenile. [MCL 769.1(3); MSA
28.1072(3). See also MCR 6.931(E)(3).]
Michigan law permits delayed sentencing for juveniles tried as adults in “designated
cases.” Thenghkam, supra at 40 n 12, citing MCL 712A.18(1)(n); MSA 27.3178(598.18)(1)(n).
The delayed or blended sentencing option permits the family court to delay sentencing of a
juvenile until the juvenile becomes an adult. While the juvenile is still a minor, the court
imposes probation, but may attach any term that could be imposed as a disposition. Id.
B
Defendant was thirteen years old on the day in question, and the neighbor of victim Stacy
Davis. Testimony established that on the day of the murder, Stacy and a friend walked home
from school at approximately 3:30 p.m., stopping to buy pop at a party store. The friend left
Stacy at her house and recalled that Stacy was carrying her book bag, clarinet, and her can of pop.
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Defendant’s statement to Liane Morgan, the Youth Services Director for the Jackson
Family Court, included the following:
Planned to break in and steal something. Went in back door - followed Stacy in.
She came in back door, surprised to see Martez. Stacy said something to Martez.
She dropped her things trying to get back out the door. She fell down basement
stairs. She got up and tried to run past Martez on the landing. Martez head back
to door. Martez put feet against door blocking it. She ran into kitchen and Martez
caught up with her. Stacy knocked over the knife holder - some fell on floor and
some in sink. She grabbed one of the knives and Martez grabbed it and it got
bent. Martez took a different knife and stabbed her. She was trying to get away
and he stabbed her in the back. Stabbed her several times after that happened fast.
Can’t remember stabbing her after she fell. Don’t know how knife got in garbage.
Can’t remember if he used another knife. Don’t remember any conversation
between the two of them. Stacy was still breathing when he left. Didn’t clean
anything up and didn’t steal anything. Left out back door and went home and
changed clothes in bedroom. Hid shorts in basement and boxer shorts in back of
garage. Went to see friends after that. Don’t know how telephone got knocked
off the wall. Don’t remember Stacy trying to call anyone.
Laurence Furnas testified that Stacy’s younger brother, Travis Davis, ran over to the
Furnas home after going in his own house and observing blood on the floor. Furnas went to the
Davis home with Travis and observed that the back door was wide open and Stacy’s clarinet case
and keys were lying on the floor. Furnas stayed with Travis outside the home until Stacy’s
father, Ricky Davis, arrived and called 9-1-1. Furnas testified that he observed defendant that
afternoon and that he appeared “calm and collected.”
Ricky Davis testified that he arrived home and found Stacy’s body in a pool of blood.
After calling 9-1-1, he was instructed on how to perform CPR, which he did until paramedics
arrived. Paramedics were unable to help Stacy and she was pronounced dead. Mr. Davis
testified that he observed defendant sitting on his front porch with his mother and stepfather, and
that defendant was looking at him but appeared “calm.” He explained that almost a year earlier
defendant had been banned from the Davis home after he got into a shoving match with Travis
during a basketball game. Mr. Davis stated that nothing had been stolen from the home.
Dale Markiewicz, an evidence technician with the Jackson Police Department, testified
that a knife was found in a garbage can, a broken knife handle was found on the kitchen counter,
and another knife handle was found on the stove. Bloody footprints surrounded Stacy’s body. A
ring on Stacy’s right hand and her sunglasses were broken and she was missing an earring. The
knives found were determined to have been from the knife block on the kitchen counter.
Police officer Maurice R. Crawford testified that while interviewing students at Stacy’s
school, he noticed that defendant’s tennis shoes appeared to have the same pattern observed at
the crime scene. A search warrant was obtained and defendant’s shoes were examined. The
shoes matched the pattern found in blood at the crime scene. DNA testing confirmed that blood
found on the tennis shoes belonged to Stacy. A search warrant was subsequently obtained for
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defendant’s home and a pair of defendant’s shorts covered in blood were found in the basement.
A pair of defendant’s underwear was found in the garbage outside of defendant’s home and also
contained blood. In addition, defendant’s fingerprint and palmprint were found on the knives
removed from the crime scene. Stacy’s blood was also found on the knives.
Forensic Pathologist Ruben Ortiz Reyes conducted the autopsy and concluded that Stacy
had been stabbed thirty-three times in the chest, left arm, and back. The stab wounds were
consistent with the knives recovered by police. The majority of the wounds were directed at the
heart and lungs. Ortiz Reyes concluded that Stacy did not die immediately because blood was
found in her lungs, indicating that she continued to breathe while sustaining the injuries. The
stab wounds were found to be the cause of death.
The family court found defendant guilty of second-degree murder, finding no evidence of
premeditation or deliberation, and defendant entered a guilty plea to that offense.
C
At the July 15, 1999 disposition hearing, Don Venema, a probation agent with the
Department of Corrections who prepared defendant’s presentence report, recommended that
defendant be sentenced as an adult, to a term of 430 to 650 months. Venema testified that
defendant’s strengths were that he had no prior substance abuse history, no prior criminal record,
no major health problems, and was continuing with his education. Defendant’s weaknesses were
that he did not have strong family support, and had almost nothing in the way of community
support. Venema testified that he believed the 430 to 650 month sentence was appropriate
because the DOC’s goal was to protect society, and Venema believed that society could best be
protected “by putting this individual away for a long period of time with the hope that there was
some reform on his part once he’s let back into society.” Venema testified that he had considered
the goals of punishment, deterrence, protection of the community and rehabilitation, in arriving
at his recommendation regarding defendant and that he did not believe that the court’s foremost
concern should be rehabilitation because of the violence involved in this case. Venema testified
on cross-examination that the DOC would not offer the treatment and services available in the
juvenile facility.
Luella Burke, warden of the Michigan Youth Correctional Facility, testified that it was a
brand new facility opening the following week and would house juveniles sentenced as adults
until they reached age twenty. Depending on their sentence, after age twenty, they would go to a
Department of Corrections facility. Burke testified that the facility was state of the art, had a
school with ten classrooms, staff for both academic and vocational programming, computers,
large general and law library, a gymnasium, yard, had one housing unit with double-celled
prisoners and another housing unit that would house prisoners individually. She testified that
educational programming will include adult basic education, special education, pre-GED and
GED education, and food technology and building maintenance classes. Burke testified that
classes will take place daily all year long. The facility will have approximately 450 beds and
Burke expected that it would house inmates from age thirteen through nineteen. Burke testified
that the facility will have case managers headed by a clinical psychologist, and will have the
ability to do outpatient mental health programming. Burke also testified:
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It’s our intent to use a program called cognitive restructuring, and I guess most
simply put is, it’s a way of working with an individual and all levels of staff. It’s
a program that you use not only with treatment staff, but you also have the
corrections officers who have probably as much contact with a prisoner as anyone
involved in the program. And probably a term that’s more familiar might be
behavior modification, in the sense that it’s real important for anyone to learn how
to do time that’s important for anyone to learn how to do time that’s going to be in
prison, and the opportunities for programing [sic] are there.
On the other hand, we have a need to protect prisoners when they’re inside and
staff as well. So the intent of the program is to work on a very individualized
basis with prisoners, to have them recognize behavior problems that are causing
them to get in trouble.
Now, in our case, within the prison environment, they’re already in our system.
We’re beyond the crime itself. Now it’s, you know, managing – managing their
time so that hopefully they can learn some of the things that got them in trouble in
the past and correct that behavior.
Burke testified that the facility is a maximum security prison equipped with sixteen-foot fences
and wire. She testified that if defendant were sentenced as an adult he would definitely be placed
at the new facility. She testified that fewer than one hundred juveniles had been sentenced as
adults in Michigan, thus defendant’s placement at the new facility would be assured.
Karen Johns, a social worker with the Family Independence Agency, recommended that
the trial court sentence defendant as a juvenile and to a medium security facility. Johns testified
that she was not in a position to evaluate the new youth correctional facility Burke testified about
because she knew little about it. Johns testified that defendant did not fall into the category of
offenders with severe mental health issues, medications or sexual predator type behavior. Johns
testified that defendant had been involved in several serious incidents at the youth center, but that
did not cause her concern regarding his ability to adjust to a juvenile facility because other
juveniles she had worked with had had more severe problems. Johns testified that if sentenced as
a juvenile, defendant would most likely go to the Maxey facility, which has a medium security
campus and a maximum security campus called Green Oaks. She testified that Maxey’s primary
goal is rehabilitation and that a juvenile not successfully rehabilitated could be required to repeat
the program before release. Johns testified that part of the rehabilitation process requires a
defendant to discuss the commission of the offense and its impact on the victim’s family.
Further, the facility offers substance abuse programs, which Johns testified were helpful even if
the juvenile had no prior problems in that area. On cross-examination, Johns testified that
defendant’s adjustment to the Youth Center had been erratic, but that he had displayed good
behavior as well as bad. She testified that she believed that the Maxey facility was fully
equipped to deal with children like defendant and that she knew of several young residents there
that had committed murder. As to Green Oaks, Johns testified that it was a maximum security,
locked facility, surrounded by high fences where the juveniles are not allowed to be anywhere
without staff present.
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Dr. Lynne Schwartz, a consulting forensic examiner for the Center for Forensic
Psychiatry, testified that defendant was referred to her three times, once for competency, once for
criminal responsibility and the third time for a special diagnostic evaluation for use at
defendant’s sentencing. She recommended that defendant be sentenced as a juvenile, to the
Maxey Green Oaks facility.
Dr. Schwartz testified that she met with defendant five times for approximately twelve or
thirteen hours, and prepared a report after consulting with a number of persons regarding juvenile
programming. Defendant reported to Dr. Schwartz that he had stolen from stores, broken into
cars and had broken into a house with several peers. Defendant told her that he stopped doing so
and was “trying to be good” after he participated in a diversion program. Dr. Schwartz opined
that defendant could be rehabilitated, but that it would be impossible to predict how long it
would take to treat an individual such as defendant and that there were no guarantees. She
opined that “a program that is geared to individuals with the kinds of problems and deficits that
Martez had done intensely in this critical period, which I think this is a critical period when
adolescents can begin to form identity, not just based on the family, but with peers, to have an
opportunity to participate in a program that emphasizes pro-social values, empathy, concern for
others, at this point when his character is still in formation.” Dr. Schwartz opined that defendant
had problems with anger and with controlling his behavior. He also had problems with
impulsivity, and Dr. Schwartz opined that he would particularly benefit from programs
developed to stop thinking in many different ways. Dr. Schwartz testified that defendant was
several years behind what would be expected for his age in terms of his judgment and
psychosocial development. She testified that she did not have an opportunity to really evaluate
his past and that for some reason defendant did not feel very good about himself, and that was
exacerbated by the act of killing Stacy. Dr. Schwartz testified that looking at defendant’s whole
record, there was a consistent pattern of a young man exhibiting signs of depression and low selfesteem, and that in some ways she was more concerned about him hurting himself than others.
Dr. Schwartz testified that defendant was in early adolescence, which is a critical period in which
a big cognitive shift occurs. During adolescence, more is expected in terms of abstract thinking,
and Dr. Schwartz testified that she did not believe defendant was at that point, that he still
“thinks concretely,” and that he does not bring in a lot of different perspectives when he makes
decisions. She testified that the period of the next three or four years were going to be critical for
defendant. She testified that she “did not see evidence of persistent characterlogical [sic] ways of
relating to the world that seems so entrenched or so ingrained, I think that this is a time period
when he is open susceptible to the kind of pro-social change that would be critical.”
Dr. Schwartz testified that when he was nine years old, defendant had made effective use
of treatment that was offered and available (from November 1994 to February 1995):
When it was offered and available to him. I mean, in some ways the records
showed that he was having problems in school; again, walking out of class, being
somewhat defiant, talking in class, and he was fighting, getting into trouble in
school, and he, in the last three weeks of his treatment, he showed that he was –
there was a marked reduction, according to the school, according to the mother,
and according to Martez, who was feeling better about being successful.
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He was using play therapy effectively, from my interpretation of the records.
They weren’t greatly detailed, but he was using the treatment to talk about his
feelings or play or act out his feelings so that they could be explored, and he was
using the therapist appropriately to test out the limits of his behavior, which has
been a consistent problem for him, and to adapt to limits when they were set,
which I saw that he was able to do with me also in our interviews.
When asked what other factors she considered in making the determination that there was
a possibility that defendant could be rehabilitated, Dr. Schwartz testified:
Well, the fact that he hasn’t had treatment, except for this one time. The fact that
out of all the records that I reviewed, I did not see the kind of history that would
support a – I didn’t see anything that led me with a – to explore the hypothesis any
further that he was the kind of child that other people saw as chronically,
persistently, severely, behaviorally disordered.
Q Just didn’t see it?
A In school he was assessed for learning problems. He was assessed with
emotional impairment, which many kids that do have the kinds of problems that
Martez has are put into emotionally impaired classes.
At times, I’ve read reports where at the end of the report they say this youngster
doesn’t fit the emotionally impaired classroom, but they are seen as socially
maladapted, and that’s why they’re not going to get special ed services.
None of that was put in there with Martez. He wasn’t seen as exhibiting the kinds
of problems that that kind of interventions that would be given to a child like that
were put into place. He was turned down for services or wasn’t felt to be
qualified for services. He doesn’t have a long history of offenses that came in
front of the court. He hasn’t had an opportunity, therefore, to have other sanctions
imposed that one would have been able to look to see how he benefited from
those sanctions. So there is a lot, you know, that it not known because these
behaviors were not seen as problematic.
One thing about Martez, and it goes to the story that, as I said, he is only at the
very beginning stages, in my opinion, of being able to accept full responsibility. I
mean, he – he says he did this act, and he takes responsibility for it. I think that
the quality of his general way that he presents himself, which is to sort of blame
other people and externalize responsibility, remarkably I felt he did not do that in
talking about the murder.
Q Okay.
A While it was very difficult for him to talk about it, at no time did he blame
Stacy for his behavior, did he say he was – which is what I hear at the forensic
center, I was provoked, it was her fault, she did something, he did this, and
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therefore. There was none of that [,] which I thought was promising, although
there were many troubling signs, that was a promising, optimistic sign.
Q When you talked with him, did you get into him about his feelings, as far as
remorse or lack of remorse is concerned?
A Yes, I did.
Q What did you come away with from that?
A Martez feels – what Martez feels is difficult to get to. That is – that’s clear.
He expressed sorrow for his act.
He talked about it in a – in my report, I mentioned that he felt helpless, in terms of
how to show it, how to say he was sorry, how one could do that, and he articulated
that there’s nothing that anybody could say. There’s nothing that he could say that
would make up for what he did, essentially.
Dr. Schwartz testified that there was nothing in her evaluation that suggested that defendant
lacked the capacity for empathy. She concluded that there was a possibility that defendant could
be rehabilitated, and that he “would require a highly structured, intensive, comprehensive
program to ameliorate many of the deficits and problems that he’s exhibiting.” She opined that
Maxey’s Green Oaks was highly suitable for defendant and a good match, and that its program is
“consistent with other programs around the country that are doing work in re-socialization with
youngsters who murder.”
The court asked Dr. Schwartz a number of questions:
Q I think it was asked, but maybe not in this exact way: Do you know what,
about Martez’s psychological makeup, caused him to do what he did.
A I agonized over trying to put the pieces together, and it would be highly
speculative of me to render an answer to that that would be meaningful.
I have some hypotheses, but that’s as far as I could go with it. I think his
problem-solving skills, obviously, are not – are not great. I think that he gets
overwhelmed in situations that involve a lot of affect.
My sense is that the beginning of the act may have occurred out of being
consistent with his sort of defiance, bending the rules a little bit. He wasn’t
allowed to go over to the property, to the house, and as tragic as it sounds, it may
have begun in that way. That’s about – once it got started, I can’t really say how it
would relate to anything in his background. I don’t think this was – anything that
I saw in his background would not have predicted this act.
Q I guess given that answer, is there any way at some point in the future then of
this Court making a determination as to what the risk of him doing such a thing
again.
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A I think that the information is being gathered now for these very questions
because we’re just beginning to have data on children who commit these acts.
I feel, as I said in my report, this did not feel like an act of someone who was
hardened, who had criminal sophistication, who planned this out, who thought it
through, and those are the kinds of behaviors and the kinds of thinking that need
to be altered, obviously, in treatment, and that kind of treatment has been shown
to be successful.
I wasn’t able to get very much data from Maxey, but I did from a similar program
in California, the Capital Offenders Program in Texas – excuse me, in Texas, and
they have a low recidivism rate. I think there were 85 – in the latest statistics, 85
juveniles who were convicted of murder and went through their program. One
committed another violent crime, it wasn’t another murder, and the rest of the
kids, there were few crimes of any type, so we don’t –we’re just beginning to look
at risk factors in juveniles.
The problem with juveniles, as opposed to adults, is that we don’t have the same
kind of character, the entrenchment of the character as an early adolescent, even a
mid-adolescent.
The personality disorders that would be most related to high risk can’t even be
diagnosed before an individual is eighteen because there is this normative period
where some of Martez’s behaviors are part of being adolescent, and then, of
course, some are his particular problems.
So it’s difficult to say now. At some point later down the road where people have
had much more time to work with Martez and to – I think that would be a time
when these questions could be answered.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Laura Quinn, defendant’s remedial math teacher at Parkside Middle School, testified that
defendant had not been labeled as needing special education. She taught in the regular education
program, but had a degree and years of teaching emotionally impaired students. Quinn testified
regarding defendant’s behavior that female students complained to her that defendant was hitting,
pushing, intimidating, and threatening them, and that the girls were scared to come forward but
also scared not to. Quinn testified that defendant did not disrupt class during class time.
However, she testified that another student of hers had been convicted of murder, and that she
believed that the type of behavior defendant manifested in school was more serious than what she
witnessed of the other student convicted of murder. She testified that Stacy had been one of her
students and that she was “a beautiful, talented young lady that I liked a lot. I felt special feelings
for her.” Quinn testified that there was nothing in Stacy’s behavior to suggest that she would
have provoked defendant.
Liane Morgan, youth services director for the Jackson County Family Court, testified that
she assigned herself to be defendant’s caseworker because she knew it was going to be a very
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difficult case and because the probation officers she supervised felt they would have a conflict of
interest if they kept the case. Morgan testified that she supervised the weekly visits from
defendant’s mother and grandmother while defendant was at the Youth Center over ten months
or so. She testified that defendant refused to discuss the murder with his mother and was
reluctant and vague when Morgan questioned him about details of the murder. Morgan testified
that defendant had had ups and downs at the Youth Center and that defendant was involved in
various incidents there, including a verbal confrontation with another resident during which
defendant told the youth he was going to kill him, and defendant had to be restrained by staff.
Another incident occurred when defendant was ordered to return to his room after he refused to
do his school work and displayed a poor attitude. Once in his room, defendant began swearing,
threatening staff, and pounding on the walls with his fists. Morgan stated that defendant had to
be removed by four adults and taken to the “max room.” Another incident occurred when a
female staff member checked on defendant while he was in his room. Morgan testified that
defendant had written a sexually obscene note and placed it on the door saying, “When can I f___
you, Patty?” Another sexually explicit note was found on another occasion, stating “I want to
f___ you in the ass now.” Morgan stated that defendant continually had difficulty following
directions and completing schoolwork, and repeatedly had difficulty with authority. She
recommended that the trial court sentence defendant as an adult:
After much consideration and angst, I feel that Martez should be sentenced as an
adult. I think we have to weigh all the factors.
Q Do you have concerns about his ability to be successful in the juvenile system
in terms of being rehabilitated?
A I think rehabilitation should be a primary goal. I think he’s very vulnerable.
He definitely needs treatment, but I’m hopeful that the new prison facility would
be able to offer him that.
On cross-examination, Morgan conceded that in the ten months defendant had been at the Youth
Center there had only been four incidents, and none of them had involved an assault. She also
testified that defendant had reached the advanced level at the Center several times.
Ricky Davis and Carolyn Kimbro Davis, Stacy’s aunt, both requested that defendant
receive life imprisonment because he was impossible to rehabilitate and the victim’s family
needed closure. Willy Brown, defendant’s stepfather, Michelle Powell, defendant’s mother, and
Donella Edwards spoke on behalf of defendant and asked that counseling and treatment be
provided defendant in a juvenile setting.
Defense counsel requested that in light of defendant’s age and absence of criminal
history, a blended sentence be imposed to afford defendant the opportunity to prove that he can
be rehabilitated and become a productive member of a society. He argued to the court that it
would risk nothing by imposing such a sentence because defendant would go to Maxey’s Green
Oaks Center, a high security facility that specialized in treating youths who have committed
similar crimes. Defense counsel argued that the court would have opportunity to review
defendant’s progress annually or sooner, and that if at any time it found that defendant was not
progressing, it could bring him back and impose an adult sentence. He argued that defendant’s
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final evaluation by the court would take place when he reached age twenty-one, and the court
could at that time impose an adult sentence if it saw fit.
D
The trial court ruled that defendant would be sentenced as an adult and sentenced him to
life imprisonment:
The factors that the Court is required to look at by statute are six in number. The
Court – the prosecuting attorney has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence at this hearing that the best interest of the public dictate [sic]an adult
sentencing.
The legislature has determined that the Court consider the following six factors,
giving greater weight to the seriousness of the offense and the juveniles [sic] prior
record.
Looking first at the seriousness of the alleged – not alleged offense, the offense of
second-degree murder, in terms of community protection and including the impact
on any victim:
I don’t think there’s any argument that this is the most serious of offenses. The
offense itself is the most serious, and the manner in which this crime occurred
makes it more serious.
The impact on the victims is also undeniable, and it’s very clear to the Court, both
from their annunciation [sic] and from the other responses that the Court has
received from people that are close to them.
The next factor that the Court needs to look at is the culpability of the juvenile in
committing the alleged offense. He was the only participant in this offense.
There isn’t a lot of clear information, in terms of planning. There’s not a lot of
clear information about exactly what happened, but it is clear that he alone
committed the offense.
The third factor is his prior record of delinquency, including, but not limited to,
any record of detention, police record, school record, or any other evidence
indicating prior delinquent behavior.
Martez does not have a record in the juvenile court. He apparently had a petition
filed, which was dealt with, according to the evidence, through diversion. He has
admitted to criminal delinquent acts of breaking into cars and homes; although,
apparently, was never caught or prosecuted for that behavior.
He has a fairly lengthy school record of bad behavior in school, suspensions, and,
according to the testimony of his – one of his teachers, a serious problem in the
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classroom with assaultive and threatening behaviors towards the female members
of the class.
The Court next looks at his programing [sic] history, and there is not a whole lot
of history. He apparently was involved in some counseling when he was in the
third grade. That was, for some reason, discontinued. He was apparently at some
point referred to the diversion system. The Court doesn’t have any information on
what, if anything, happened with that. He has not had any of the programs
available in the juvenile system because he was not petitioned and formally
adjudicated for any offenses in the juvenile system.
The Court next looks at the adequacy of punishment and programing [sic]
available in the juvenile justice system. Based upon the testimony presented,
there does appear to be adequate programing [sic] available in the juvenile justice
system, but it does not appear to the Court that there is adequate punishment
available in the juvenile justice system. The maximum time that the Court could
keep Martez in the juvenile system for punishment would be up to age twentyone.
The Court also must look at the dispositional options available to the juvenile.
The basic option, in terms of disposition as a juvenile, would be his being sent to
the Green Oaks Center or the Maxey Training School where he would get
treatment and education, and there would be the availability of attempted
rehabilitation for him.
The options available to the Court utilizing those three factors, I think, are well
known. The Court could give him a juvenile disposition, at which time the Court
would be mandated to release him at age twenty-one or sooner.
The Court could delay imposition of an adult sentence, which, if the Court felt at
any time he had not been rehabilitated in the juvenile system, could sentence him
as an adult. Mr. Dungan indicated that had the Court could do [sic] that adult
sentence at any time, but I do believe the requirement is that the Court would have
to feel that he had not been rehabilitated; although, there is no time on that. The
Court would not have to wait until age twenty-one to make that decision.
The other option is the incarceration as an adult, as recommended by the
Probation Department.
Mr. Dungan was correct in terms of the Court not considering sentence as a
juvenile. The maximum term of years for punishment, deterrence, and protection
of society would be a maximum of seven years, and the Court finds that to be
willfully [sic woefully?] inadequate.
The blended option or the delayed imposition of adult sentence, the Court has
found in the past that – and participated with other judges in formulating that
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option and presenting it to the legislature, and, for a judge, that has a lot of
attraction. It gives, obviously, options to the Court for someone of Martez’s age.
However, in analyzing the factors for the sentencing hearing, which I have
enumerated on the record, and also looking at the four factors for sentencing; that
of punishment, deterrence, protection of society, and rehabilitation, the Court
finds that that option has severe limitations for the Court.
The Court is unable to be aware today of why this murder occurred, and
apparently then have no basis for making a determination between now and age
twenty-one of Martez whether he has been rehabilitated and can be safely
reentered into society.
In addition, even if it were possible for the Court to anticipate being able to make
that decision and prediction, the Court is of the opinion that the crime committed
here is of such a nature that seven years is willfully [sic woefully] inadequate
punishment, deterrence, or protection of society.
The court then imposed a sentence of life imprisonment:
The Court has basically enumerated for everyone why the Court is sentencing
Martez as an adult. The extreme brutality of the crime, the devastating impact it’s
had on the family and the community indicate to the Court a need for a sentence
which is commensurate with that crime.
The Court is in hope that Martez can get some counseling and other assistance in
the system and hopefully at the new facility. The Court is concerned with his
eventual rehabilitation, but also feels that the issues of punishment, deterrence,
and protection of the community mitigate a lengthy sentence.
It’s the sentence of this Court that Martez Stewart serve life in prison for the
murder of Stacy Davis. The Court will also order that he pay restitution of
$6,013. The Court will recommend that he receive counseling while incarcerated.
That he pay $150 assessment for forensic lab tests, and $60 crime victim right’s
[sic] fee.
E
We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff had demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendant should be sentenced as an adult. The trial court
appropriately examined each factor as required by the statute, and its findings are supported by
the record.
The trial court rejected the blended or delayed sentencing option, noting that it was
unaware of the reason this murder occurred, and stating that it apparently had “no basis for
making a determination between now and age twenty-one of Martez whether he has been
rehabilitated and can be safely reentered into society.” The trial court further concluded that
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seven years would provide inadequate punishment under the circumstances, and held that in
order to protect society, and provide adequate punishment and deterrence, defendant must be
sentenced as an adult. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it
determined that an adult sentence was warranted.
II
Defendant next argues that his sentence of life imprisonment constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment. He argues that he was thirteen years old and had a prior history of mental health
treatment, and had previously been referred to child protective services. Defendant argues that
he had no previous contact with a juvenile facility and had demonstrated that he was amenable to
treatment. Defendant argues that although he was convicted of murder, a serious offense, the
murder occurred during a physical altercation and was not premeditated. Defendant notes that a
majority of the other states considering this issue have concluded that life imprisonment for a
juvenile is cruel and unusual punishment, which is a higher standard than Michigan’s prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment. Defendant argues that the blended or delayed sentencing
option, unlike the adult sentence, would have met the goal of rehabilitation, a central purpose
behind sentencing, and would have ensured that he have opportunity to rehabilitate and would
have also presented the court with the opportunity to ensure that defendant was rehabilitated
before he was released.
We review constitutional questions de novo. People v Conat, 238 Mich App 134, 144;
605 NW2d 49 (1999). In deciding whether a punishment is cruel or unusual, we look to the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; compare the penalty to those imposed for
other crimes in this state as well as the penalty imposed by other states for the instant offense;
and consider the goal of rehabilitation. People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 363; 551
NW2d 460 (1996).
Defendant concedes murder is a serious offense. It is indisputable that life imprisonment
is a severe penalty. Defendant concedes that several other crimes are punishable by a life
sentence with the possibility of parole, including assault with intent to commit murder, MCL
750.83; MSA 28.278; armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797; possession of more than 650
grams of a controlled substance, MCL 333.7403; MSA 14.15(7403); first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2); kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581; and
conspiracy to commit murder, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1).
Several states have approved sentences of juveniles to life imprisonment for seconddegree murder convictions. See Louisiana v Payne, 482 So 2d 178, 181-182 (La App, 1986) (life
sentence without parole upheld); Nebraska v Laravie, 194 Neb 548; 233 NW2d 789 (1975) (life
sentence upheld). See also People v Smith, 635 NYS2d 824; 217 AD2d 221, 226-227 (1995)
(sentence of nine years to life upheld); and Arizona v Toney, 113 Ariz 404; 555 P2d 650, 655
(1976) (sentence of sixty years to life upheld).
As this Court recognized in Launsburry, the fourth factor, need for rehabilitation, is
already taken into consideration when the court determines whether to sentence defendant as an
adult. Launsburry, supra at 364-365.
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We conclude that defendant’s sentence of parolable life imprisonment does not constitute
cruel or unusual punishment. Several other offenses are also punishable in Michigan by life
imprisonment and several other states have imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in seconddegree murder cases involving juveniles. Finally, the goal of rehabilitation is not foreclosed by
defendant’s sentence.
III
Defendant last argues that his sentence of life imprisonment violates the principle of
proportionality. He argues that although the sentence is within the guidelines, it was the
maximum sentence possible for this offense and is disproportionate because mitigating factors
were present. He notes that he did not plan the murder; rather, it occurred during an altercation.
Our review is limited to whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. People v
Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 665-666; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). A trial court abuses its discretion when
it violates the principle of proportionality. People v Bennett, 241 Mich App 511, 515; 616
NW2d 703 (2000). A sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances
surrounding the offense and offender. Id.
Defendant’s sentence is within the guidelines range of 120 to 300 months or life
imprisonment and is therefore presumed proportionate. People v Lyons (After Remand), 222
Mich App 319, 324; 564 NW2d 114 (1997).
Defendant relies on People v Stone, 195 Mich App 600, 608-609; 491 NW2d 628 (1992),
in which this Court reversed the juvenile defendants’ minimum sentences of 7 1/2 years’ for their
armed robbery convictions on the basis that they were disproportionate. The defendants robbed a
bank with a sawed-off shotgun when they were fifteen years old. Id. at 602. They were
sentenced as adults. The minimum sentencing guidelines for the two defendants were three to
eight years and two to six years. This Court, after examining the circumstances surrounding the
crime, concluded that “we find nothing in the record before us that makes this particular armed
robbery more heinous than others, justifying a departure from the guidelines. Although the
victims were scared, none was physically injured, nor did they appear to be harassed.” Id. at 608.
The same cannot be said in the instant case. Defendant entered Stacy Davis’ home
uninvited. Defendant prevented Stacy from leaving and stabbed her thirty-three times, using
several knives. Defendant then went home, hid his bloody clothes, and went outside to play. We
conclude under these circumstances that a life sentence was proportionate to the circumstances
surrounding the offense.
The life sentence was also proportionate to the circumstances surrounding defendant, the
offender. Defendant seems to argue that his young age and lack of criminal sophistication
support that the life sentence is disproportionate. This Court in People v Piotrowski, 211 Mich
App 527, 532-533; 536 NW2d 293 (1995), considered the seventeen-year-old defendant’s
argument that her “youth at the time the crime was committed, her lack of a prior record, and the
fact that the crime was inartfully perpetrated” required a conclusion that the defendant’s five- to
twenty-year sentence for her armed robbery conviction was disproportionate. This Court stated:
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With respect to defendant’s contention concerning her age, while a sentencing
court may, in some, circumstances, consider a defendant’s age, it need not do so.
With respect to her contention that the court failed to consider her lack of a
criminal record, we have previously held that such failure does not constitute an
unusual circumstance sufficient to overcome the presumption of proportionality.
Last, with respect to her contention that her actions were so inept as to seemingly
“be part of a childish script,” we respond that “expertly” executed crimes are not
punished more severely than those that are committed merely “competently.”
Neither should ill-devised crimes be rewarded with undeserved clemency. [Id. at
532-533; citations omitted.]
We conclude that defendant has not overcome the presumption of proportionality,2 and
that under the circumstances presented here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing defendant to parolable life imprisonment.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
2
Defendant argues that an unpublished opinion of this Court, People v Perkins, Docket No.
160177 (issued November 21, 1995), lv den 459 Mich 921-922 (1998), “compels a finding of
disproportionality in this case.” We disagree.
In Perkins, this Court concluded that a juvenile’s sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years for
second-degree murder violated the principle of proportionality, noting that the minimum
sentencing guidelines range was four to fifteen years. This Court held that, even though within
the guidelines, the sentence was disproportionate given defendant’s age and lack of criminal
history. Id. Defendant relies on this statement and on our Supreme Court’s denial of leave in
that case to argue that his sentence is disproportionate.
Under MCR 7.215 “[a]n unpublished opinion is not precedentially binding,” and the Supreme
Court’s denial of leave to appeal, 459 Mich 921-922, is not to be regarded as having precedential
value, MCR 7.321. Moreover, the unpublished opinion does not discuss the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense, thus it is impossible to compare it to the
circumstances in the instant case.
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