PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES WILLIAM VAUGHN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 26, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 215190
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-000860
CHARLES WILLIAM VAUGHN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Doctoroff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction by a jury of two counts of first-degree felony
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); MSA 28.548(1)(b). Defendant was sentenced to two terms of
natural life in prison. We affirm.
The charges in this case arose from the brutal murders of Mary Lou Drury and Dorothy
Gilbert. The victims were killed in their home and their bodies were hidden in a basement
storage room. The women had been beaten, their hands and feet were bound with duct tape, and
duct tape also covered their nose and mouth. Unlike Mrs. Gilbert, Mrs. Drury also sustained
severe head injuries that were consistent with being pistol-whipped. Both bodies had scrapes
which were consistent with being dragged across the floor. A plastic garbage bag covered each
woman’s head, and the evidence indicated they both died of suffocation.
Defendant and codefendant Pamela Vannoy1 had a sporadic personal relationship.
Vannoy lived in the Drury home in an upstairs flat and both defendant and Vannoy worked
occasionally for the Drurys. Vannoy also cared for Mrs. Gilbert, who suffered from lung
congestion and required supplemental oxygen. On the day of the murders, the Drurys informed
Vannoy that she had to move out because she stole money from them. Defendant and Vannoy
admitted that they went to the Drury apartment shortly after Mr. Drury left. Defendant claimed
that he left before Vannoy killed the women. Vannoy claimed that defendant killed the women
1
Vannoy is not a party to this appeal, having challenged her conviction in a separate appeal,
People v Vannoy, Docket No. 215189.
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in a rage and that she could not stop him. Defendant and Vannoy were prosecuted in a joined
trial with two separate juries.
On appeal, defendant challenges his murder convictions on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In sufficiency of the evidence
claims, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999).
In order to prove that defendant committed first-degree felony murder, the prosecution
would have to introduce sufficient evidence that defendant (1) killed the victims, (2) with the
intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm
with the knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result, (3) while
committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the felonies specified
in MCL 750.316(1)(b); MSA 28.548(1)(b). People v Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 346-347; 578
NW2d 697 (1998), rev’d on other grounds 462 Mich 415 (2000).
Defendant argues that he was merely present while Vannoy killed Drury and Gilbert and
that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed the crimes or had the requisite
intent to kill the victims. We disagree. The prosecution tried defendant on the alternative
theories that he either committed the killings or aided and abetted Vannoy in committing the
killings. Where felons act intentionally or recklessly in pursuit of a common plan, liability may
be established by agency principles. People v Flowers, 191 Mich App 169, 178; 477 NW2d 473
(1991). To prove that defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting Vannoy in the killings, the
prosecutor need only show that homicide was within the scope of the conspiracy and defendant
either had the requisite intent to kill victims or participated in the felony with the knowledge of
the principal’s intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. Id.
Although defendant is correct that there was no direct evidence that he killed the victims,
there was ample circumstantial evidence to prove his participation in the killings and his intent
not only to rob the victims, but to kill them. Defendant admitted that he was in the victim’s
apartment with Vannoy at the time they were killed. The timeline of events showed that the
crimes at the Drury home were completed in approximately one hour. During that hour, the
evidence established that the killer or killers (1) subjected the victims to prolonged and severe
beatings during which the victims struggled against their attackers, (2) searched the house to find
duct tape to bind and gag the victims and plastic bags to put over the victims’ heads, (3)
attempted to break, then pry open a window, (4) rummaged through the house for items to steal,
(5) packed Vannoy’s belongings in a plastic bag, and (6) dragged the bodies to the basement.
Based on all of these events taking place in the space of an hour, it was reasonable for the jury to
infer that Vaughn was not merely present while Vannoy killed the victims, but actively
participated in the killings.
We conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find that Vaughn either killed the victims or aided and abetted Vannoy in
committing the killings, and we will not reverse defendant’s convictions on this ground.
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Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury on
reasonable doubt. Because defendant consented to the instructions as given, he failed to properly
preserve this issue for appeal. People v Taylor, 159 Mich App 468, 488; 406 NW2d 859 (1987).
Further, where a defendant’s counsel expressly accepts a trial court’s jury instruction, he
effectively waives appellate review of any error based on that accepted instruction. People v
Carter, 462 Mich 206, 218-219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). However, this case is distinguishable
from Carter because the issue here involves a fundamental constitutional right which cannot be
waived by the action of counsel. Id. at 218. In addition, this Court may review a constitutional
issue for the first time on appeal despite the defendant’s failure to preserve the alleged error if the
issue could be decisive of the outcome. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 547; 520 NW2d 123
(1994).
Defendant claims that the reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial court was flawed
because it shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to defendant and because it required
the jury to have a reason to doubt defendant’s guilt. We review de novo an error in jury
instructions. People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 487; 552 NW2d 493
(1996). The instructions must be read as a whole to determine whether the trial court made an
error requiring reversal. People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261, 270-271; 378 NW2d 365 (1985); People
v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 127; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). Even if the instructions are imperfect,
there is no error if they fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the
defendant’s rights. Id.
A reasonable doubt instruction, when read in its entirety, must leave no doubt in the mind
of the reviewing court that the jury understood that the prosecution had the burden of proof and
what constituted reasonable doubt. Hubbard, supra at 487. If the jury is not properly instructed
on reasonable doubt, the defendant is denied his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to be
convicted by the jury only if the prosecution proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan v
Louisiana, 508 US 275, 278-281; 124 L Ed 2d 182; 113 S Ct 2078 (1993). An erroneous
instruction on reasonable doubt is a structural error that is not subject to harmless error analysis.
Sullivan, supra at 280-281; People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 405; 521 NW2d
528 (1994).
In this case, the trial court gave a lengthy and somewhat rambling reasonable doubt
instruction. During the course of its instruction, the court referred to reasonable doubt as “the
kind of doubt that makes you hesitate before making any normal, reasonable or rational decision”
and “the kind of doubt for which you can assign a reason for having.” The court also told the
jury that “[i]f you have a doubt, you must have a reason for having the doubt. That’s why it is
called reasonable doubt.” These statements are problematic because instructions which require
the jurors to have a reason to doubt defendant’s guilt shift the burden of proof. People v Jackson,
167 Mich App 388, 391; 421 NW2d 697 (1988).
Had the trial court only utilized the above-stated instructions on reasonable doubt, we
would be forced to conclude that reversal is required. Id. However, the court also provided
accurate definitions, describing reasonable doubt at “reason and common sense,” and “fair,
honest, and reasonable doubt.” These instructions closely track the definition contained in the
standard jury instructions, CJI2d 3.2(3), which this Court has approved as an appropriate
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instruction on reasonable doubt. People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 656; 601 NW2d 409
(1999). In addition, the trial court properly contrasted reasonable doubt with what does not
constitute reasonable doubt, such as “proof beyond a shadow of a doubt,” “a fictitious, or flimsy,
or vain, or imaginary doubt,” “a hunch or a feeling,” or a possibility of innocence.” Further, the
court unequivocally stated at least three times that the prosecution has the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is apparent in this case that the trial court provided the jury with a less than perfect
definition of reasonable doubt. However, when the instruction is read in its entirety, it is equally
apparent that the court gave sufficient correct information on the burden of proof and the
definition of reasonable doubt such that the jurors understood the meaning of reasonable doubt
and the prosecution’s burden. Hubbard, supra at 487. We do not believe that the imperfections
in the reasonable doubt instruction in this case were sufficient to warrant reversal of defendant’s
conviction.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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