PEOPLE OF MI V STEVEN WESLEY RICHARDSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 13, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214344
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 97-001623-FH
STEVEN WESLEY RICHARDSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and White and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit arson of a dwelling house, MCL
750.157(a); MSA 28.354(1); MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267, two counts of arson of a dwelling
house, MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267, and placing explosives with intent to cause injury, MCL
750.207; MSA 28.508. The trial court sentenced defendant as a third habitual offender, MCL
769.11; MSA 28.1083, to concurrent prison terms of fifteen to forty years each for the arson and
conspiracy convictions and life imprisonment for the placing explosives conviction. Defendant
appeals as of right, and we affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings
This case arises out of the firebombings of two residential homes in the City of Flint
during the early morning hours of October 21, 1997. At 3:04 a.m., firefighters were called to a
house at 313 East Russell to investigate a fire in progress. While extinguishing the flames,
investigators concluded that the fire occurred in the living room at the front of the house. An
inspection of the living room carpet revealed marks made by a flammable liquid and
investigators found two Molotov cocktails at the scene. After the fire crew doused the fire and
left the house, they received another call about a fire at 309 East Russell, the house next door to
the earlier fire. Investigators again determined that someone threw a Molotov cocktail through
the front bedroom window of the house.
Sabrina Thompson lived at 309 East Russell with her three children, Nakita, Ramon and
Rashad. Defendant, Nakita’s boyfriend, often spent the night with Nakita at the Thompson
house. On October 20, 1997, the day before the firebombings, defendant and Nakita argued
about Nakita’s relationship with an old boyfriend, Alonzo Jones. Defendant confronted Nakita
about some threats she made to Stacey, a woman who informed defendant about Nakita’s
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relationship with Jones. Sabrina Thompson asked defendant to leave the house after he began
yelling and using vulgar language.
That night, Nakita stayed at a friend’s house and Ramon slept in Nakita’s bedroom
located at the front of the house. The Thompson family awoke when a neighbor alerted them to
the fire next door, but went back to sleep after watching the firefighters extinguish the flames.
Sabrina woke up again at approximately 6:00 a.m. when she heard something crash through the
window in Nakita’s bedroom. Sabrina heard Ramon shouting and, when he ran out of the
bedroom, she saw that he was badly burned. Paramedics took Ramon to the hospital where
doctors determined that he suffered third-degree burns over fifty percent of his body.
At trial, Robert Steele testified that, on October 20, 1997, defendant promised him drugs
and money to firebomb a house. According to Steele, defendant made the firebombs, but Darion
“PJ” McDaniel drove to the first house and Steele and Tyrone Jones hurled the firebombs during
the early morning of October 21, 1997. Steele further testified that, later that morning, defendant
informed Steele that he firebombed the wrong house and promised Steele more money and drugs
to firebomb the house next door. Steele stated that defendant then made two more firebombs and
then drove Steele and McDaniel to the Thompson house. Defendant instructed Steele to throw
the firebomb through the front bedroom window and Steele complied.
On October 23, 1997, defendant admitted to police in a recorded statement that he paid “a
man” with cocaine to scare someone by firebombing a house. However, defendant maintained
that he told the man to throw rocks at the windows of the house before bombing it, to make sure
the people inside would wake up and avoid injury from the firebombs. Moreover, defendant told
the police that when the man firebombed the wrong house, defendant told him that he need not
correct the mistake, but that the man took it upon himself to return to East Russell and firebomb
the Thompson home.
II. Analysis - Evidentiary Issues
A. Defendant’s Prior Threats
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor introduced
improper character evidence when Nakita Thompson testified that defendant threatened to kill
her on prior occasions.
Defendant forfeited this issue by failing to object to the challenged testimony pursuant to
MRE 103(a)(1). People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Accordingly,
relief is precluded absent a showing of plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Id;
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). This Court will not reverse a
defendant’s conviction on this basis unless (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, that is,
clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error “resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent
defendant or … the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” People v Wyngaard, 462 Mich 659, 668; 614 NW2d 143 (2000).
Nakita testified that defendant confronted her about Alonzo Jones at her house on the
afternoon of October 20, 1997, the day before the firebombing. She further testified that
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defendant said that “no one else was gonna be with” her. Nakita explained that defendant
threatened her “all the time” and said he would kill her if she dated someone else. The
prosecutor asked if defendant threatened to kill her on the day before the firebombings and
Nakita replied that he did not, but that he had on prior occasions. Further, Nakita testified that,
during their argument that afternoon, defendant stated that no other man would “have her” and
warned her that no other man could sleep in her bed.
Defendant claims that Nakita’s testimony violated MRE 404(b), which prohibits the
introduction of a defendant’s other acts if they are offered to prove the defendants character or
propensity to commit the offense. However, Nakita’s testimony described defendant’s prior
statements, not his prior acts. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, MRE 404(b) is not applicable
because “[a] statement of general intent is not a prior act for purposes of MRE 404(b).” People v
Goddard, 429 Mich 505, 514-515; 418 NW2d 881 (1988). Rather, defendant’s threats are
statements of a party-opponent pursuant to MRE 801(d)(2) and “admissibility is determined by
the statement’s relevancy and by whether its probative value is outweighed by its possible
prejudicial effect.” People v Milton, 186 Mich App 574, 576; 465 NW2d 371 (1990), citing
Goddard, supra, 429 Mich 514-515.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” MRE 401. Evidence of a defendant’s intent to harm a victim “is of the
utmost relevance” in a criminal trial. People v Amos, 453 Mich 885; 552 NW2d 917 (1996).
Here, defendant’s prior threats were highly probative of defendant’s intent to harm Nakita and
her family, making it more probable that defendant made the firebombs and recruited Steele to
throw them at the houses. This supported Steele’s version of events and his credibility, both of
which defendant vigorously attacked throughout trial.
Moreover, the threats to kill Nakita were relevant to rebut defendant’s claim that he did
not intend to harm anyone and that he instructed Steele to first throw rocks at the windows so any
occupants could flee. Defendant’s warning that no one else could sleep in Nakita’s bed had
particular significance because, according to Steele, defendant instructed him to throw the
firebomb through Nakita’s bedroom window and Ramon was injured while sleeping in Nakita’s
bed. Finally, the threats were relevant to show defendant’s motive to order the firebombings and
to persuade Steele to return to East Russell to firebomb Nakita’s house after the initial mistake.
Defendant’s statements revealed his ongoing jealousy about Nakita’s relationship with Alonzo
Jones, the subject of their heated argument shortly before the firebombings occurred. In sum, the
disputed evidence was highly probative of material issues at trial.
We also find that the probative value of the challenged evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to MRE 403. As discussed above, the
evidence was very relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent and motive. While the evidence
was adverse to defendant’s position, it did not have “an undue tendency to move the tribunal to
decide on an improper basis” the issues before it. People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 501; 537
NW2d 168 (1995). Accordingly, the significant probative value of the evidence outweighed any
danger of unfair prejudice and defendant has not shown an error requiring further review.
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Defendant also contends he was denied a fair trial because Ramon testified that defendant
threatened him in the past. Defense counsel elicited this testimony asking Ramon directly
whether defendant ever threatened him. On redirect, the prosecutor asked Ramon when and how
defendant threatened him and Ramon responded. Defendant cannot claim error on evidence he
introduced himself. See People v McMaster, 154 Mich App 564, 570-571; 398 NW2d 469
(1986). Absent a showing of plain error, relief is precluded and we need not review the issue
further. Carines, supra, 460 Mich 763-764. In any case, the evidence was relevant to show
defendant’s intent and motive as were the threats to Nakita. Moreover, for the reasons articulated
above, the probative value of the threats was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice. Accordingly, the evidence was admissible as a statement of a party opponent pursuant
to MRE 801(d)(2).
Defendant also complains that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
foregoing testimony or for introducing it himself. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that the representation so prejudiced defendant that he was denied a fair trial.
People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 5; 594 NW2d 57 (1999); People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 191; 585
NW2d 357 (1998). Because we conclude that evidence of defendant’s threats was admissible
under MRE 801(d)(2), defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the
introduction of this testimony. Moreover, defendant has not overcome the presumption that
defense counsel’s inquiry of Ramon about whether defendant threatened him was sound trial
strategy. Hoag, supra, 460 Mich 6. Defense counsel appears to have been attempting to
establish that defendant meant no harm to Ramon, a strategy we will not reassess with the benefit
of hindsight. People v Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 331; 614 NW2d 647 (2000).
B. Defendant’s Drug Activity
During the prosecutor’s direct examination, Nakita testified that defendant and McDaniel
knew each other “in the drug business.” Steele testified that defendant gave him crack cocaine
on the night of the firebombings and that defendant promised him more if Steele returned to East
Russell to firebomb the Thompson house. Further, Steele and his girlfriend, LeVaughn Marve,
both testified that defendant was Steele’s drug dealer. Finally, the prosecutor played a tape of
defendant’s formal interview with police, during which defendant admitted that he paid for the
first firebombing with cocaine.
Defendant contends that the introduction of this evidence violated MRE 404(b)(1).
Defendant failed to object to the testimony as provided by MRE 103(a)(1) and, therefore, we
review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra, 460
Mich 763-764. MRE 404(b)(1) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
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Evidence of other “bad acts” is admissible under MRE 404(b) if: (1) it is offered for a proper
purpose and not to prove the defendants character or propensity to commit the offense; (2) it is
relevant; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 496; 577 NW2d 673 (1998);
People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994).
Defendant argues that evidence of his involvement with drugs was impermissible character
evidence that, “[w]hile arguably relevant to fully describe the transaction,” was not probative of
defendant’s guilt.
The record reflects that the disputed evidence was not offered to prove that defendant had
a bad character, but to show opportunity, plan or scheme. Evidence of defendant’s drug activity
supported the prosecutor’s theory that defendant ordered the firebombings and paid for them with
drugs. The evidence also helped “put the charged activity in context by enabling the jury to
better understand the dynamics of the relationship between defendant” and Steele. See People v
Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 13; 577 NW2d 179 (1998). These were all proper purposes for which
to introduce the evidence other than for character or propensity as prohibited by MRE 404(b).
Moreover, the evidence of defendant’s drug activity was relevant to support the purposes
for which it was offered. It is well settled that relevant evidence must be both material to a fact
of consequence in the action and must have probative force. People v Sabin (After Remand), 463
Mich 43, 56-57; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). However, materiality, does not require that the evidence
be directed at an element of the crime, but that the fact be “one that is ‘in issue’ in the sense that
it is within the range of litigated matters in controversy.” Id. at 57 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, to be material, the evidence of defendant’s drug activity did not have to prove a
specific element of the crime, but merely had to prove a fact “in issue.”
The evidence tended to show that defendant enticed Steele into participating in his
scheme by giving him crack on the night he requested Steele’s help. Defendant also assured
Steele he would pay him $500 for firebombing the first house. Defendant then promised Steele
more drugs and more money if he went back to East Russell to bomb the Thompson house.
Defendant used drugs and the promise of drugs throughout the transaction. Accordingly, his
drug activity was an integral part of the series of events that led to the firebombings. Moreover,
the evidence of defendant’s involvement with drugs explained why Steele, an admitted drug
addict, would agree to perform the firebombings for defendant. Defendant’s ability to get drugs
made it more probable that Steele would agree to firebomb two houses at defendant’s request
because Steele knew defendant had access to the drugs and money he promised. In fact, Steele
specifically testified that one reason he agreed to help defendant was because defendant “had
drugs.”
Finally, the evidence of defendant’s drug activity rebutted defendant’s opening argument
in which he questioned how a person like defendant could have the power to order someone to
burn down a house. As the evidence showed, defendant was able to enlist Steele to carry out the
firebombings because Steele wanted drugs and defendant had access to them. In sum, the
evidence of defendant’s drug activity made facts of consequence at trial more probable by linking
defendant to the crimes, by illustrating his plan, and by explaining his ability to carry it out.
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Defendant contends, however, that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and
should have been excluded under MRE 403. We disagree. The evidence was highly probative
of defendant’s connection to the crime and strongly supported Steele’s version of events.
Moreover, the prosecutor elicited only that testimony that supported that proper purpose. Steele
and Marve described the relationship between defendant and Steele to explain how defendant
involved Steele in the firebombings and why Steele acquiesced. Defendant himself explained to
police that he ordered the firebombing and paid for it with cocaine. In short, the evidence was an
integral part of the events at issue and defendant has failed to show that it was “so inflammatory
or prejudicial that a jury would give [it] preemptive weight.” People v Davis, 199 Mich App
502, 517; 503 NW2d 457 (1993).
The trial court also gave the jury a limiting instruction admonishing it not to consider the
testimony as evidence of defendant’s bad character or his propensity to commit crimes. See
VanderVliet, supra, 444 Mich 74-75. The court further instructed the jury that it may not convict
defendant based on evidence of other bad conduct. Moreover, in his arguments to the jury,
defense counsel emphasized that defendant was not on trial for other crimes. These instructions
diminished any prejudice the evidence may have caused defendant.
Accordingly, the disputed evidence more than satisfied the test set out in VanderVliet,
supra, 444 Mich 74-75. Defendant has not shown that the introduction of this evidence
constituted plain error and, therefore, further review is precluded.
Defendant again argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
evidence of defendant’s drug dealing activities. However, because the evidence was admissible
for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b), we find that defense counsel was not ineffective for
failing to object.
C.
Defendant’s Possession of a Gun
Defense counsel raised the issue of defendant’s possession of a gun when he crossexamined Nakita. Specifically, defense counsel asked Nakita whether defendant had a weapon
during their argument on the afternoon before the firebombings. Nakita responded that defendant
regularly carried a gun, but admitted that she never told the police that defendant owned or
carried a weapon. Review of the admissibility of evidence is generally waived if the complaining
party voluntary injects the issue into the trial during cross-examination. McMaster, supra, 154
Mich App 570-571; People v Bates, 91 Mich App 506, 510; 283 NW2d 785 (1979). Because
defendant raised this issue, he waived appellate review of this claim.
Defendant contends, however, that defense counsel’s introduction of this evidence
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We are persuaded that defense counsel’s crossexamination of Nakita concerning defendant’s possession and ownership of a gun was a matter
of trial strategy. The record clearly reveals defense counsel’s attempt to undermine Nakita’s
credibility by questioning her extensively about why she never told anyone about the gun prior to
trial. We will not second-guess counsel on matters of trial strategy. People v Stewart (On
Remand), 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 715 (1996). Further, defendant has failed to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel’s conduct, the result of the trial
would have been different. Hoag, supra, 460 Mich 6.
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III. Juror Misconduct
Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because a juror allegedly slept during
trial. If a juror slept during a portion of the trial, counsel had a duty to bring this to the court’s
attention immediately. See United States v Curry, 471 F2d 419, 421-422 (CA 5, 1973); Carter,
supra, 462 Mich 214. Here, defendant did not raise this issue at trial, but instead, raised it for the
first time at sentencing. Because defendant did not timely raise this issue before the trial court, it
is not preserved for review. Therefore, defendant must demonstrate a plain error affecting his
substantial rights. Carines, supra, 460 Mich 763-764.
When defendant raised the issue was raised for the first time at sentencing, the judge
discussed the matter, and said he too initially thought the juror in question was sleeping. Upon
closer inspection, however, the court was satisfied that the juror was not sleeping. Under these
circumstances, the record does not disclose plain error. See United States v Tierney, 947 F2d
854, 868-869 (CA 8, 1991); Curry, supra, 471 F2d 421-422. Further, because it is not apparent
from the record that the juror was sleeping, defendant has not shown that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to bring the matter to the court’s attention.
IV.
Testimony Regarding Polygraph Examination
Finally, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial because a witness testified that
defendant said that he took a lie detector test. We disagree. Defendant did not object to the
testimony in question. It is apparent from the record that the reference was unsolicited.
Immediately after the witness referred to the test, the prosecutor cut the witness off and informed
the witness not to talk about the test. There were no other references to a lie detector test during
trial. The testimony was neither offered nor used in an attempt to bolster the witness’ credibility
or to undermine defendant’s credibility. Further, the results of the test were never disclosed.
Under these circumstances, defendant was not prejudiced by the isolated reference to a lie
detector test. People v Yatooma, 85 Mich App 236; 271 NW2d 184 (1978). Further, defendant
has not overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s decision not to pursue the matter
further constituted sound strategy.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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