PEOPLE OF MI V MARSHALL MCKINNEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
MARSHALL MCKINNEY, a/k/a FREDERICK D.
MCKINNEY,
No. 216071
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-008834
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316;
MSA 28.548, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b;
MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to natural life in prison for the first-degree murder
conviction, to be served consecutively to a term of two years’ imprisonment for the felonyfirearm conviction. We affirm.
First, defendant contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the
elements of voluntary manslaughter. However, defendant failed to object to the voluntary
manslaughter instruction at trial. Instructional error should not be considered on appeal unless
the issue has been preserved by an objection in the trial court. Relief will be granted absent an
objection only in cases of manifest injustice. People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 544-545;
494 NW2d 737 (1993). While we agree that the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding
the provocation element of voluntary manslaughter, we find no manifest injustice because the
evidence presented at trial did not support the existence of adequate provocation and did not
support the reading of a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
Although the trial court read the voluntary manslaughter instruction directly from CJI2d
16.8, that does not automatically preclude a finding of error. When a trial court reads an
erroneous or misleading jury instruction on an essential element of the charged offense, even
when the misleading instruction is taken from the criminal jury instructions, this Court may find
error requiring reversal. People v Stephan, 241 Mich App 482, 495-496; 616 NW2d 188 (2000).
MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553 provides the punishment for the crime of manslaughter. The
common law, however, defines the elements of the crime. People v Sullivan, 231 Mich App 510,
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518; 586 NW2d 578 (1998), aff’d 461 Mich 986 (2000). The elements of voluntary
manslaughter are: (1) the defendant must kill in the heat of passion, (2) the passion must be
caused by an adequate provocation, and (3) there cannot be a lapse of time during which a
reasonable person could control his passions. Id.; People v Etheridge, 196 Mich App 43, 55; 492
NW2d 490 (1992). The element of provocation distinguishes the offense of manslaughter from
murder. Sullivan, supra, 231 Mich App 518. “The provocation necessary to mitigate a homicide
from murder to manslaughter is that which causes the defendant to act out of passion rather than
reason.” People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 389; 471 NW2d 346 (1991).
In addition, the provocation must be adequate, namely, that which would
cause the reasonable person to lose control. Not every hot-tempered individual
who flies into a rage at the slightest insult can claim manslaughter. The law
cannot countenance the loss of self-control; rather, it must encourage people to
control their passions. [Id., internal citations omitted.]
In the present case, we agree that the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the
provocation element of voluntary manslaughter. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the trial
court’s error requires reversal in this case. In a murder case, a trial court must instruct on
manslaughter where the evidence presented at trial could support a conviction of the lesser
offense. Etheridge, supra, 196 Mich App 55, emphasis added. Because the evidence produced at
trial could not support a guilty verdict on voluntary manslaughter charges, we conclude that
defendant was not entitled to such an instruction.
At trial, defendant did not argue that he had been provoked into killing the victim.
Rather, he denied any involvement in the shooting. Defendant testified that he was not at the
hotel when the shooting took place, and that he never fought with the victim. Further, the
testimony of other trial witnesses did not support the existence of adequate provocation. Walter
Ector testified that he heard two gunshots, then saw defendant return to the hotel, where
defendant remained for approximately 10-15 seconds. Ector then saw defendant exit the hotel
and shoot the victim three times. We believe that this passage of time was sufficient to provide
defendant with a cooling-off period. Id. at 392. Further, defendant retreated into the hotel, a safe
harbor, and there was no evidence that he was compelled by anyone to go back outside. Id.
Based on this evidence, we hold that a reasonable jury could not have found the adequate
provocation necessary to support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Moreover, even if
adequate provocation did exist, this Court has held that, where a defendant is convicted of firstdegree murder and the jury rejects other lesser included offenses, the failure to instruct on
voluntary manslaughter is harmless. Sullivan, supra, 231 Mich App 520. In the present case, the
jury rejected a verdict of second-degree murder (as well as a verdict of manslaughter) and found
defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Thus, the instructional error does not require reversal.
Defendant next contends that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it
prefaced the instruction regarding second-degree murder by informing the jury that Michigan law
required the reading of that instruction. A charge of first-degree murder requires consideration of
the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. People v Darden, 230 Mich App 597, 600;
585 NW2d 27 (1998). “In every case of first-degree murder, the jury must be instructed, sua
sponte, on the necessarily included offense of second-degree murder.” People v Curry, 175 Mich
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App 33, 40; 437 NW2d 310 (1989). We believe that defendant’s argument is without merit
because the trial court was simply stating Michigan law.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor made several improper remarks during rebuttal
argument. Because defendant counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s comments at trial, our
review of the issue is precluded absent a miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice will not
be found if the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s comments could have been cured by a timely
curative instruction. People v Rivera, 216 Mich App 648, 651-652; 550 NW2d 593 (1996).
Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided case by case, and the
reviewing court must examine the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate a
prosecutor’s remarks in context. Prosecutors may not make a statement of fact to
the jury that is unsupported by the evidence, but they are free to argue the
evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate to the theory
of the case. Prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in
light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted
at trial. [People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000),
internal citations omitted.]
Although a prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness, a prosecutor may argue
from the facts that a witness, including the defendant, is not worthy of belief. People v
Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996). Moreover, the prosecutor is not
required to state inferences and conclusions in the blandest possible terms. Schutte, supra, 240
Mich App 722; Launsburry, supra, 217 Mich App 361.
In the present case, the prosecutor told the jury that “defendant lies when it’s convenient,”
and pointed to several instances where defendant’s testimony was inconsistent. Further, the
prosecutor told the jury that defendant’s demeanor on the witness stand indicated that defendant
was not telling the truth. Reading the prosecutor’s comments in context, we believe that the
prosecutor was merely attacking the weaknesses in defendant’s version of what occurred, which
is not improper. People v Godbold, 230 Mich App 508, 521; 585 NW2d 13 (1998).
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel
during closing arguments. Although defense counsel objected during the prosecutor’s rebuttal
argument, that objection went to the claim that the prosecutor was addressing new issues in his
rebuttal, not that the prosecutor made improper comments about defendant or defense counsel.
After defense counsel objected, the trial court admonished him for objecting during the course of
the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument. In his brief, defendant argues that the trial court dissuaded
defense counsel from making any further objections during the course of the prosecutor’s rebuttal
argument. Nonetheless, there was nothing preventing defense counsel from objecting at the close
of the prosecutor’s argument. Therefore, our review of this issue is precluded absent manifest
injustice. Rivera, supra, 216 Mich App 651-652.
Defendant asserts that the following remarks were improper:
First of all, I should say that I should have known. I should have known. I
should have known that Defense Counsel would resort to perhaps one of the
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oldest Defense Counsel tricks of the trade. And it’s kind of something that can
sometimes be referred to as smoke and mirrors. You just create a lot of
distractions and a lot of issues that are really nonissues, and drop some untruths
into your creation, and hope that something sticks, and something that sticks can
be somehow defined by one juror or some jurors’ minds as reasonable doubt.
***
Defense counsel said there are a number straws that he draws on. See it’s
kind of like Houdini or a Globetrotter kind of move where you just hide the ball,
or you hide different things, and you stay away from the issues.
These remarks must be considered in context and evaluated in light of defense arguments
and their relationship to the evidence presented at trial. People v Phillips, 217 Mich App 489,
497; 552 NW2d 487 (1996). Viewed in this context, the prosecutor did not argue that defense
counsel lied or was trying to intentionally mislead the jury concerning the facts. The prosecutor
was merely responding to the following statements made by defense counsel in reference to
Ector, the prosecution’s witness:
Because, see, if you testify at the district court and you come in and say,
hey, that’s not true, that’s wrong what I testified to, that’s perjury. Now you are
supposed to go to jail for perjury. So what they have here is a noose around
[Ector’s] neck. We’re going to lock you up until you testify. And if you testify to
how we said and what you said down there, then we’ll let you go. But if you
don’t, we send you to jail for perjury. If you told us something that wasn’t true,
then we’re going to lock you up for falsifying a police report. So he has no
choice. He gets back up there and repeats.
We find that defendant was not denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's comments, which were no
more than a response to defense counsel’s argument. People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601,
608; 560 NW2d 354 (1996). We do not believe that a miscarriage of justice occurred in this
case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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