PEOPLE OF MI V ARTHUR MOSES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 213694
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-900013
ARTHUR MOSES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Neff and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver between fifty and 224
grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii).
Following a
preliminary examination, the district court suppressed defendant’s statements and dismissed the
charge against defendant because of insufficient evidence. The prosecutor appeals by leave
granted the court order affirming the district court’s dismissal of the charge against defendant.
We reverse and remand.
The prosecutor first argues that the district court erred by suppressing defendant’s
statements as the fruit of an illegal arrest. A lower court’s factual findings when ruling on a
motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error and will be affirmed unless we are left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. People v Faucett, 442 Mich 153, 170;
499 NW2d 764 (1993); People v Custer, 242 Mich App 59, 64; ___ NW2d ___ (2000).
However, to the extent that a lower court’s decision to suppress evidence is based on an
interpretation of the law, appellate review is de novo. People v Kaslowski, 239 Mich App 320,
323; 608 NW2d 539 (2000).
The district court found that, because defendant was advised of his Miranda1 rights, he
was under arrest. The district court also found that no probable cause had been shown to arrest
defendant at that time and, therefore, the court held that defendant’s statements were
inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal arrest. However, in Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692; 101
S Ct 2587; 69 L Ed 2d 340 (1981), the Court held that for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, “a
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited
authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Id. at 705.
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court assessed the justification for the detention of an occupant
of premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant by analyzing the nature of
the articulable and individualized suspicion supporting the detention and law enforcement’s
interest in preventing flight, minimizing the risk of harm to the officers, and the orderly
completion of the search. The Court noted that the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics
is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or efforts to conceal or destroy
evidence, and the risk of harm to police officers is minimized if they are able to exercise
command of the situation. Additionally, the orderly completion of the search may be facilitated
if the occupants of the premises are present, which serves to avoid the use of force that is not
only damaging to property, but may also delay completion of the search. Id. at 702-703.
In People v Zuccarini, 172 Mich App 11; 431 NW2d 446 (1988), this Court applied the
above principles and found that the defendant was lawfully detained, and not arrested, during the
execution of a search warrant at his home. Id. at 13-14. In that case, the defendant was detained
and handcuffed during the execution of a search warrant at his home. The defendant was
detained while the police were attempting to gain control over the area to be searched. The
defendant was handcuffed mainly for safety reasons and because the officers heard what sounded
like other people running inside the house. The defendant was then advised of his Miranda
rights and afterward showed the officers where the cocaine was located. Id. at 14. The defendant
argued that his statements regarding the location of the cocaine should have been suppressed as
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” stemming from his illegal arrest. Id. at 13. However, this Court
held that the handcuffing of the defendant was a reasonable, limited intrusion of his liberty under
the circumstances and that the fact that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights did not
necessarily mean that he was under arrest. Id. at 14-15. Thus, this Court affirmed the trial
court’s finding that the defendant was not arrested and his statements were not inadmissible as
the fruit of an illegal arrest. Id. at 15.
The facts in Zuccarini are remarkably similar to the facts in the present case. Here, a
search warrant was obtained after a controlled drug purchase was made at defendant’s home.
The record is not clear whether defendant was involved in that controlled buy, but his name was
listed on the search warrant. Defendant was detained and handcuffed at a time when the police
were trying to gain control over the residence to be searched. Police officers arrived at the
residence and observed defendant getting ready to flee to the back of the residence at the sight of
the officers’ presence. As a result, the officers made a forced entry and detained defendant,
another occupant, and a third individual who stopped by the house during the execution of the
search warrant. An officer stated that the occupants, including defendant, were detained and
handcuffed for the safety of the officers in order to secure the premises for weapons and conduct
the search. The officer further stated that defendant and the other individuals were not under
arrest, but were merely detained for the purpose of executing the search.2 Defendant’s handcuffs
2
The officer stated that it was policy to read the subject of a search warrant his Miranda rights
before actually conducting the search. Thus, the giving of Miranda rights was in this case was
not necessarily indicative of an arrest.
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were removed after the search was concluded and substances believed to be cocaine were found.
The evidentiary record supports the finding that defendant was detained but not arrested, and
therefore, it was error for the district court to suppress defendant’s statements as the fruit of an
illegal arrest. Summers, supra at 452 US 702; Zuccarini, supra at 14.
The prosecutor next argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the
charge against defendant. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to bind over a
defendant, we apply the same standard of review as is applied by the circuit court in reviewing
the district court’s decision. We determine whether the district court abused its discretion in
concluding that there was not probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the
crime. People v Kieronski, 214 Mich App 222, 228; 542 NW2d 339 (1995). The charge of
possession with intent to deliver between fifty and 224 grams of cocaine requires proof that the
defendant (1) knowingly possessed a controlled substance; (2) with intent to deliver this
substance to someone else; (3) the substance possessed was cocaine and the defendant knew it
was cocaine; and (4) the substance was in a mixture that weighed between 50 and 224 grams.
People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 389; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). Possession may be either actual
or constructive and may be joint, with more than one person actually or constructively possessing
a controlled substance. Possession may even be found where the defendant is not the owner of
the recovered narcotics. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 520-521; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441
Mich 1201 (1992). “The essential question is whether the defendant had dominion or control
over the controlled substance.” People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 34; 597 NW2d 176 (1999)
(quoting People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 271; 536 NW2d 517 (1995)).
It appears from the record that the district court found insufficient evidence to satisfy the
first element of the charge, that defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine. The district court
stated in its findings of fact that no clear nexus had been established to link the cocaine to
defendant and show that the drugs belonged to him. The district court further stated that
defendant’s suppressed statements probably identified the location of the drugs on the premises,
but because those statements were suppressed, no evidence connected defendant to the drugs on
the premises other than the fact that he lived there. A person’s presence at the location where
drugs are found is not sufficient, by itself, to prove constructive possession. “Instead some
additional connection between the defendant and the contraband must be shown.” Wolfe, supra
at 520.
Because defendant’s statements were suppressed, we are unable to determine whether the
statements establish a connection between defendant and the cocaine sufficient to support the
inference that defendant exercised dominion and control over the cocaine.3 Accordingly we
remand this case to the district court to reconsider the evidence with the admission of defendant’s
statements to determine whether sufficient evidence was presented to establish probable cause
that defendant possessed with the intent to deliver between fifty and 224 grams of cocaine.
3
We note that the record establishes that defendant’s statements were made in response to an
officer’s questions regarding the location of the drugs on the premises. If defendant’s statements
identified where the drugs were located, than this would establish the knowledge/possession
element of the offense sufficient to bind defendant over as charged.
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Reversed and remanded. Jurisdiction is not retained.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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