PEOPLE OF MI V BRUCE GOSS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 26, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217608
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-007317
BRUCE GOSS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Jansen and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of one count of intentional discharge of
a firearm at a dwelling, MCL 750.234b; MSA 28.431(2), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, second offense, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The trial court
sentenced defendant to one to four years’ imprisonment for the intentional discharge of a firearm
conviction, and a consecutive five-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that his convictions of both intentional discharge of a firearm at
a dwelling and felony-firearm violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. We
note that defendant failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal because he did not raise the
issue at trial. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). Moreover, this Court
previously rejected the identical argument defendant raises, concluding that “the Legislature
intended that the felony-firearm statute apply to those who commit the act prohibited under MCL
750.234b; MSA 28.431(2).” People v Guiles, 199 Mich App 54, 59; 500 NW2d 757 (1993). We
are bound by this decision. MCR 7.215(H)(1). Furthermore, because the Guiles analysis appears
sound,1 we decline to invoke the conflict rule of MCR 7.215(H)(2), as defendant suggests.
1
In Guiles, the Court correctly observed that “[i]t is clear from the language of the [felonyfirearm] statute that the Legislature intended, with only a few stated exceptions, that every felony
committed by a person possessing a firearm result in a felony-firearm conviction,” citing People
v Sturgis, 427 Mich 392, 406-407; 397 NW2d 783 (1986) and People v Morton, 423 Mich 650,
656; 377 NW2d 798 (1985), and that “[t]he statute that punishes the intentional discharge of a
firearm at a dwelling or occupied structure, MCL 750.234b; MSA 28.431(2), is not one of the
(continued…)
-1-
Defendant next argues that his intentional discharge of a firearm at a dwelling conviction
violated his due process rights because he was not given adequate notice that he would have to
defend against this charge. This issue is also unpreserved for appeal because defendant did not
raise it at trial. Grant, supra. Nonetheless, we will briefly consider defendant’s argument.
A trial court has no authority to convict a defendant of an offense not specifically charged
unless the defendant has received adequate notice. Notice is considered adequate if the charge is
a lesser included offense of the original charge. People v Quinn, 136 Mich App 145, 147; 356
NW2d 10 (1984). A review of the lower court record, including the preliminary hearing
transcript, indicates that defendant originally was charged with six counts of assault with intent to
commit murder for firing multiple gunshots into a residential house occupied by six persons.
MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278. Under the instant facts, the discharge of a firearm into a dwelling
charge of which defendant ultimately was convicted constitutes a cognate lesser offense. People
v Jones, 395 Mich 379, 387-390; 236 NW2d 461 (1975); People v Sullivan, 231 Mich App 510,
517; 586 NW2d 578 (1998) (“A cognate lesser offense shares several elements and is in the same
class of offenses as the greater crime, but differs from the greater crime in that it contains some
elements not found in the higher offense.”), aff’d 461 Mich 986 (2000). Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court did not violate defendant’s due process rights when it found him
guilty of the cognate lesser discharge of a firearm offense.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
(…continued)
exceptions provided in the felony-firearm statute.” Guiles, supra at 59.
-2-
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