PEOPLE OF MI V JUWAUN LONG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 5, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 216364
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-000088
JUWAUN LONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his bench trial conviction for carrying a concealed
weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. Defendant was sentenced to one year of probation. We
affirm.
Defendant first contends that the prosecutor elicited inadmissible hearsay and opinion
testimony from the police officer in charge, Robbin Farrar, and the trial court improperly
considered the prejudicial evidence. We disagree. Defendant did not properly preserve these
issues below by specifically objecting to the alleged statements and stating the same basis on
appeal.1 See MRE 103(a)(1). “It is well established that objections to admissibility not properly
raised at trial cannot be later asserted on appeal.” People v Kilbourn, 454 Mich 677, 685; 563
NW2d 669 (1997). Accordingly, this Court will only review the issue to the extent that failure to
do so would result in manifest injustice. People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 44; 597 NW2d 176
(1999). We find no manifest injustice in this instance.
The purpose of Officer Farrar’s examination was to determine whether she satisfied the
due diligence requirement in investigating the identity of two officers defendant and his brother
alleged were the first to respond to the crime scene. The testimony was elicited to explain why
Officer Farrar did not engage in additional investigative efforts. Officer Farrar testified that she
conducted no further investigation because she thought the case would end with a plea and
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Defendant raised one relevancy objection during the disputed testimony which was sustained by
the trial judge who held that any reference to plea negotiations was irrelevant information that
she would not consider in deciding the case.
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because it was a “straight CCW” case. Officer Farrar also recounted a conversation she had with
defendant’s mother who “was basically trying to ascertain from me what should she do in terms
of him pleading and getting some kind of a deal so he wouldn’t get a criminal record.” Officer
Farrar further testified that, as a result of the conversation with defendant’s mother, she “was
given the impression that the other brother had admitted to them having the weapon.” These
statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted or to state a legal conclusion.
Officer Farrar’s statements simply explained the rationale for her decision not to engage in
further attempts to identify two alleged res gestae witnesses. Accordingly, there was no error in
their admission.
Defendant next contends that the trial court’s findings of fact were not supported by the
evidence of record and thus were inadequate to support defendant’s conviction. We disagree. In
waiver cases, the trial court is charged with the duties to find the facts specially, state its
conclusions of law, and direct entry of the judgment. MCR 6.403. The purpose of requiring
specific factual findings is to allow appellate review by disclosing the facts relied upon by the
factfinder on each element of the applicable law. People v Simon, 189 Mich App 565, 568; 473
NW2d 785 (1991). Factual findings are sufficient as long as it is manifest that the court was
aware of the factual issues and correctly applied the law. People v Legg, 197 Mich App 131,
134; 494 NW2d 797 (1992).
The elements of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, with regard to this case, are
that the accused carried a pistol and that it was concealed on or about his person. See MCL
750.227; MSA 28.424; People v Davenport, 89 Mich App 678, 682; 282 NW2d 179 (1979). In
rendering her findings of fact, the trial judge found that defendant had a pistol that he carried in
his coat pocket until the police arrived on the scene and he dropped it to his side. The trial judge
further found that defendant could take the gun from his pocket and drop it, consistent with the
arresting police officer’s testimony, although defendant had open reduction surgery to repair a
fractured finger fifteen days before his arrest and was wearing a short arm cast.
The issue on appeal concerns the trial judge’s finding, which supported defendant’s
alleged ability to remove the gun from his pocket and drop it, that “[t]he defendant testified that
the cast could be removed and that he didn’t have to wear the cast all the time.” In fact,
defendant did not testify to those facts. However, the trial court did not solely rely on those
incorrect facts in reaching her guilty verdict. Instead, the trial judge indicated that she relied
upon the “medical evidence,” i.e. the orthopedic surgeon’s note describing the nature of the
injury and subsequent medical intervention. The trial judge further indicated that her decision
was based on her assessment of the credibility of the arresting police officers with regard to the
events that transpired leading to defendant’s arrest. This Court gives great deference to the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. People v Brannon, 194 Mich App 121, 131;
486 NW2d 83 (1992). In this case, the trial court’s findings were sufficient because it is apparent
from the record that the court was aware of the factual issues, correctly applied the law, and
explicitly found the elements of the charged offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Legg,
supra.
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor did not provide reasonable assistance in the
effort to identify two alleged res gestae witnesses. We disagree. We review the trial court’s
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determination of due diligence for an abuse of discretion. People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341,
348; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). The prosecutor has a duty to provide reasonable assistance to locate
witnesses on a defendant’s request. See People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 289; 537 NW2d 813
(1995). There is no requirement to exercise due diligence to discover the names of witnesses.
People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 36; 592 NW2d 75 (1998).
In the instant case defense counsel issued a request to the prosecution to identify one
African-American officer and one Caucasian officer, both wearing plain clothes with their
identifications around their necks, driving a burgundy Crown Victoria on the night in question.
The request further indicated that the officers were “possibly narcotic officers.” It was alleged
that these two officers detained defendant and his brother prior to the arrival of the arresting
officers.
In response to defendant’s request, Officer Farrar retrieved the duty and vehicle logs for
the night in question and attempted to ascertain the identity of the officers. She identified four
officers who matched the description and submitted those names to defense counsel. Defense
counsel interviewed the officers and declared that they were not the officers in question.
However, contrary to defendant’s request to the prosecutor, defendant and his brother both
testified that the alleged first officers on the scene were driving a white vehicle. This
inconsistency undermines the credibility of defendant and his brother. Further, this is not a
situation where both parties agree that an unknown res gestae witness exists. See, e.g.,
Gadomski, supra. The arresting officer testified that he did not remember any police officers at
the scene prior to his arrival and Officer Farrar testified that, as a result of her investigation, she
determined that no other officers were at the crime scene. The trial court’s finding that the
prosecution provided reasonable assistance under the circumstances in identifying the alleged
witnesses was not an abuse of discretion. Lawton, supra.
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor made several statements during her closing
argument that constituted prosecutorial misconduct and denied defendant a fair trial. We review
issues of prosecutorial misconduct to determine whether defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
During the prosecutor’s closing argument she made an unsupported statement regarding
defendant’s ability to use his hand to sign his rights form. Defense counsel objected to the
statement. The prosecutor attempted to proceed, but the trial judge interrupted her and stated that
the prosecutor needed to address the objection. We hold that the trial judge implicitly sustained
defense counsel’s objection. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s statement was harmless and did not
deny defendant a fair trial. Paquette, supra at 342.
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly referred to inadmissible evidence
in her initial closing argument by mentioning the telephone conversation Officer Farrar testified
she had with defendant’s mother. Defense counsel objected to the statement during the
prosecutor’s rebuttal argument. The trial judge sustained defense counsel’s belated objection,
holding that there was no record evidence of the substance of the alleged telephone conversation.
The result of an objection for an improper remark by a prosecutor is the issuance of a curative
instruction. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). In the instant case,
where the trial judge was the trier of fact, such a curative instruction was unnecessary because the
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trial judge recognized and agreed that the prosecutor’s argument was improper. Accordingly, we
hold that defendant was not denied a fair trial. Paquette, supra at 342.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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