PEOPLE OF MI V DALVIN JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 17, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 216729
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 98-042001-FH
DALVIN JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Talbot and R. J. Danhof*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to deliver more than 650 grams of a mixture
containing cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i), and was sentenced to serve
life imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for conspiracy
to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine. We disagree. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Nowak, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). This Court’s review is
deferential, drawing all reasonable inferences and making credibility choices in support of the jury’s
verdict. Id. at 400; People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441
Mich 1201 (1992).
The elements of the offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver a controlled
substance include:
(1) the defendant possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum as
charged, (2) his coconspirators possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory
minimum as charged, and (3) the defendant and his coconspirators possessed the
specific intent to combine to deliver the statutory minimum as charged to a third person.
[Id. at 349 (citation omitted).]
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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The term conspiracy has been defined to mean a “partnership in criminal purposes.” People v Justice
(After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 345; 562 NW2d 652 (1997) (citation omitted). A conspiracy is
proven by “demonstrating that the parties specifically intended to further, promote, advance, or pursue
an unlawful objective.” Id. at 347.
Identifying the objectives and even the participants of an unlawful agreement is
often difficult because of the clandestine nature of criminal conspiracies. Thus, direct
proof of the conspiracy is not essential; instead, proof may be derived from the
circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties. Inferences may be made because such
evidence sheds light on the coconspirators’ intentions. [Id. (citation omitted).]
Circumstantial evidence may be used to determine the conspiracy’s scope. Id. at 348.
Here, the testimony indicated that the Sixth Street address was a drug house where defendant
and several of his coconspirators took turns selling cocaine twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week. Drug paraphernalia was seized when police raided the house. After the Sixth Street raid, the
evidence demonstrated that defendant and certain of his coconspirators continued to sell cocaine from
Sixth Street as well as from several other locations. The raid of the Seventh Street address resulted in
the seizure of drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons, and a large amount of currency. One coconspirator
who was a supplier of cocaine that was sold referred to defendant on one occasion as his trusted “left
hand man.” Testimony further revealed that defendant and several of his coconspirators grew up in the
same Detroit neighborhood and that defendant recruited people from that neighborhood to sell drugs in
Muskegon. Accordingly, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the evidence to be
sufficient to prove that a conspiracy existed among defendant and his coconspirators to possess with
intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine.
Defendant argues that, even if sufficient evidence of a conspiracy was demonstrated, the
statutory minimum of 650 grams could not be met by the evidence. We reject this argument. The
aggregate amount of sales of cocaine from the Sixth Street house alone exceeded 650 grams of cocaine.
Where there was sufficient evidence that defendant intended to join with his coconspirators to deliver
the aggregate amount, his criminal liability for the aggregate amount of narcotics sold by his
coconspirators during the entire period of the conspiracy is not negated by the fact that he was not
present continuously during the drug operation, that he was not the only supplier of drugs for sale, and
that no drugs were found in his possession when he was arrested. Justice, supra. See also People v
Mass, 238 Mich App 333, 336-337; 605 NW2d 322 (1999), lv gtd. We likewise reject defendant’s
challenge to the credibility of the witnesses who testified against him. Questions of credibility are for the
trier of fact to determine. Nowak, supra.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for witnesses and made
improper civic duty arguments. These allegations of error are not preserved because defendant failed to
make appropriate objections at trial. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 512; 597 NW2d 864
(1999). Appellate review of unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct is precluded unless the
prejudicial effect of the improper conduct could not have been cured by a cautionary instruction or
unless failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Nimeth, 236 Mich
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App 616, 626; 601 NW2d 393 (1999). We conclude that the challenged conduct was either proper
or could have been cured by timely objection and a curative instruction. Thus, there is no prosecutorial
misconduct requiring reversal.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a
song called “Thug Life,” testimony regarding a comment that a coconspirator made when listening to the
song, and defendant’s response to the statement. We reject defendant’s argument that the evidence
was inadmissible under MRE 801(d)(2)(E) on the basis that the statements were not made in
furtherance of the conspiracy. We find it plausible that the coconspirator’s statement, made while
listening to the song, was intended to provide reassurance and foster cohesiveness among the
coconspirators, and to inform defendant of the status and progress of the conspiracy. Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony as evidence in furtherance of the conspiracy.
See People v Bushard, 444 Mich 384, 395-396; 508 NW2d 745 (1993) (Boyle, J.). Further,
defendant’s response to his coconspirator’s statement was relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent,
without regard to the truth of the statement. Neither are we persuaded that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that the probative value of the challenged evidence was not substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
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