PEOPLE OF MI V JULIA FAY FERGUSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 14, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 222487
Oakland Circuit Court
LC Nos. 97-152083-FH;
97-152223-FH
JULIA FAY FERGUSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Smolenski and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This prosecutor’s appeal is before this Court pursuant to the Michigan Supreme Court’s
order remanding for consideration as on leave granted.1 We vacate defendant Julia Fay
Ferguson’s sentences for possession with intent to deliver heroin and remand for resentencing.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
The trial court consolidated the two separate cases that are involved in this appeal. In
Docket No. 97-152223-FH, the prosecutor charged Ferguson with possession with intent to
deliver less than fifty grams of heroin,2 possession of less than twenty-five grams of cocaine,3
and possession of alprazolam without a prescription.4 In Docket No. 97-152083-FH, the
prosecutor charged Ferguson with possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of
heroin,5 fleeing and eluding a police officer,6 and driving with a suspended or revoked license.7
1
461 Mich 866 (1999).
2
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv).
3
MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(v).
4
MCL 333.7403(2)(b); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(b).
5
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv).
6
MCL 750.479a; MSA 28.747(1).
7
MCL 257.904(1); MSA 9.2604(1).
-1-
Ferguson pleaded guilty to each of these offenses after the trial court made a preliminary
estimate of the sentences it would impose pursuant to People v Cobbs.8 The trial court estimated
that, for Docket No. 97-152223-FH, it would impose a prison sentence of one to twenty years for
the heroin offense, thirty days to one year for the cocaine offense, and two years’ probation for
the alprazolam offense. In relation to Docket No. 97-152083-FH, the trial court estimated that it
would impose lifetime probation for the heroin offense, ninety days to four years’ imprisonment
for fleeing and eluding a police officer, and two years’ probation for the license violation.
The trial court did not sentence Ferguson immediately. Rather, Ferguson, who was free
on bond, failed to appear at her scheduled sentencing hearing. Slightly more than seven months
later, the police arrested Ferguson on a new charge. She was incarcerated for approximately six
weeks before being sentenced in these cases.
The sentencing hearing finally took place approximately nine months after Ferguson
entered her guilty pleas. In Docket No. 97-152223-FH, the trial court sentenced Ferguson to
consecutive prison terms of one to twenty years for the heroin offense, ninety days to four years
for the cocaine offense, and ninety days to two years for the alprazolam offense. In Docket No.
97-152083-FH, the trial court sentenced Ferguson to two to twenty years' imprisonment for the
heroin conviction, to be served consecutive to sentences of fifty days in jail for fleeing and
eluding and driving with a suspended or revoked license, with credit for forty-four days she had
already served in jail. Although not identical to the sentences the trial court mentioned at the
hearing when Ferguson entered her guilty pleas, the sentences the trial court imposed roughly
tracked the sentences it mentioned at the plea proceeding in terms of severity.
On appeal, the prosecutor continues to maintain that these sentences are too lenient.
However, as far as we can tell, the prosecutor only challenges the sentences the trial court
imposed for possession of heroin. The prosecutor contends that the trial court should have
sentenced Ferguson to consecutive 60 to 160 month prison terms for each heroin guilty plea.
II. Waiver
Before we address the merits of the prosecutors arguments on appeal, we must resolve
Ferguson’s argument that, pursuant to People v Blount,9 the prosecutor waived the right to
challenge the sentences the trial court imposed. Blount holds that a defendant who pleads guilty
and is sentenced as was agreed waives the right to appeal the sentence absent an effort to
withdraw the plea.10 As the Blount Court stated, “A bargain is indeed a bargain.”11
While we do not quarrel with the proposition that a prosecutor must also be held to the
terms of a plea bargain,12 Ferguson’s argument is misplaced because she did not enter her guilty
8
People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993).
9
People v Blount, 197 Mich App 174; 494 NW2d 829 (1992).
10
Id. at 175.
11
Id.
12
See generally People v Shuler, 188 Mich App 548, 549-550; 470 NW2d 492 (1991).
-2-
pleas pursuant to a plea agreement. Rather, she relied on the procedure outlined in Cobbs, supra,
in order to determine the trial court’s preliminary inclination toward sentencing. This Cobbs plea
did not involve the prosecutor. In fact, throughout the trial court proceedings, the prosecutor
objected that the sentences the trial court was contemplating, and actually imposed, were too
lenient. This conduct contradicts any inference of waiver. Accordingly, we conclude that the
prosecutor is not precluded from challenging the proportionality of Ferguson's sentences.
III. Sentencing
A. Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a sentence determined under the judicial sentencing guidelines to
determine if the trial court abused its discretion when imposing that sentence.13
B. Legal Standard For Sentencing
In People v Kowalski,14 this Court explained the standards that define a trial court’s
sentencing discretion:
A sentence must be "proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances
surrounding the offense and the offender." People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630,
636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). The Michigan Sentencing Guidelines, while not
legislatively mandated, nevertheless establish a useful "barometer" to measure the
proportionality of a sentence. Id. If a sentence falls outside the guidelines range,
there must be a specific explanation. People v Fleming, 428 Mich 408, 415; 410
NW2d 266 (1987). Moreover, "in the absence of factors not adequately reflected
in the guidelines [a departure] should alert the appellate court to the possibility
that the trial court has violated the principle of proportionality and thus abused its
sentencing discretion." Milbourn, supra at 660; People v Houston, 448 Mich 312,
321; 532 NW2d 508 (1995).
In sum, this Court may not overturn a sentence unless it is disproportionate or otherwise
invalid.15
C. Drug Addiction As A Reason For A Downward Departure
The sentencing guidelines proposed a minimum sentence for the two heroin offenses that
ranged from 60 to 160 months. The trial court actually imposed minimum sentences of twelve
13
People v Phillips (On Rehearing), 203 Mich App 287, 290; 512 NW2d 62 (1994).
14
People v Kowalski, 236 Mich App 470, 472-473; 601 NW2d 122 (1999).
15
In re Dana Jenkins, 438 Mich 364, 369, n 3; 475 NW2d 279 (1991).
-3-
and twenty-four months for each conviction16 without providing any written justification for this
downward departure.17 The trial court explained the light sentences it was imposing, saying:
I went below the guidelines because I think you’re addicted to drugs, and
the things that you do are irrational, illegal –
***
– amoral. But, look, you’re addicted, so I have to consider that. It’s like
having a person with pneumonia who keeps coughing. Do I say to them, if you
don’t stop coughing, I’m going to give you 90 days in the county jail? That’s
ridiculous. I can’t change your addiction. So I’m trying to be fair to you . . . .
So I went below the guidelines because she [Ferguson] has demonstrated a
commitment here, which I believe will be to her benefit and [a] benefit to the
taxpayers. Okay.
In essence, the trial court believed that Ferguson’s drug addiction mitigated her crime of
possessing heroin with the intent to deliver it.
The problem with the trial court’s reasoning is that it completely ignored the
circumstances surrounding each heroin offense. There are no statements on the record explaining
why these were the proper sentences for these two crimes. Furthermore, whether Ferguson
actually had "demonstrated a commitment” to lead a drug-free life is debatable given that her
most recent drug-free period was confined solely to her incarceration in the county jail. While
this is progress that we encourage, and it may be relevant to her potential for rehabilitation, this
one factor does not explain why she is the unusual drug offender who does not require a sentence
within the guidelines. Simply speaking, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider
any of the circumstances surrounding the offense and by failing to explain why her drug use
makes her any less culpable than many other drug users who commit this same crime and are
punished according to the guidelines.18
16
Although the prosecutor discusses these consecutive sentences in tandem, at places discussing
the cumulative minimum sentence the trial court did impose and arguably should have imposed,
we must look at them separately. People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 698; 580 NW2d 444
(1998), citing People v Warner, 190 Mich App 734, 736; 476 NW2d 660 (1991).
17
The trial court did not impose a sentence below the one year minimum prison sentence
mandated in MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 4.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv) for either offense.
Accordingly, it did not have to articulate “substantial and compelling” reasons for its sentencing
decision. See People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 76; 528 NW2d 176 (1995), citing MCL
333.7401(4); MSA 14.15(7401)(4). Rather, as all sentencing courts must do, the trial court in
this case had to explain why the sentences it actually imposed reflected the seriousness of the
offense and Ferguson as an offender. See Milbourn, supra at 636.
18
Milbourn, supra at 636, 661
-4-
We vacate the sentences for the two heroin convictions subject to Ferguson’s right to
withdraw her Cobbs pleas for these two offenses. We remand for resentencing under the judicial
sentencing guidelines.19 We do not retain jurisdiction and express no opinion on whether the
sentences can or should be enhanced under MCL 333.7413(2); MSA 14.15(7413)(2).
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
19
The new sentencing guidelines do not apply here because, even though the sentence was
imposed after their adoption, the crimes were committed before the new guidelines were
implemented.
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
