IN RE GRAHAM/PIERCE/CAMPBELL MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ASHLEY GRAHAM, JAMES
GRAHAM, JAZZMA GRAHAM, AILYHA
PIERCE and KEIARAH CAMPBELL, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 227060
Oakland County Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-612042 NA
TANYA GRAHAM,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Doctoroff and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM
Respondent Tanya Graham appeals as of right from the family court’s order terminating
her parental rights to her five minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), and (g). We affirm.
I.
Basic Facts and Procedural History
On September 3, 1998, respondent phoned protective services and advised that she was
living in a motel with her five minor children and requested that child protective services pick the
children up and place them in foster care. At first, the child protective services worker indicated
that respondent had money management problems and offered her assistance in that regard and
respondent agreed to accept those services. However, on September 9, 1998, respondent
contacted protective services and renewed her request for them to take the children and place
them into foster care indicating that the manager at the motel advised that she could not keep all
of the children with her in a single room. Because respondent lived in a motel, her children that
were of school age were not enrolled for the 1998-1999 school year.
The children came into care on September 16, 1998 and on September 21, 1998, the
children became temporary wards of the court. The Parent/Agency Agreement that respondent
signed in November of 1998 required respondent to secure and maintain permanent and stable
housing, for six consecutive months, participate in and complete a psychological evaluation,
-1-
attend weekly one hour visits with the children, notify the caseworker of current address and
telephone numbers, attend and complete a parenting skills training class, attend individual
counseling for money management and participate in individual therapy.
Respondent had difficulties with visitations throughout the pendency of the case.
Respondent completed her parenting skills training classes, but she failed to derive any benefit
therefrom. After respondent visited with her children, the children’s negative behavioral patterns
increased. Respondent usually did not stay for the entire hour. At best, respondent would only
stay for 45 minutes.1
Respondent also had significant difficulty finding any housing, appropriate or otherwise.
Respondent testified that she looked for housing all day, every day but despite all of respondent’s
efforts, she could not locate suitable housing for her five children. In fact, respondent admitted
that she experienced housing problems since 1991. Respondent refused to visit Wayne County
FIA for housing referrals pursuant to the case manager’s suggestion even though respondent
stated a clear preference for Wayne County over Oakland County. Respondent did not follow up
on all of the referrals provided and that the agency’s request for section 8 housing was denied
because of respondent’s criminal history.
On July 20, 1999, the FIA filed a permanent wardship petition on behalf of the five
children. Trial was held on October 21, 1999, the testimony established that respondent entered
into a Parent/Agency Agreement and that respondent failed to substantially comply therewith,
and respondent constantly moved and that she failed to provide notification of her current
address and telephone number. Further, despite all of the referrals, respondent failed to obtain
and maintain suitable housing. The psychologist testified that respondent had a dependent
personality and that respondent is a passive individual and that it is her hope that someone will
find housing for her so that her children can be returned with little or no effort in her part.
The family court terminated respondent’s parental rights on two separate grounds. First,
the matter was adjudicated and 182 days have elapsed since the issuance of the dispositional
order and that the conditions leading to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will change in the foreseeable future considering the
children’s age.2 Second, clear and convincing evidence established that without regard to intent,
respondent failed to provide proper care and custody for the children and there remained no
reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to do so within a reasonable time period
considering the children’s ages.3
In making its findings of fact, the family court focused on respondent’s inability to secure
stable housing after one and a half years of searching and that respondent’s visits with her
children were “strained at best.” The court indicated that respondent’s failure to attend therapy
1
The case manager testified that on one occasion, Respondent indicated that she had to leave the
visitation early because some of her friends were picking her up to go out.
2
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i).
3
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g).
-2-
on an ongoing basis negatively impacted the quality of respondent’s visits with her children. The
court concluded that on the evidence presented, respondent was not any closer to finding
permanent housing at the close of the proceedings than she was in September of 1998 when her
five children came within the court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, the family court entered an order
terminating respondent’s parental rights to her five children.
II.
Standard of Review
This court reviews a trial court’s factual findings in an order terminating parental rights
for clear error.4 A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.5
Pursuant to this standard, the appellate court must give due deference to the trial court’s
determinations regarding the credibility of the witnesses that testified before it.6 Once a trial
court finds that a statutory ground for termination of parental rights exists by clear and
convincing evidence, the court must terminate parental rights unless it finds, based on the entire
record before it, that termination is clearly not in the best interests of the child.7
III. Grounds for Termination
The family court terminated Appellant’s parental
712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) which provide in pertinent part that:
rights
pursuant
to
MCL
The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
***
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this
chapter, 182 days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there
is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.
4
MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); In re Vasquez, 199
Mich App 44, 51; 501 NW2d 231 (1993). In Respondent-Appellant’s brief on appeal,
Respondent correctly states that the proper standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases is the clearly erroneous standard. However, Respondent thereafter submits that the trial
court “abused its discretion” by terminating Respondent’s parental rights. The abuse of
discretion standard does not apply in this case. Termination cases are reviewed for clear error
not abuse of discretion.
5
6
In re Miller, supra.
MCR 2.613(C); In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 65; 472 NW2d 38 (1991).
7
MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d
407 (2000).
-3-
***
(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or
custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the
child’s age.
Termination of respondent’s parental rights was proper under subsection
19b(3)(c)(i). The children were made temporary wards of the court on October 19, 1998
because of respondent’s inability to provide suitable housing for the children. At the
bench trial in January 2000, respondent still could not secure proper housing for the
minor children. Therefore, 182 days had elapsed since the original dispositional order
was entered and the same conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist.
Consequently, termination of respondent’s parental rights pursuant to subsection
19b(3)(c)(i) was not clearly erroneous.
Additionally, termination was proper under subsection 19b(3)(g). This subsection
provides that termination is proper where a parent, regardless of intent, fails to provide
proper care and custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the
parent will be able to do so within a reasonable amount of time considering the age of the
child.
In the case at bar, respondent failed to provide suitable and appropriate housing for
her five children. At trial, respondent admitted that she had difficulty with housing since
1991. The children in the instant case were in foster care for 15 months and during that
15-month period, respondent was not able to obtain any housing despite the efforts of
Catholic Social Services (CSS) and FIA. Although respondent argues on appeal that FIA
and CSS did not do enough to assist her in finding suitable housing, the record is clear
that both CSS and the FIA made many referrals for housing, made phone calls on
respondent’s behalf, and provided respondent with free bus tickets to follow up on the
housing referrals.8 Despite these efforts, respondent failed to follow up on these referrals.
The testimony adduced at trial established that respondent’s clinical assessment
indicated that she was a passive individual and that she hoped that someone would find
housing for her and that she would have her children returned without any effort on her
part. Consistent with this personality assessment, all of respondent’s arguments on
appeal shift the primary burden for this family’s reunification from respondent, the
mother, to the two social service agencies involved. A review of the record in this case
belies Respondent’s assertions. The record is replete with testimony regarding all of the
services offered to respondent in an effort to reunify her with her children. Respondent’s
failure to secure adequate housing is not CSS’s or FIA’s failure. Therefore, her claim in
8
In fact, testimony at trial indicated that when respondent was living at the Pontiac Rescue
Mission for two weeks, Respondent’s caseworker gave her a referral to Lighthouse and FIA in
Oakland County because both were within walking distance of the rescue mission.
-4-
this regard is wholly without merit and accordingly, termination was proper under
subsection 19b(3)(g).
IV. Best Interests of the Children
The trial court did not err by finding and concluding that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was consistent with the best interests of the children. As
noted above, respondent consistently failed to secure suitable and appropriate housing for
the children. Additionally, the testimony at trial indicated that respondent did not interact
well with her children during visitations. Respondent verbally abused her children and on
occasion, completely ignored them when the children tried to engage her during
visitations.9 Testimony established that after visitations with respondent, the children
experienced increased distress and their acting out behaviors intensified.
Perhaps most telling, is respondent’s own request to reduce her visitation from
once every week to once every two weeks because visiting every week was simply too
hectic for her. And, when CSS changed the visitation pursuant to respondent’s request
and scheduled three visits within six weeks, respondent canceled all but one of those
visits.
The trial court noted that it would not be fair to the children to give respondent
additional time to secure housing. The court also indicated that what these children need
is more than just a physical structure in which to live, but moreover, they need a nurturing
environment in which they can thrive.
We agree. The trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights
served the children’s best interests, was not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
/s/ Judge Harold Hood
/s/ Judge Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Judge Kirsten Frank Kelly
9
In fact, the case manager testified that when she confronted respondent about her parenting
skills, respondent advised that, “[s]he had been beaten growing up and that’s the way she was
going to raise her children.”
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
