KENNETH DOBRIK V BOMBARDIER INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KENNETH DOBRIK,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 216197
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-536890-CZ
BOMBARDIER, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
ANDERSON SALES & SERVICE,
Defendant.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Kelly and Sawyer, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Kenneth Dobrik appeals by right from the circuit court order granting summary
disposition of his product liability claim against defendant Bombardier, Inc. We affirm.
Plaintiff was injured while riding a 1995 Sea-Doo model XP personal watercraft
manufactured by defendant Bombardier, and purchased by plaintiff as new from defendant
Anderson Sales and Service in April 1995.1 According to plaintiff, the cause of his injury was
the failure of the craft’s steering system which resulted in his inability to turn the craft and avoid
striking a dock.
Following this accident, plaintiff filed suit against both Bombardier and Anderson Sales,
alleging that his injuries were the result of negligent design, manufacture, and marketing of the
1995 Sea-Doo XP’s steering system. As part of discovery in this matter, expert representatives
from each party performed a post-accident inspection of plaintiff ’s 1995 XP. During this
inspection, gouges in the internal surface area of the steering stem arm, as well as the steering
stem itself, were found. Both parties’ experts indicated that although no screws were found at
1
Defendant Anderson Sales and Service is not a party to this appeal.
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the time of the inspection, these gouges were consistent with marks which would have been
created by driving drywall screws in between the craft’s steering stem and steering stem arm.
Bombardier’s expert also noted that these gouges had cut into the key of the steering stem arm,
causing substantial damage to the steering system’s components and resulting in “the inability of
the steering mechanism to fully function.” During his deposition in this matter, plaintiff
acknowledged that he drove two drywall screws into the steering stem the summer before his
accident, but asserted that he had the steering system replaced by Anderson Sales later that same
year. He had not asked Anderson Sales which parts of the system were replaced.
Following inspection of the Sea-Doo, Bombardier filed a motion for summary
disposition, MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10). Bombardier argued that because the
evidence showed that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by damage caused by plaintiff ’s alteration
of the XP’s steering system, it was not liable to plaintiff because the alteration was not
reasonably foreseeable. The trial court agreed that the alteration by plaintiff was not foreseeable
and granted summary disposition on that ground.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)2 is subject to de novo
review. Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). In order to
defeat a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a plaintiff must bring forth
some evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. With respect to a suit for product
liability, this entails production of admissible evidence showing that the defendant supplied a
product that was defective and that the defect caused the injury. Auto Club Ins Ass'n v General
Motors Corp, 217 Mich App 594, 604; 552 NW2d 523 (1996). A plaintiff may establish its case
by circumstantial and direct evidence, but mere speculation and conjecture are insufficient to
meet the burden imposed. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 165; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).
There must be more than a mere possibility that defendant’s unreasonable conduct caused the
injury. Id. We agree with the trial court that the evidence proffered by plaintiff here did not
establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the existence of a design or
manufacturing defect which caused his injuries.
Plaintiff presented evidence of a warranty bulletin involving a different watercraft, the
1995 HX model. Even accepting arguendo as true plaintiff ’s claim that Bombardier redesigned
the upper support of the steering housing on the 1995 HX model, plaintiff ’s rationale for the
reasons underlying that fact are no more than conjecture and are therefore insufficient to meet his
burden establishing an issue of fact with respect to a defect in the system. See Skinner, supra, at
165. The warranty bulletin, which indicates that the steering arm on the HX Model may have
been “improperly assembled” does not establish that the HX steering system was defectively
designed, nor does plaintiff offer expert opinion that the single-key system initially used in the
HX model was inadequate to withstand its intended use.
2
Although Bombardier's motion for summary disposition was premised on both MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10), the trial court did not specify which subsection of MCR 2.116(C) it was
relying on when it granted the motion. Nonetheless, because both parties and the trial court
relied on matters outside the pleadings, this Court will construe the motion as having been
granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Driver v Hanley (After Remand), 226 Mich App 558, 562;
575 NW2d 31 (1997).
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Further, even if a single-key system was inadequate for the HX model, there is nothing in
the record to establish that the same was true with respect to the XP. There may or may not be
significant differences in these models. Plaintiff was required to develop this information in
order to avoid summary disposition of his claim. This is not apparent from the record. MCR
2.116(G)(4). Plaintiff’s supposition that the 1995 XP at issue here was defective because it used
the same single-key system as the HX, is simply too speculative to create a factual dispute.
Nor did plaintiff create a factual dispute as to causation. Under Michigan products
liability law, proving causation entails proof of two separate elements: (1) cause in fact, and (2)
legal causation, also known as proximate cause. Id. at 162-163. The first of these elements,
cause in fact, generally requires a showing that but for the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff
would not have been injured. Id. at 163. On the other hand, legal or proximate cause involves
examining the foreseeability of consequences, and whether a defendant should be held legally
responsible for such consequences. Id. While proximate cause is a legal question reserved for
the court, the question of cause in fact is an issue of fact to be decided by a jury. Charles
Reinhart Co v Winiemko, 444 Mich 579, 626; 513 NW2d 773 (1994).
Here, in finding that plaintiff ’s alteration of the steering system was not reasonably
foreseeable, the trial court was addressing the issue of legal causation. However, in order for
legal causation to even become a relevant consideration, a plaintiff must first adequately establish
cause in fact. Skinner, supra at 163. In this case, plaintiff failed to create a factual dispute
regarding whether, but for Bombardier’s failure to place a key in the upper support, his accident
would not have occurred, and thus any error in the trial court’s decision as to legal causation was
irrelevant. Id.
In challenging the trial court’s decision as to legal causation, plaintiff argues that
summary disposition on this ground was not proper because there remained a question of fact as
to whether the “alterations” found by the parties’ experts during the post-accident inspection of
the craft were made before or after plaintiff ’s accident, and thus whether these alterations could
have been the cause of his accident. In support of this argument, plaintiff asserts that as
Anderson Sales assured him that it had “replaced the steering system” after plaintiff’s initial
alterations during the summer of 1995. Plaintiff also argues that we must consider the possibility
that it may have been necessary for the person who towed his XP from the lake after the accident
to have made modifications to the steering system in order to get the craft ashore, creating a
material question of fact as to the existence of the alterations at the time of the accident. Plaintiff
argues that the issue whether it was an alteration to the craft’s steering system which caused his
injuries, or whether those injuries were caused by a defect in the steering system as designed and
manufactured by Bombardier, remains, precluding summary disposition. We do not agree.
Contrary to plaintiff ’s assertion that the “steering system” was completely replaced
before his accident, the invoice issued by Anderson Sales indicates only that the “steering stem
arm” had been replaced. Plaintiff acknowledge in this deposition that he did not ask Anderson
Sales what specific parts were replaced. As previously noted, during the post-accident inspection
of the vehicle, both parties’ experts discovered screw marks consistent with plaintiff ’s initial
alterations within the steering stem as well as the steering arm. Moreover, in light of plaintiff’s
testimony during his deposition that no modifications or alterations were done to the craft since
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the accident, he is precluded from attempting to create a triable issue of fact by now
contradictorily asserting the possibility of a subsequent modification. See, e.g., Atkinson v
Detroit, 222 Mich App 7, 11; 564 NW2d 473 (1997). Plaintiff offered no evidence, save his own
lay opinion that the single-key system was inadequate and therefore failed, which would
contradict the opinion of Bombardier’s expert that an alteration to the steering system caused a
malfunction. As noted by the Court in Skinner, supra at 166, “[s]omething more should be
offered the jury than a situation which, by ingenious interpretation, suggests the mere possibility
of defendant’s negligence being the cause of his injury.”
Plaintiff also argues that even if this Court finds no error in the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition with respect to his product liability claim, the trial court still erred in
dismissing the entire complaint against Bombardier because plaintiff also alleged that
Bombardier was negligent in authorizing Anderson Sales as a certified Bombardier service
center. Review of the complaint filed by plaintiff reveals no such allegation and we therefore
find this argument to be factually without merit.
We also reject plaintiff ’s claim that despite the trial court’s grant of summary disposition
with respect to Bombardier, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition with respect to
Anderson Sales. Contrary to plaintiff ’s implication, Anderson Sales was not dismissed from the
suit in conjunction with Bombardier’s motion for summary disposition. Rather, plaintiff ’s
claims against Anderson Sales were dismissed without prejudice by stipulation of the parties
some nine months later. In light of this fact, as well as the fact that plaintiff failed to raised this
issue in his statement of questions presented, we reject plaintiff’s claim of trial court error in the
dismissal of Anderson from this suit. MCR 7.212(C)(5); Marx v Dep't of Commerce, 220 Mich
App 66, 81; 558 NW2d 460 (1996).
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ David H. Sawyer
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