PRODO INC V CITY OF MIDLAND
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
B. B. BANUCKS, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
September 5, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 215176
Midland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-005043-CZ
CITY OF MIDLAND,
Defendant-Appellee.
PRODO, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 215177
Midland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-004857-CZ
CITY OF MIDLAND,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and McDonald and Doctoroff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order granting defendant partial summary disposition of
plaintiffs’ consolidated actions for reimbursement and credit for improvements to subdivision property.
We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand to the trial court.
Plaintiffs are subdivision developers who sued pursuant to several city ordinances that they
alleged gave a private cause of action for credits or reimbursement from the city for oversized
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subdivision improvements. Plaintiffs also sued for credits for double fronting lots, claiming that the city
ordinance required that they receive tax credits if forced to improve both an internal subdivision street
and a public street as a condition of approval of the subdivision. The trial court ruled pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10) that § 20-4 of Midland’s city ordinance provided no basis for plaintiffs’ recovery,
and that any claim for reimbursement that plaintiffs might have under chapter 23 of the ordinance was
waived by plaintiffs’ failure to reserve the right to seek reimbursement in plaintiffs’ contracts with the city
to complete the subdivisions. The court further denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaints to
allege a takings cause of action.
Initially, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in ruling that Midland ordinance § 20-4 created
no right for plaintiffs to seek reimbursements or credits for allegedly oversized public improvements.
This Court reviews a circuit court’s grant of summary disposition de novo. Ins Comm’r v Aageson
Thibo Agency, 226 Mich App 336, 340; 573 NW2d 637 (1997). The rules governing the
construction of statutes apply with equal force to the interpretation of municipal ordinances. Gora v
City of Ferndale, 456 Mich 704, 711; 576 NW2d 141 (1998). Accordingly, we review this issue de
novo. Michigan Municipal Liability & Property Pool v Muskegon Cty Bd of Cty Rd Comm’rs,
235 Mich App 183, 189; 597 NW2d 187 (1999).
The trial court did not err in ruling that Midland ordinance § 20-4 provided no basis for
recovery by a subdivision developer. This section appears in chapter 20, governing special
assessments, and only addresses public improvements made in special assessment districts. Section 20
4 could not serve as a basis for plaintiffs’ reimbursement because none of the improvements in the
various subdivisions occurred in special assessment districts. Instead, these improvements were made
in the construction of housing developments. Improvements made for subdivisions are governed by
Chapter 23 of the code.
Next, plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their request to amend
their pleadings to claim an unconstitutional taking of property. A trial court’s decision on a motion to
amend pleadings is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 654; 563
NW2d 647 (1997).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Prodo’s motion to amend its complaint
with regard to Plymouth Estates Nos. 1 and 3, Plymouth Park Drive Estates No. 1, and Winchester
Estates No. 4 because any takings claims related to these developments were barred by the statute of
limitation. MCL 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813; see Hart v Detroit, 416 Mich 488; 331 NW2d 438
(1982). Further, while it is a close question, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying plaintiffs’ motion for amendment of the complaint regarding the remaining subdivisions. A
motion to amend pleadings should ordinarily be granted absent such factors as undue prejudice to the
opposing party, undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the movant’s part, or where the proposed
amendment would be futile. Ben P Fyke & Sons v Gunter Co, 390 Mich 649, 656; 213 NW2d 134
(1973). This Court has recently stated that an oral motion for amendment is not sufficient under MCR
2.118, governing amendment of pleadings. Lown v JJ Eaton Place, 235 Mich App 721, 723; 598
NW2d 633 (1999). Here, plaintiffs filed neither a separate written motion for amendment nor a
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proposed amended complaint. Under the reasoning of Lown, plaintiffs’ failure to file a proposed
amended complaint violated MCR 2.118, making the court’s denial a reasonable exercise of discretion.
Finally, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in determining that their agreements with the city
entered into to ensure the installation of all required improvements within twenty-four months after the
plat’s approval were actually contracts. In addition, plaintiffs argue that even if the agreements are
contracts, the trial court erred in concluding that the contracts barred plaintiffs’ claims for
reimbursements or credits. We disagree with plaintiffs that the agreements were not contracts.
However, we remand this matter to the trial court for further consideration of the issue whether the
contracts barred plaintiffs’ claims for reimbursements or credits.
A finding that the parties intended a written instrument to be a complete expression of their
agreement concerning the matters covered is a prerequisite to the application of the parol evidence rule.
Farm Credit Services of Michigan’s Heartland, PCA v Weldon, 232 Mich App 662, 669; 591
NW2d 438 (1998). When a contract contains an integration clause it is conclusive; parol evidence is
not admissible to show that the agreement is not integrated unless fraud is alleged or where an
agreement is incomplete on its face and requires parol evidence to fill in the missing terms. UAW-GM
Human Resource Center v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich App 486, 502; 579 NW2d 411
(1998), citing 3 Corbin, Contracts, § 578, p 411.
However, when there is no integration clause, parol evidence is admissible to the extent it bears
on whether the parties intended a written instrument to be a complete expression of their agreement
concerning the matters. Farm Credit Services, supra at 669. Here, none of the contracts submitted
to the trial court included an integration clause, therefore parol evidence was not conclusively barred for
the purposes of determining whether the parties intended the contract to be a complete expression of
their agreement and what its terms meant. Id.; UAW-GM, supra at 502. The trial court was presented
with no evidence that the contracts were a complete integration of the parties’ agreements. Therefore,
contrary to the trial court’s ruling, parol evidence was admissible to explain the terms of the parties’
agreements.
Additionally, plaintiffs cannot be said to have waived their rights in the contracts. The city
ordinance provides that the city “shall pay for that part of required facility, the size of which exceeds that
normally required to serve the subdivision under consideration, as determined by the city engineer.” §
23-74. The use of the word “shall” indicates a mandatory, rather than a discretionary, provision. In re
Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). This mandatory language seems to
create a non-waiveable duty to pay for excessive improvements. While no cases have discussed the
waiver of rights under ordinances, our Supreme Court has held that the waiver of statutorily protected
rights in a contract should not be inferred unless explicit and the waiver is clear and unmistakable.
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1564, AFL-CIO v Southeastern Michigan Transportation
Authority, 437 Mich 441, 460; 473 NW2d 249 (1991). The contracts contain no clear and
unmistakable language of plaintiffs’ waiver. Neither the ordinances nor the contracts specifically provide
that a developer’s claim for reimbursements or credits is waived unless reserved at the time the pacts
are drafted.
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The trial court erred in ruling that the contracts barred plaintiffs’ claims for credits and
reimbursements because they were not reserved. Questions of fact regarding integration of the
agreement prohibited summary disposition.
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the trial court. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
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