IN RE CASSELDINE/VONCANNON MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JOHN CLARK CASSELDINE and
CYNTHIA LEE VONCANNON, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 224405
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 94-320705
KATHLEEN ANN CASSELDINE, a/k/a
KATHLEEN ANNE BAKER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BENJAMIN EDWIN VONCANNON, a/k/a
EDWARD VONCANNON,
Respondent.
In the Matter of CYNTHIA LEE VONCANNON,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 224812
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 94-320705
BENJAMIN EDWIN VONCANNON a/k/a
EDWARD VONCANNON,
Respondent-Appellant,
-1-
and
KATHLEEN ANN CASSELDINE, a/k/a
KATHLEEN ANNE BAKER,
Respondent.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents Kathleen Casseldine and Benjamin
VonCannon appeal as of right from the December 1, 1999, order of the Family Division of the
Wayne Circuit Court terminating their parental rights to the minor children1 pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), and MCL
712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), and (g), respectively.
We affirm.
Docket No. 224405
Respondent Kathleen Casseldine argues the family court clearly erred in finding that the
statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights under subsections (3)(c)(i) (conditions
that led to adjudication continue to exist), (3)(g) (parent failed to provide proper care), and (3)(j)
(child would be harmed if returned to parent), were established by clear and convincing evidence
and that such termination would be in the children’s best interests. We disagree.
To terminate parental rights, the family court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501
NW2d 182 (1993). Once a statutory ground is established, the court must terminate parental
rights unless “there exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the
child’s best interests.” MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462
Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review the family court’s findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard. MCR 5.974(I); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520
(1999).
A review of the record in the instant case reveals that respondent was involved with the
family court on two prior occasions with regard to her son John Casseldine. The first petition for
temporary wardship was dismissed, but a second petition was filed in May 1995, precipitated by
respondent’s addiction to heroin and prescription codeine. Respondent was ordered to enroll in a
six-month inpatient drug treatment program, which she completed. The case was dismissed in
1
The father of John Clark Casseldine is deceased; respondent Benjamin VonCannon’s appeal
pertains only to his daughter, Cynthia Lee VonCannon.
-2-
May 1997 after respondent completed two years of treatment and abided by the parent-agency
agreement to the satisfaction of the family court. However, in July 1998, respondent’s daughter
Cynthia Lee VonCannon was born with cocaine and opiates in her system. Respondent admitted
to using these drugs prior to Cynthia’s birth and acknowledged she had been a drug user since the
age of sixteen, with a history of treatment and relapses due to her addiction to cocaine and
heroin. The children were consequently adjudicated temporary court wards in October 1998.
Respondent’s parent-agency agreement required, among other things, that she establish
and maintain a drug and alcohol free lifestyle, submit to random alcohol and drug screens,
complete parenting classes, complete individual and domestic abuse counseling, maintain a legal
source of income, obtain suitable housing, and visit the children. On appeal, respondent
maintains that she has been rehabilitated: “although there may have been periods of time when
her children were temporary court wards that she did not comply with each and every aspect of
her parent-agency agreement, appellant did not have any positive drug screens in the four months
before trial” and “was fairly consistent in her visitation, behaved appropriately during her visits,
had employment and most importantly, was bonded with her children.”
However, the evidence adduced at the permanent custody hearing demonstrated that
respondent only submitted nine out of the thirty-seven requested drug screens. She tested
positive for drugs in May 1999, by which time her visits with her children had been suspended
due to her non-compliance with the parent-agency agreement. Respondent thereafter missed her
drug screens in July and September 1999, prior to the permanent custody hearing in December
1999. Although respondent did not have any positive drug screens in the four months prior to the
permanent custody hearing, she submitted only eight out of the sixteen drug screens that were
requested during that time. Moreover, she admitted she could not properly care for her children
when she was on drugs.
Although respondent contends on appeal that she was consistent in her visitation with the
children, she attended only eighteen out of the thirty-seven requested visits before they were
suspended in April 1999. The referee agreed to reinstate respondent’s visitation when she started
submitting regular drug screens, but she never complied with that condition. Respondent
attended an intake session for domestic violence in July 1999 but subsequently failed to attend
any further sessions. Respondent did not follow through on the housing referrals and denied the
foster care case manager access to her home, stating that it was not adequate or suitable for the
return of her children. A psychological evaluation in June 1999 lead the clinician to conclude
that respondent exercised poor judgment and insight as it related to her role as a parent. The
clinician concluded that “the prognosis for the reunification of the mother with her children was
poor based on her pattern of instability and her inconsistency in remaining drug free,” and
recommended the termination of respondent’s parental rights. Moreover, at the time of the
permanent custody hearing, respondent had two outstanding misdemeanor warrants which were
properly noted by the family court. MCR 5.974(F)(2).
In light of these proofs, we find no clear error in the family court’s determination that
termination of respondent’s parental rights pursuant to subsections (3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) was
supported by clear and convincing evidence. Contrary to respondent’s assertion, the family
court’s decision terminating her parental rights was based not on evidence of her criminal
-3-
history, but rather on her failure to comply with the court ordered treatment plan to overcome her
drug addiction. Respondent’s unresolved addiction severely hampered her ability to properly
care for her children, particularly her son, who was diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and
had a history of self-abusive behavior, depression, and physical aggression, thus requiring special
care and attention. We further conclude the evidence did not establish that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was clearly not in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5). Therefore, the family court did not err in terminating respondent’s
parental rights to the minor children.
Docket No. 224812
Respondent Benjamin VonCannon argues on appeal that the trial court clearly erred in
terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Cynthia Lee VonCannon, pursuant to subsections
(3)(a)(ii) (desertion of child for ninety-one or more days), (3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to
adjudication continue to exist), and (3)(g) (failure to provide proper care). Specifically,
respondent contends that although “it may be true that he did not fulfill the terms of his parentagency agreement, . . . it is questionable why domestic violence counseling, parenting classes and
regular drug screens should have been included in that plan in the first place.” Respondent
argues there was no substantiation either that domestic violence occurred in the family unit or
that respondent knew his live-in girlfriend, corespondent Kathleen Casseldine, was abusing drugs
or that he used drugs himself. Respondent alleges that his parent-agency agreement was not
rationally related to the problems that brought his child to the attention of petitioner in the first
place: the fact that corespondent Casseldine took illegal drugs while carrying his child.
However, this issue regarding the propriety of the terms of respondent’s parent-agency
agreement has been waived because it was not appealed following the jurisdictional hearing. See
In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 436-438; 505 NW2d 834 (1993). In any event, a review of the
record indicates that at the pretrial hearing, respondent stipulated to the court that he knew the
corespondent mother, Kathleen Casseldine, had a history of drug abuse and that he should have
known she was using drugs when his daughter was born. The record of this hearing further
reflects respondent’s counsel’s representation that although respondent “denies that there’s been
any physical altercations . . . just normal squabbling between him and . . . the mother,”
respondent was “willing to go into counseling” with regard to the issue of domestic violence.
Finally, at the pretrial hearing, counsel for respondent further stipulated to “drug screens for both
the mother and my client even though there’s no allegations of drug usage against my client he
supports the mother in her efforts of reunification.”
Moreover, the requirements of the parent-agency agreement were not unreasonable under
the circumstances. The plan required that respondent participate in domestic violence
counseling, drug assessment, parenting classes, individual family counseling, and also that he
establish a legal source of income, suitable housing, and regular visitation with his child. These
terms were appropriate given that respondent had lived with corespondent for a long period of
time, admitted he knew of her drug history, and should have known she was using drugs while
pregnant with his daughter, who was born at home with drugs in her system and was only taken
to the hospital several weeks after her birth because she was suffering from withdrawal
symptoms. Domestic violence in the relationship had been previously indicated in an evaluation
-4-
report concerning corespondent.
Thus, respondent’s belated claim concerning the
appropriateness of the requirements imposed on him by the court through the parent-agency
agreement is without merit.
In a related argument, respondent argues that he had a succession of different attorneys
standing in for his assigned counsel and therefore his concerns regarding submission to the
rehabilitative measures set forth above were not effectively raised or dealt with by counsel prior
to the permanent placement hearing. To the extent respondent’s argument can be regarded as an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court applies by analogy the principles of ineffective
assistance of counsel used in the criminal law context. In re Simon, 171 Mich App 443, 447; 431
NW2d 71 (1988). Thus, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, respondent
must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that because of such representation, he was prejudiced to the extent he was denied a fair trial.
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). To demonstrate prejudice,
respondent must show that but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been different. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688;
521 NW2d 557 (1998). Respondent must also overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s
actions constituted sound trial strategy. Id. at 687. Because respondent did not move for a new
trial or an evidentiary hearing in the trial court, our review is limited to errors apparent on the
record. People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604, 612; 493 NW2d 471 (1992).
Respondent has not demonstrated that his counsel’s alleged failure to address his
concerns regarding the terms of the parent-agency agreement prior to the permanent custody
hearing fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that the representation so
prejudiced him as to deprive him of a fair trial. First, respondent’s acquiescence in the terms of
the parent-agency agreement at the pretrial hearing repudiates his contention that the propriety of
the agreement was not considered by respondent and his counsel prior to its implementation.
Second, as previously discussed, the parent-agency agreement was reasonable under the
circumstances. Third, there was ample factual and legal justification for the family court’s
termination of respondent’s parental rights. Respondent made no attempt to abide by its terms,
missing five out of nine scheduled visits with his daughter between October 8, 1998, and
December 19, 1998, and eight out of eleven scheduled visits between December 15, 1998, and
March 23, 1999. Respondent did not attend any visits with his daughter after March 16, 1999,
and similarly ceased contact with petitioner and provided none of the requisite drug screens. He
also failed to follow through on referrals for individual counseling, domestic violence classes,
parenting classes, and drug assessment.
Respondent testified at the permanent custody trial that he did not comply with the courtordered treatment plan because he did not have time to do so and that a lack of transportation
prevented visitation with his daughter, because his car had been impounded and his driver’s
license suspended due to his extensive traffic violation record. He further admitted that he was
still involved with corespondent Kathleen Casseldine and, in the event he was given custody of
his daughter, corespondent would help care for her. Respondent denied the case worker access to
his home, stating that it was not adequate. Despite his claim that he had a new job, the telephone
number he gave to the case worker was wrong, and he never provided the worker with proof of
income.
-5-
Taking into consideration the above evidence of record, we conclude that respondent’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. In sum, we find no clear error in the
family court’s conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights was warranted by clear
and convincing evidence pursuant to subsections (3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), and (g). In re Miller, 182 Mich
App 70, 83; 451 NW2d 576 (1990). The family court likewise did not err in determining that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo Minors, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ William B. Murphy
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
