PEOPLE OF MI V NABEEL M MASHNI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 26, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee
v
No. 209396
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 94-135150-FH
ROBERT H. HLAVATY,
Defendant-Appellant
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v
No. 211879
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 94-135149-FH
NABEEL M. MASHNI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a joint jury trial, defendants Robert Hlavaty and Nabeel Mashni were both convicted
of possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA
14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), and conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a;
MSA. 28.354(1) and MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv). Both defendants were
sentenced to lifetime probation for each conviction. Defendants now appeal as of right. We affirm
defendants' convictions and sentences for possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of
cocaine, but vacate their convictions and sentences for conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of
cocaine.
I
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At trial, Farmington Hills Detective Robert Tiderington testified that he observed defendants in a
vehicle at a restaurant parking lot. While remaining inside the vehicle, the two defendants met a third
individual in a manner which, according to Detective Tiderington, was indicative of a suspected
narcotics transaction. After the third individual left the vehicle, defendants drove off. Detective
Tiderington followed the vehicle and requested that a marked vehicle stop defendants for investigative
purposes. During the stop, two similarly packaged baggies containing different amounts of cocaine, with
a combined weight of less than fifty grams, were seized from inside the vehicle. One baggie was found
on the floorboard between the passenger side door and the seat, in an area where defendant Robert
Hlavaty ("Hlavaty") had been observed leaning down. The other baggie was retrieved from a beverage
cup after one of the police officers participating in the stop saw the driver, defendant Nobeel Mashni
("Mashni"), put the baggie in the cup and try to conceal it.
II
Hlavaty's sole claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a police
officer, who had been qualified as an expert, to provide expert testimony outside the scope of his
qualifications with respect to the ultimate issue of intent to deliver. Specifically, Hlavaty argues that
Officer Mike Farley should not have been allowed to provide opinion concerning the average
consumption of cocaine by a drug addict because this is not within the scope of expertise of an expert
qualified as knowledgeable regarding drug investigations and trafficking, and that his testimony
constituted improper drug profile testimony.
We find that Hlavaty failed to preserve his evidentiary claim with a timely objection at trial.
MRE 103(a)(1). We further note that the specific testimony challenged by Hlavaty, regarding the
average consumption of cocaine by an addict, was elicited on cross-examination by Mashni's attorney
and that Hlavaty's own attorney then elicited further testimony from Officer Farley concerning this issue.
Error must be that of the trial court and not that which an aggrieved party contributed by plan or design.
People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 46; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). Thus, to the extent Hlavaty claims
that the challenged testimony from Officer Farley was error, we find no basis for relief.
We note, however, that Officer Farley's testimony regarding average cocaine use, in response
to the defense questions, was based on usage he had observed in his work as a police officer. Contrary
to Hlavaty's claim, Officer Farley did not purport to render an opinion on average consumption of
addicted individuals in a more general context.
More importantly, we note that a prosecutor may use expert testimony from police officers to
aid a jury's understanding of evidence in controlled substance cases. People v Murray, 234 Mich App
46, 53; 593 NW2d 690 (1999). In the case at bar, as is acknowledged by Hlavaty, the specific area in
which Officer Farley was qualified to provide expert testimony for the prosecution was drug trafficking
and investigation. We are not persuaded that Officer Farley's opinion regarding the significance of the
evidence with regard to the quantity of cocaine found in the vehicle, as well as items that were not found
during the stop (e.g., drug paraphernalia associated with personal use), was outside the scope of his
expertise or otherwise constituted plain evidentiary error, even though the opinion embraced the ultimate
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issue of intent to deliver. People v Stimage, 202 Mich App 28, 29-30; 507 NW2d 778 (1993);
People v Ray, 191 Mich App 706, 708; 479 NW2d 1 (1991).
Turning to the trial court's denial of defendants' joint motion for new trial based on their claim
that Officer Farley provided improper drug profile testimony, we note that the trial court denied the
motion on the basis that it did not believe that drug profile evidence was presented to the jury. A new
trial may be granted on any ground supporting appellate reversal of a conviction or because a trial court
believes that the verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice. MCR 6.431(B). A trial court's decision to
grant a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Jones, 236 Mich App 396, 404; 600
NW2d 652 (1999). Our review of the record convinces us that defendant Hlavaty has not
demonstrated plain evidentiary error in connection with this unpreserved issue. MRE 103(d); People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
We similarly find that defendant Mashni has failed to establish support for his claim that Officer
Farley's expert testimony warrants reversal. Nor has Mashni shown that the admission of Detective
Tiderington's expert testimony requires reversal. We deem any challenge by Mashni to Detective
Tiderington's qualifications to provide expert testimony in the area of drug trafficking, based on his
training and experience, abandoned because Mashni has not briefed this issue. The failure to brief the
merits of an allegation of error constitutes an abandonment of the issue on appeal. People v Kent, 194
Mich App 206, 210; 486 NW2d 110 (1992).
Further, defendant Mashni’s objection at trial to Detective Tiderington's qualifications to provide
expert testimony in the area of drug trafficking is insufficient to preserve an objection to Detective
Tiderington's testimony on another ground. MRE 103(a)(1); Stimage, supra at 30. Hence, Mashni
must show plain error affecting substantial rights. MRE 103(d); Carines, supra, at 763.
Because Mashni does not identify the specific testimony of Detective Tiderington that he claims
was improper, we need not consider this issue further. People v Norman, 184 Mich App 255, 260;
457 NW2d 136 (1990). In any event, to the extent Mashni may be arguing that Detective Tiderington's
testimony concerning the events that he perceived in the restaurant parking lot, and his characterization
of those events as a narcotics transaction, constituted inadmissible drug profile evidence, no plain error
is apparent. Cf. Griffin, supra at 44 (detective's expert testimony concerning his impression that what
he observed was drug trafficking was not improper drug profile evidence).
III
Of the remaining issues raised by Mashni, we find only one that warrants appellate relief. We
agree with Mashni's claim that insufficient evidence was presented to establish the conspiracy charge. In
this regard, we note that the trial court considered the wrong offense when denying a directed verdict at
trial. The conspiracy charged and presented to the jury was conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams
of cocaine, not conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver cocaine.
Our review of this issue is de novo. People v Hammons, 210 Mich App 554, 556; 534
NW2d 183 (1995). Due process commands a directed verdict of acquittal when evidence is
insufficient to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625,
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633-634; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). "Considering all the evidence presented by the prosecution in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, a directed verdict is inappropriate where a rational trier of fact
could find that the essential elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
Hammons, supra at 556. The elements of conspiracy to deliver cocaine are:
(1) the defendant possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum
as charged, (2) his coconspirators possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory
minimum as charged, and (3) the defendant and his coconspirators possessed the
specific intent to combine to deliver the statutory minimum as charged to a third person.
[People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 349; 562 NW2d 652 (1997).]
Thus, to convict defendants of the charged offense, the prosecutor was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants conspired to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine.
Knowledge of the exact quantity was not required. People v Mass, 238 Mich App 333, 336-337;
605 NW2d 322 (1999), lv gtd ___ Mich ___ (June 13, 2000). However, the criminal agreement
required for a conspiracy offense is defined by the scope of the coconspirators' commitment. Justice
(After Remand), supra at 347. There must be proof that the coconspirators specifically intended to
further, promote, or pursue the unlawful objection. Id. Circumstantial evidence may determine the
scope of the conspiracy, but any inferences drawn must be reasonable. Id. at 348. The evidence must
show beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more individuals reached a mutual understanding to violate
the law in question. Id. at 348.
Viewed most favorably to the prosecution, the evidence showed that defendants acted in
concert to acquire the cocaine in question, which was packaged in two separate baggies and had a total
weight of less than fifty grams. However, such evidence was insufficient to enable a rational trier of fact
to reasonably infer an agreement to deliver all or part of that cocaine. While an intent to deliver is
reasonably inferable from the evidence, an agreement to deliver is not. Cf. People v Atley, 392 Mich
298, 314; 220 NW2d 465 (1974) (agreement to sell marijuana not inferable from evidence on joint
acquisition of the marijuana).
Accordingly, we vacate defendant Mashni's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to deliver
less than fifty grams of cocaine. Although defendant Hlavaty does not raise this issue on appeal, we will
give him the benefit of this issue in order to avoid inconsistent results. Hence, defendant Hlavaty's
conspiracy conviction and sentence are likewise vacated. People v Hayden, 132 Mich App 273, 288
289 n 8; 348 NW2d 672 (1984).
IV
The other claims raised by defendant Mashni warrant little discussion. Because we have
vacated his conviction for conspiracy, Mashni's challenge to his bindover on the conspiracy charge,
based on the preliminary examination, is moot and we decline to address it.
The trial court's denial of Mashni's motion for a separate trial from Hlavaty was not an abuse of
discretion. People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 346; 524 NW2d 682 (1994). Severance was not
required because Mashni failed to show mutually exclusive or irreconcilable defenses. Id. at 349.
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Further, neither defendant testified as proposed in their respective motions for severance and, with the
benefit of hindsight, reversal would not be required in any event because Mashni was not prejudiced by
the joint trial. Id. at 360; see also People v Stricklin, 162 Mich App 623, 630; 413 NW2d 457
(1987).
Mashni's challenge to the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle was previously addressed
and decided against Mashni in a prior appeal in this Court. People v Mashni/Hlavaty, unpublished
order of the Court of Appeals, issued December 4, 1996 (Docket Nos. 188859 & 189222). We
agree with prosecution that the law of the case doctrine precludes reconsideration of this issue. People
v Phillips (After Second Remand), 227 Mich App 28, 33-34; 575 NW2d 784 (1997); People v
Kozyra, 219 Mich App 422, 433; 556 NW2d 512 (1996).
Mashni's claim regarding the 180-day rule of MCL 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq. is
without merit because he was not an inmate in a state penal institution. People v Patterson, 170 Mich
App 162, 166; 427 NW2d 601 (1988), remanded on other grounds 437 Mich 895 (1991). Further,
remand is not necessary to consider Mashni's speedy trial claim because we are able to apply the
balancing test for evaluating this issue based on the record presented. Contrast People v Gambrell,
157 Mich App 253, 259; 403 NW2d 535 (1987). Although the delay in the case was more than
eighteen months, on balance, we agree with the trial court's determination that Mashni was not denied
his right to a speedy trial. People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997).
Finally, we uphold the trial court's pretrial ruling that the destruction of the narcotics evidence by
the police does not require dismissal. The failure to preserve the evidence did not constitute a denial of
due process because bad faith on the part of the police was not shown. Arizona v Youngblood, 488
US 51; 109 S Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988). See also People v Hunter, 201 Mich App 671,
677; 506 NW2d 611 (1993); People v Leigh, 182 Mich App 96; 451 NW2d 512 (1989).
Affirmed in part and vacated in part. We remand for entry of an amended judgment of sentence
for each defendant reflecting that the conspiracy conviction and sentence has been vacated.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
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