IN RE KASEY VELTKAMP MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KASEY VELTKAMP, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 23, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 228817
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-000390-NA
TREASA VELTKAMP,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ANDREW CROWLEY,
Appellee.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent mother appeals from an order of the probate court terminating her parental
rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g)
and (i). We affirm.
In making a termination decision, the trial court must engage in a two-step analysis. First,
it must determine if a statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich 624, 632; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Second,
if a statutory ground has been established, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless
there exists clear evidence on the whole record that it is not in the child’s best interests to
terminate parental rights. In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 354; 603 NW2d 787 (2000).
The Court has carefully reviewed the record on appeal, the opinion of the trial court, and
the respondent’s brief. We are not persuaded that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory
grounds for termination were met and that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate the
parental rights. Specifically, with respect to respondent’s argument that she was not afforded an
adequate opportunity to comply with the parent-agency agreement, we disagree. Respondent
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made a similar argument in the appeal from the termination of her parental rights to her two older
children. We rejected that argument. In re Veltkamp, unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket
No,. 221543, decided 5/30/00). This case involved essentially the same parent-agency
agreement. Because there was adequate time in the prior case, there of necessity must be
adequate time in this case to have complied with the same agreement. As for respondent’s
argument that the trial court improperly considered a prior, unproven allegation of sexual abuse
of one of respondent’s older daughters, there is no indication from the record that the trial court
did so. Furthermore, even if the trial court did, that would not affect termination under
subsection 19b(3)(g) and, therefore, would not require reversal. Accordingly, we find no abuse
of discretion by the trial court in terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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