PEOPLE OF MI V BRIAN J ROSE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 20, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 223153
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 99-003712
BRIAN J. ROSE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Sawyer and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by delayed leave granted the trial court’s order suppressing defendant’s
statements. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. This appeal is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant is charged with criminal sexual conduct in the third degree (CSC III), the victim being
at least thirteen years of age but less than sixteen years of age, MCL 750.520d(1)(a); MSA
28.788(4)(1)(a). He moved to suppress inculpatory verbal and written statements. At the evidentiary
hearing, the investigating officer testified that defendant voluntarily appeared at the police station to
discuss his contact with complainant. Defendant was told that he was not under arrest and that he was
free to leave. During a conversation, defendant acknowledged that he had sexual intercourse with
complainant. After being informed that complainant was only thirteen years of age, defendant began to
cry. At that point, he was advised of his Miranda rights. He waived his rights, and continued the
interview. Defendant also made a written statement.
Defendant testified to a somewhat different version of the interview. He testified that once the
victim’s age was established, the atmosphere of the interview changed, and he was asked pointed
questions regarding his activities with the victim in a manner that led him to believe he was no longer free
to leave. He further believed he was not free to leave because there were two officers in the interview
room with him, and a third, very large, officer periodically entered the room and stood in the doorway
asking questions. Defendant testified that he was so upset when his Miranda rights were given, that he
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did not read them and did not understand them. He gave a written statement because he was told it was
in his best interest to do so.
The trial court suppressed defendant’s statements, finding that because defendant reasonably
believed that he was not free to leave, the interrogation was a custodial one and defendant should have
been advised of his rights at the outset of the interview. The trial court also found that defendant’s
statements were the result of psychological coercion.
A statement made by an accused during a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the
accused voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his or her Fifth Amendment rights. Miranda v
Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). A custodial interrogation is
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after the accused has been taken into custody or
deprived of his or her freedom in a significant way. People v Zahn, 234 Mich App 438, 449; 594
NW2d 120 (1999). The ultimate question of whether a person is in custody and thus entitled to
Miranda warnings is a mixed question of law and fact which we decide de novo on appeal. However,
absent clear error, we defer to the trial court’s historical findings of fact. People v Mendez, 225 Mich
App 381, 382-383; 571 NW2d 528 (1997). Compliance with Miranda does not dispose of the issue
of the voluntariness of a confession. People v Godboldo, 158 Mich App 603, 605-606; 405 NW2d
114 (1986). The voluntariness of a confession is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances, with
consideration given to the duration of detention and questioning, the defendant’s age, education,
intelligence, and experience, the delay in any arraignment, the defendant’s physical and mental state, and
whether the defendant was threatened or promised leniency. People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113,
121; 575 NW2d 84 (1997). No single factor is determinative. People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178,
182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by suppressing defendant’s statements. We agree,
reverse the trial court’s decision, and remand for further proceedings. The trial court erred by finding
that defendant was in custody, and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings from the outset. Defendant
agreed to speak with the police, and drove himself to the station. He was informed prior to the
interview that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave. At no time was defendant told that
he was not free to leave. The door was left open, and the large police officer was only present
intermittently. Any interview conducted by a police officer has a certain coercive aspect to it, simply
because the officer is part of the law enforcement system. However, Miranda warnings are not
required every time a police officer asks questions of a person. Mendez, supra, 383-384. The
officer’s failure to tell defendant that he was being investigated for CSC did not alter the fact that
defendant was told he was free to leave, or render the interview a custodial one. Under the totality of
the circumstances, defendant’s perception that he was not free to leave before his admission regarding
having had sex with the victim was not reasonable. Defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings at
the outset of the interview because he was not subject to custodial interrogation at that time. Zahn,
supra; Mendez, supra, 383-384.
Furthermore, we find that under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s statements were
knowingly and voluntarily made, and were not the product of psychological coercion. The investigating
officer’s failure to inform defendant of the nature of the investigation did not render defendant’s
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statements involuntary, especially given that the officer did not engage in active misrepresentation
regarding his investigation. People v Hicks, 185 Mich App 107, 113; 460 NW2d 569 (1990).
Defendant, who was twenty-one years of age and had completed three years of college, acknowledged
that soon after the interview began, he discerned the focus of the officer’s inquiries. At no time during
the interview was defendant either threatened or promised leniency. 1 The entire encounter lasted
approximately one hour. Although defendant cried during the encounter, and the trial court credited his
testimony that he did not read his Miranda rights because he was too distraught, although he initialed
them, the evidence does not support a finding that defendant was so distraught that he was unable to
understand his rights. The trial court erred by concluding that defendant’s statements were the product
of psychological coercion. We find that under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s statements
were knowingly and voluntarily made. Givans, supra.
The trial court’s decision suppressing defendant’s statements is reversed, and this case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Helene N. White
1
The officer’s statement that it would be in defendant’s best interest to write out a statement does not
constitute a promise of leniency so as to render defendant’s statement the product of psychological
coercion.
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