IN RE FRITZ MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JENNIFER and ALEXANDER
FRITZ, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
October 31, 2000
Petitioner -Appellee,
v
No. 219922
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-025582 NA
RENEE SHANNON,
Respondent -Appellant
and
DARREN FRITZ
Respondent.
Before: Wilder, P.J., Smolenski and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant Renee Shannon appeals by right from the family court order terminating
her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3) (g), (i) and (l); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g), (i) and (l). We affirm.
Respondent first argues that her due process rights were violated when the trial court admitted a
certified record under seal from the Bay County Probate Court as evidence of termination of her
parental rights to another child in 1995, without first making the records available to her and her
attorney. We disagree.
A thorough review of the record reveals that respondent was not denied due process of law by
admission of the certified record because she was in fact afforded an opportunity to review the certified
record, and place any objections to the evidence on the record, prior to its admission. The prosecution
offered the certified record into evidence as a self-authenticating document, but acknowledged that the
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record had just been received the morning of trial and that the parties did not have an opportunity to
thoroughly review the documents therein. The family court inquired whether respondent’s counsel had
any objection to admission of the certified record, or had any reason to question its admissibility, to
which respondent’s counsel replied that she briefly reviewed the record and had “no question” about its
admissibility. The family court then received the record, but noted that it would provide copies of the
record for both counsel during a recess and return to questioning on the subject at a later time.
Subsequently, during a lengthy recess in the proceeding, the family court provided both parties an
opportunity to review the documents so that “its contents were not a surprise.”
Later in the proceeding, during respondent’s testimony, the family court questioned respondent
about the termination of her parental rights to her son and the services and programs offered to her
during that time. The family court inquired whether respondent had an opportunity to review the
certified record with her attorney, to which respondent replied affirmatively. The family court then
asked respondent to note any inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the certified record. Respondent
testified that, contrary to the information in the certified record, she did attend her son’s birthday party
and did attend a parent enrichment program through the YWCA. Respondent did not dispute any other
information in the record. At the conclusion of proofs, the family court adjourned the matter to allow
counsel to thoroughly review the certified record before closing arguments. Again, no objections were
raised by respondent to the certified record or the contents therein.
On this record, we find that respondent had a full and fair opportunity to review the certified
record under seal and note any objections to admission of the record or request additional time for
review, if necessary. Respondent was also provided an opportunity to note any inaccuracies or
inconsistencies in the certified record during her testimony and again before closing arguments, prior to
the family court’s decision. At no time during the trial court proceedings did respondent object to
admission of the certified record into evidence or argue that she did not have an adequate opportunity to
review the record. A party or her counsel may not waive objection to an issue before the trial court and
then raise it as an error before this Court. To hold otherwise would be to allow respondent to harbor
error as an appellate parachute. People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 520; 583 NW2d 199
(1998). Accordingly, we find that respondent was not denied due process of law by admission of the
certified record. See also In re Schmeltzer, 175 Mich App 666, 678; 438 NW2d 866 (1989); In re
LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 392; 210 NW2d 482 (1973) (how a parent treats one child is compelling
evidence, albeit not conclusive, of how a parent treats other children).
Respondent next argues that termination of her parental rights was improper because even
assuming a statutory ground for termination exists, termination was not in the best interests of the
children. We disagree.
Once a statutory ground for terminating parental rights has been established, the court shall
terminate parental rights unless termination is clearly not in the children’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); MCR 5.974; In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 350
354; ___ NW2d ___ (2000). Subsection 19b(5) provides the family court with only limited discretion
not to terminate parental rights where a statutory ground for termination has been established. Thus, in
the absence of “clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best interests,”
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termination by the family court is mandatory. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re
Trejo, supra.
In this case, the record is clear that despite numerous services, offers of assistance and
admonitions to respondent to clean her home, respondent repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to
provide a safe and healthy environment for her children to reside. Rather than accepting responsibility
for her children’s needs, she offered a variety of excuses for not maintaining her home and tried to shift
the blame to others for the condition of her home. Further, respondent admitted that she knew how to
pick clothes up off the floor, wash dishes, clean the sink, put trash in a bag and take it outside, and did
not need to be taught these basic housekeeping tasks, yet she continuously neglected to perform any of
these chores. Under these circumstances, the trial court appropriately refused to further delay
permanency in these children’s lives while respondent decided whether to obtain and maintain suitable
housing. Accordingly, we conclude that the family court did not clearly err in finding that termination of
appellant’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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