IN RE MICHAEL JOHN CRAIG MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MICHAEL JOHN CRAIG, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 23, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 226866
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-372823
MARIA T. CRAIG,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Griffin and R. B. Burns*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the family court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i),
(g), and (j).1 We affirm.
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, the trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error. MCR 5.974(I); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999);
In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Terry, supra at 22. Consistent with this standard,
deference must be accorded to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
before it. In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 75; 472 NW2d 38 (1991). To terminate parental
rights, the family court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination has
been met by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445
NW2d 161 (1989). Once a statutory ground is established, the court must terminate parental
rights unless “there exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the
1
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the child’s father, who has not appealed the
trial court’s decision.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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child’s best interests.” MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich
341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Respondent argues on appeal that the family court clearly erred in terminating her
parental rights because the court failed to give due consideration to her substantial hardship,
which allegedly served as a barrier to compliance with the court ordered treatment plan.
Respondent notes that despite her long standing history of drug use, she made significant efforts
to comply with the drug treatment program, taking it upon herself to seek treatment on her own at
the Parkview Clinic where she continued her methadone treatments. Respondent contends that
due to transportation problems and significant hardship -- her home burned to the ground,
causing her to lose all her personal belongings and reside in her vehicle – she was unable to fully
comply with the treatment plan. Respondent alleges that she sought assistance to obtain housing
from petitioner and the Red Cross but was denied assistance from these agencies. Given the
ongoing losses that she suffered throughout the custodial period, respondent maintains that she
should have been given additional time by the family court to complete the treatment plan.
However, a review of the record indicates that respondent made minimal effort to comply
with the court ordered treatment plan and in fact did not avail herself of opportunities to
accommodate her personal hardships. Respondent, who was thirty-seven years old at the time of
the permanent custody hearing, admitted to having an extensive history of drug abuse, involving
cocaine and heroin, since the age of twenty-one. The minor child, Michael John Craig, was born
in July 1998 at only twenty-three weeks gestation, with heroin and cocaine in his system. As a
result, the child has numerous serious medical problems, including laryngeal papillomas
requiring past and future surgeries and cerebral palsy.
Respondent’s treatment plan required that she visit her son weekly, participate in a drug
rehabilitation program, submit to random drug screens, attend weekly Narcotics Anonymous and
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, attend parenting classes, and receive individual counseling.
However, she did not comply with the court’s order to visit the minor child. Following
Michael’s discharge from the hospital in November 1998, respondent never visited him, but she
did contact him by telephone on his first birthday. Respondent attributed her failure to visit to
distance and a lack of transportation, but the record indicates that respondent never attempted to
drive her van to visit Michael even though she drove her van to work and to some drug
counseling appointments. The foster care social worker testified that she made numerous efforts
to assist respondent with the visits, including an arrangement to have the visits moved closer to
respondent. The social worker further testified that she mailed bus tickets to respondent;
respondent contended that she never received them. Moreover, in February, April, and July
1999, Catholic Social Services offered to meet with respondent to discuss her son’s medical
needs and the training respondent would have to undergo to provide care for him. Although
respondent was made aware of these meetings, she failed to participate.
At the time of the permanent custody hearing, respondent was living in her van and she
had been living there for the last six months. She had been evicted from her previous apartment
in April 1998, before her son was born. Respondent testified that she sought assistance from the
Family Independence Agency and the Red Cross to find housing but received no help. However,
the social worker testified that Catholic Social Services offered to meet with respondent to
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discuss the housing issue, but respondent did not attend any of the meetings. In fact, the social
worker had sent a letter to respondent instructing her to contact the Michigan Housing Authority
and the Highland Park Community Housing Commission for assistance in housing. Respondent
did not contact either of these organizations or pursue these referrals. Thus, at the time of the
permanent custody hearing, she still had not obtained suitable housing.
Respondent did not attend any parenting classes or individual counseling sessions.
Respondent told the social worker that she could not comply with portions of the treatment plan
because she could barely take care of herself. Respondent admitted to a sixteen-year history of
drug use. Although respondent partially complied with the random drug screens and drug
treatment, she never successfully completed a drug treatment program. Respondent was referred
to Metro East for drug treatment and counseling but was discharged for noncompliance. While
respondent stated that she participated in another drug treatment program at the Parkview Clinic,
her counselor from Parkview testified that respondent’s participation in the program was
irregular, that respondent was not ready for the treatment that Parkview offered and that, in fact,
respondent was ultimately discharged from the program due to non-participation in December
1999.
On the basis of the above record, which demonstrates respondent’s failure to comply with
most of the aspects of her treatment plan and, most significantly, her failure to meaningfully
address her long-standing drug addiction, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating her
parental rights. In re Ovalle, 140 Mich App 79, 84; 363 NW2d 731 (1985). Further, the
evidence did not establish that termination of respondent’s parental rights was clearly not in the
child’s best interests. MCL 712A.3178(598.19b)(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo,
supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Robert B. Burns
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