GENERAL MEDICINE PC V METROPOLITAN TITLE CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GENERAL MEDICINE, P.C.,
UNPUBLISHED
March 2, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 216012
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-806151-CK
METROPOLITAN TITLE COMPANY, and
FIRST AMERICA TITLE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Saad, P.J., and White and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to
defendants. We affirm.
This case arises out of a policy of title insurance dated August 10, 1994, that plaintiff
purchased from defendants. In May 1994, Dr. Thomas Prose, plaintiff’s president, agreed to
purchase the land and building (hereinafter “NBD building”) located at 306 South Main Street in
the city of Plymouth from the National Bank of Detroit. Dr. Prose then assigned all of his
“rights, duties, and obligations” under the purchase agreement to plaintiff. The National Bank of
Detroit employed defendants to “research the condition of title/ownership” of the NBD building,
and to issue a title insurance commitment and policy.1 Defendants issued plaintiff a commitment
of title on or about July 19, 1994, without discovering that an easement burdening the NBD
building in favor of an adjacent property was recorded in the Wayne County Register of Deeds.
On the same day that the commitment of title was issued, plaintiff consummated the purchase of
the NBD building. On August 10, 1994, defendants issued plaintiff a title insurance policy on
the NBD building. After discovering the easement, plaintiff commenced this case against
defendants.2
1
It appears that in this case defendant Metropolitan Title company issued the title commitment
and defendant First American Title Company underwrote the policy of title insurance that named
plaintiff as the beneficiary.
2
The record indicates that the claim was first brought by Dr. Thomas Prose, but was dismissed
when it was determined that he was not the true party in interest. Thereafter, the case was refiled
(continued…)
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In response to plaintiff’s complaint, defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(8). Defendants claimed that plaintiff voluntarily deeded the property by quitclaim deed to Maria Prose, who was not a shareholder in plaintiff, in September 1994. Thus,
defendants claimed that plaintiff had failed to state a valid claim because plaintiff had no
standing to sue, and because as “merely a tenant” in the NBD building, plaintiff had not suffered
any damages “associated with diminution in value as a result of the easement.” In response to
defendants’ motion for summary disposition, plaintiff conceded that it deeded the property to
Maria Prose in September 1994, but argued that the title insurance policy issued by defendants
was still in force after the sale because plaintiff retained a leasehold interest in the property. The
trial court rejected plaintiff’s argument and granted defendants’ motion.
Although defendants filed their motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8),
it appears from the record that the trial court relied on documentary evidence outside the
pleadings. Accordingly, we will review the grant of summary disposition by the trial court under
the standard for a motion filed pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Shirilla v Detroit, 208 Mich App
434, 436-437; 528 NW2d 763 (1995). We review a trial court’s grant of summary disposition de
novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998); Russell v
Dep’t of Corrections, 234 Mich App 135, 136; 592 NW2d 125 (1999). Our Supreme Court
recently summarized the legal standard under MCR 2.116(C)(10):
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the
complaint. In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this
subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to
establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. [Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597
NW2d 817 (1999) (citation omitted).]
Here, the title insurance policy that defendants issued to plaintiff on August 10, 1994,
provides in relevant part:
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in
favor of an insured only so long as the insured retains an estate or interest in the
land, or holds an indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given by a
purchaser from the insured, or only so long as the insured shall have liability by
reason of covenants of warranty made by the insured in any transfer or
conveyance of the estate or interest. [Emphasis added.]
A quit-claim deed conveys all rights, title and interest that the grantor has to the lands in
the deed. Doelle v Read, 329 Mich 655, 657; 46 NW2d 422 (1951). In this case, plaintiff
conveyed its entire title interest by quit-claim deed to another person, Maria Prose. The
conveyance was absolute and there is no indication from the transfer that plaintiff retained any
(…continued)
by plaintiff.
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title interest. Because the policy of insurance issued by defendants only protected plaintiff’s title
interest and because the policy terminated upon plaintiff transferring its title interest in the land,
the trial court did not err when it granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Plaintiff’s claims that it retained an interest in the NBD Building that would permit it to
pursue this action are without merit. First, plaintiff suggests that it retained a leasehold interest
in the property after the quit-claim transfer because the transfer was effectuated for estate tax
planning only. Plaintiff offers no support for this argument. For that reason alone we could
decline further review. Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999);
Head v Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc, 234 Mich App 94, 116; 593 NW2d 595 (1999).
However, the reason for the lack of support is obvious. The law does not recognize the proposed
dual interest in property, one for Internal Revenue Service (IRS) purposes and the other for all
other legal purposes.
Next, plaintiff relies on the fact that its medical practice continued to operate on the
second floor of the NBD Building to argue that it retained an interest in that building after the
quit-claim transfer that precluded termination of defendants’ title insurance policy. In this
context, plaintiff relies upon the language of the policy that declares that the policy shall provide
coverage as long as “the insured retains an estate or interest in the land.” Essentially, plaintiff
argues that its tenant status prevents defendants from terminating their title insurance policy.
Like any tenant, plaintiff’s occupancy of part of the NBD Building with the consent of the
owner gives rise to a legally cognizable interest in the property. This interest is recognized and
protected by basic landlord-tenant law. See, e.g., MCL 554.601 et seq.; MSA 26.1138(1) et seq.
However, a tenant’s interest cannot be equated to an ownership or a title interest. Therefore, we
agree with the trial court that because plaintiff did not retain any ownership or title interest in the
NBD Building, the coverage provided in the policy was extinguished when plaintiff executed the
quit-claim deed. We read the wording of the policy where it refers to retaining an estate or
interest in land to require an ownership or title interest in order for the policy to remain in effect.
To read those words to include mere possession or the right to possess an interest in the property
is contrary to the very nature of interest protected by the policy, that being the title interest of the
insured.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
I concur in result only.
/s/ Helene N. White
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