TOBIN S MACBETH V APRIL J MACBETH-SCARLETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TOBIN S. MACBETH,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2000
Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellee,
v
No. 226912
Lenawee Circuit Court
LC No. 98-019904-DM
APRIL J. MACBETH-SCARLETT,
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-
Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Talbot and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order denying her motion to modify
custody of the parties’ minor child. We affirm.
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced in March 1999. The consent judgment of divorce
awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of their minor son. On November 4, 1999,
defendant filed a motion to modify the custody arrangement to grant her primary physical
custody of the child based on a material change in circumstances. The case evaluation submitted
prior to the hearing recommended that defendant obtain primary physical custody of the child.
In resolving custody disputes, the trial court must consider the child’s best interests, as
measured by the factors articulated in MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3). Bowers v Bowers, 198
Mich App 320, 327-328; 497 NW2d 602 (1993). A change in circumstances may be grounds for
modification of a custody award if the moving party can establish that the modification is in the
child’s best interests. MCL 722.27(1)(c); MSA 25.312(7)(1)(c); Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich
App 163, 166; 559 NW2d 59 (1996). Where there exists an established custodial environment, a
court may not change or modify custody unless presented with clear and convincing evidence
that the best interests of the child would be served by the change. MCL 722.27(1)(c); MSA
25.312(7)(1)(c); Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 25; 614 NW2d 183 (2000); Bowers, supra
at 324. In this case, the trial court found that a custodial environment existed with both parents,
and the parties do not dispute that finding on appeal.
After reviewing the testimony from the evidentiary hearing and conducting an in-camera
interview with the minor child, the trial court considered the best interest factors provided in the
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Child Custody Act, MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3). The court essentially found that the parties
were equal with respect to all factors. Based on these findings, the court concluded that
defendant had not shown by clear and convicting evidence that it would be in the best interests of
the minor child to change or modify physical custody. On appeal, defendant challenges the
court’s findings of fact with respect to each statutory interest factor, arguing that they were
against the great weight of the evidence and that the court’s refusal to modify custody was an
abuse of discretion.
In child custody cases, findings of fact, including the trial court’s findings as to each
custody factor, are reviewed under the great weight of the evidence standard and will be affirmed
unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. Fletcher v Fletcher, 229
Mich App 19, 24; 581 NW2d 11 (1998), citing Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 877-878; 526
NW2d 889 (1994); see also Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192, 196; 614 NW2d 696 (2000).
The trial court’s custody decision is reviewed under a “palpable abuse of discretion” standard.
MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8); Fletcher, supra at 24. An abuse of discretion occurs when the
result was so grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of
judgment or the exercise of passion and bias. Fletcher, supra at 879-880 (Brickley, J.), 900
(Griffin, J.). Finally, questions of law are reviewed for clear error. MCL 722.28; MSA
25.312(8).
The first factor requires the court to consider “[t]he “love, affection, and other emotional
ties existing between the parties involved and the child.” MCL 722.23(a); MSA 25.312(3)(a).
Defendant contends that the child indicates that he misses her when he is upset at preschool, and
that plaintiff is insensitive to the child’s emotional needs. However, each party testified and
presented other witnesses who testified regarding their love and affection for the child. There
was also evidence that the child was happy and content in both settings. In light of this evidence,
even defense counsel conceded during closing arguments that factor (a) equally favored both
parties. The trial court did not err in finding that the evidence on this factor did not favor either
party.
The second factor examines “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give
the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in
his or her religion or creed, if any.” MCL 722.23(b); MSA 25.312(3)(b). In support of her
contention, defendant cites plaintiff’s failure to follow safety rules, his inappropriate language
toward defendant, his decision to purchase a BB gun for the child, and the fact that only she
provides religious guidance by taking the child to church. The testimony established that
plaintiff and his fiancée attend counseling sessions to learn to provide a better home for the child
and that plaintiff takes an active interest in how the child is faring in preschool. Although
plaintiff does not take the child to church, the trial court did not err in weighing this factor
equally between the parties, considering their love, affection, guidance, and involvement in the
child’s education.
The third factor is the “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide
the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under
the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.” MCL 722.23(c); MSA
25.312(3)(c). Defendant maintains that she adheres to a meal schedule when the child is with
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her, whereas plaintiff leaves this responsibility to his fiancée and feeds the child at irregular and
late hours, that plaintiff does not always return the proper clothes with the child, and that plaintiff
has exhibited a disregard for the child’s asthma and medical care.
While the trial court found that both parties “have the best interests of the child at heart,”
it chastised them for failing to cooperate with each other and with the doctors regarding the
child’s medical treatment. In any event, both parties presented evidence to suggest that the child
was well cared for at both residences. Contrary to defendant’s assertion regarding meal
preparation, plaintiff testified that he does all of the cooking during the week, and his fiancée
cooks on the weekends. Mogle, supra at 201 (this Court defers to the trial court on issues of
credibility). Defendant relies on only one instance of the child being fed at 11:00 p.m., and the
failure to return the child with proper clothes does not establish that plaintiff lacks the capacity to
provide the child with clothing. There was also evidence that plaintiff attended the child’s
doctor’s appointment and that he exhibited concern for the child’s care. The trial court did not
err in finding that the evidence on this factor did not favor either party.
The fourth and fifth factors require the court to examine “[t]he length of time the child
has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity” and
“[t]he permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.” MCL
722.23(d)-(e); MSA 25.312(3)(d)-(e). Defendant claims that she offers a more stable home
environment for the child because (1) she is newly married and can provide a family unit unlike
plaintiff who lives with his girlfriend and her daughter (2) plaintiff has no immediate plans to be
married because he does not want to “rush into anything” and (3) she and her husband own a
home while defendant rents his home.
The trial court found that both parties offered a stable, satisfactory environment, and a
family unit. The court commended plaintiff for making a commitment to be married, stated that
it understood plaintiff’s reluctance to marry hastily given his prior experience, and stated that it
was appropriate that plaintiff and his fiancée were receiving counseling. With respect to the
morality of plaintiff’s living arrangement, the court noted that defendant’s husband spent three
nights with defendant (while the child was in the house) before they were married. The court
stated that the parties “have taken two different routes to accomplish the same thing” and that it
would “not disparage [the parties] for that.” With regard to the importance of maintaining
continuity, the court noted that if the custody arrangement were disrupted “it will have a negative
affect [sic]” on the child. We cannot conclude that the trial court’s erred in its findings on these
factors.
The sixth and seventh factors require the court to consider the “moral fitness” and the
“mental and physical health” of the parties. MCL 722.23(f)-(g); MSA 25.312(3)(f)-(g).
Defendant argues that plaintiff does not exhibit a moral lifestyle. As discussed above, the trial
court found that this factor did not weigh in favor of either party, noting that defendant’s husband
testified that he had spent the night at defendant’s house before they were married. Although
defendant questions plaintiff’s mental health based upon his controlling and verbally abusive
behavior, the trial court chastised both parties for their manipulations and lack of cooperation
regarding the child. We find no error.
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The eighth factor the court must consider is the “[t]he home, school, and community
record of the child.” MCL 722.23(h); MSA 25.312(3)(h). Defendant maintains that she provides
a more stable home environment for the child, that she has invested more time in the child’s
schooling than plaintiff, and that she is committed to providing the child with a church
community. In finding the parties equal on this factor, the court noted “we have had testimony
from both [schools] that he has a good record. I think that bodes well for both of you.” The
evidence also showed that the child was happy and content at both parties’ residences and,
according to the instructors and daycare workers at the preschool, that both parties took an active
interest in the child’s schooling. The trial court’s finding that the parties were equal on this issue
was not erroneous.
The ninth factor the court must consider is “[t]he reasonable preference of the child”
MCL 722.23(i); MSA 25.312(3)(i). Defendant contends that the court should have given great
weight to the provision in the custody evaluator’s report which stated that the child preferred to
be with the mother. The trial court indicated that it spoke with the child and considered his
preference, but did not reveal the content of the discussion to the parties. “As a general rule, a
trial court must state on the record whether children were able to express a reasonable preference
and whether their preferences were considered by the court, but need not violate their confidence
by disclosing their choices.” Fletcher v Fletcher, 200 Mich App 505, 518; 504 NW2d 684
(1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds 447 Mich 871 (1994), after remand 229 Mich
App 19; 581 NW2d 11 (1998). See also Hilliard v Schmidt, 231 Mich App 316, 320-321; 586
NW2d 263 (1998); Impullitti v Impullitti, 163 Mich App 507, 510; 415 NW2d 261 (1987). We
cannot conclude that the trial court erred in this respect.
The tenth factor requires the court to address “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the
parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the
child and the other parent or the child and the parents.” MCL 722.23(j); MSA 25.312(3)(j).
Although defendant cites incidents in which plaintiff has been uncooperative and has interfered
with the child’s relationship with defendant, the evidence also revealed that defendant engaged in
similar behavior. The court determined that defendant contributed to the child’s emotional upset
during the transition period and suggested that it did not have confidence in defendant’s ability to
encourage plaintiff’s participation in the child’s life in the event the motion were granted. Based
on our review of the record, the trial court did not err in finding that both parties have acted to
undermine the other’s relationship with the child.
The eleventh factor requires the court to consider evidence of domestic violence. MCL
722.23(k); MSA 25.312(3)(k). The court correctly determined that no testimony had been
offered in this regard, and defendant acknowledges that “[t]here has been no physical domestic
violence between the parties.”
The twelfth factor the court must consider is “[a]ny other factor considered by the court to
be relevant to a particular custody dispute.” Defendant maintains that although the court
addressed the custody evaluation under this factor it erred in failing to follow the
recommendation therein. The record reveals that the trial court seriously considered the
evaluator’s recommendation. The court stated that it was “almost” persuaded by the report
which recommended that defendant receive physical custody based in part on an incident
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involving the child’s security blanket; however, the court noted that there was testimony that
plaintiff ultimately returned the blanket to the child. Further, in declining to follow the
recommendation, the court explained that the child “has begun to adjust to this situation having
one home in Saline and one home in Blissfield,” that the child believes that he has “two homes
instead of one,” and that a change at this point would have a negative effect on the child.1 The
record also indicates that the court viewed both parties as equally complicit in their bad behavior,
which undermined their relationship with the child, and that the court focused on the parties’
apparent inability to foster a continuing and close relationship between the child and the other
parent.
The trial court’s findings of fact were supported by the evidence, as were its findings on
the custody factors. Because the statutory factors weighed equally with respect to both parties,
the trial court properly determined that defendant failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that a change or a modification in custody was in the child’s best interests.
1
The court specifically explained as follows:
The recommendation was for your husband to have custody of the child
back when the divorce was filed because you were getting your life together while
he was taking care of the child. And what we did, we entered an order that
allowed both of you to have custody of that child.
Now, the recommendation is for you to have custody of the child. And I
will do the same thing. I will allow both of you to have custody of the child and it
will stay the same.
I think the child has begun to adjust to this situation having one home in
Saline and one home in Blissfield. In talking to the child what I find the child
believes he has two homes instead of one or none. I think it is very good. . . .
***
And so now you want me to take the very difficult step to change what is
going on and hope that that will result in something better and that that will not
have a negative affect [sic] on the child. I will tell you it will have a negative
affect [sic] on the child if I do. Because whenever you have a change of
circumstances like that it is going to have an affect [sic]. It may be better for you
but I am not here to do what is in your best interests or your best interests. I am
here to do what is in the child’s best interests. And I have to do my best to
determine what is in the child’s best interests based on what is presented here.
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Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s
motion to modify the custody to grant her primary physical custody of the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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