DAWN FRANTZ V EAST CHINA SCHL DIST
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DAWN FRANTZ,
UNPUBLISHED
September 1, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
EAST CHINA SCHOOL DISTRICT and JOSEPH
PIUS,
No. 214283
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 96-003763-NZ
Defendants-Appellees,
and
THOMAS MALLOY,
Defendant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Kelly and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants
East China School District (hereinafter East China) and Joseph Pius pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10)
and from an order dismissing with prejudice her claims of sexual harassment and unlawful retaliation.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
This case arises out of plaintiff’s claim that defendant Thomas Malloy, a teacher and media
specialist at St. Clair Middle School, sexually harassed her while she was working as a library aide.
Plaintiff claims that the harassment began in 1992. In January 1996, plaintiff was hospitalized after she
attempted to take her own life by taking an overdose of medication. After plaintiff’s allegations were
investigated, plaintiff was transferred to a comparable position at a nearby elementary school.
Approximately eight days later, plaintiff stopped coming to work. Then, in a letter dated May 16,
1996, plaintiff was informed that because some of the district’s regularly employed teachers expressed
interest in serving as High School cheerleading advisor, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement
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between the teachers and the district, plaintiff’s services as cheerleading advisor were “no longer
necessary.” Plaintiff never returned to work for East China in any capacity.
On June 4, 1997, the trial court ordered the case submitted to mediation. Mediation was
adjourned twice during the ensuing months. Before mediation could take place, East China and Pius
filed their motion for summary disposition. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated March
25, 1998. The trial court explained that plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim against these two
defendants was being dismissed because East China and Pius did not have actual or constructive notice
of the alleged harassment, and that once they became aware of the situation in January 1996, East
China and Pius took prompt and appropriate remedial action. The court dismissed plaintiff’s quid pro
quo sexual harassment claim because it concluded that “by any objective examination of the facts,” it
was clear that plaintiff and Malloy were coworkers, i.e., Malloy was not plaintiff’s supervisor. Finally,
the court concluded that plaintiff could not maintain her retaliation cause of action because “no plausible
explanation has been offered to rebut” the argument that the cheerleading position had to be offered to a
regular employee under the collective bargaining agreement.
The mediation hearing was finally held on April 24, 1998. The notice of mediation evaluation
indicates an award of “[$]18[,]500 for Plaintiff against Malloy.” The mediation evaluation was
accepted by both plaintiff and Malloy. Finally, on August 17, 1998, in response to the acceptance of
the mediation evaluation, the court entered an order dismissing with prejudice the cause of action “as to
all parties.”
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by entering the order of dismissal with
prejudice as to “all parties” because only her claims against Malloy were submitted to mediation. We
agree. “[T]his Court has jurisdiction only over appeals filed by an ‘aggrieved party’” pursuant to MCR
7.203(A). Reddam v Consumer Mortgage Corp, 182 Mich App 754, 757; 452 NW2d 908 (1990).
A party who accepts a mediation award is not an “aggrieved party” within the meaning of MCR
7.203(A). Id. However, if a party makes a showing that less than all the issues were submitted to
mediation, that party is deemed to be an “aggrieved party” regarding those issues that were not
submitted to mediation.
We conclude that plaintiff made a showing that only her claims against Malloy were submitted to
mediation. The mediation evaluation only lists counsel representing Malloy and expressly awards
“[$]18[,]500 for Plaintiff against Malloy.” The mediation evaluation does not include either an
indication of a damage award assessed against East China and Pius, or conversely, an indication that no
damages were assessed against one or both. Moreover, the record only includes acceptances of the
settlement by plaintiff and Malloy. Further, we do not believe it makes any sense for the claims against
East China and Pius to be submitted to mediation after their motion for summary disposition had been
granted. Accordingly, with respect to plaintiff’s claims against East China and Pius, we conclude that
plaintiff is an “aggrieved party,” thus giving this Court jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s appeal regarding
those claims.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to East China and
Pius on plaintiff’s hostile work environment cause of action. We agree. This Court reviews decisions
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on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337;
572 NW2d 201 (1998). Although the motion was premised on MCR 2.116(C)(7),(8), and (10),
because the trial court examined evidence outside the pleadings when rendering its decision, the issue
will be reviewed under the standard of review applicable to (C)(10) motions. Kubisz v Cadillac Gage
Textron, Inc, 236 Mich App 629, 633, n 4; 601 NW2d 160 (1999).
A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a plaintiff’s
claim. MCR 2.116(C)(10) permits summary disposition when, except for the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to damages as a matter of law. A court reviewing such a motion must
consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in
favor of the opposing party and grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the
opposing party. [Stehlik v Johnson (On Rehearing), 206 Mich App 83, 85; 520
NW2d 633 (1994).]
Under the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., an
employer or its agent cannot discriminate “against an individual with respect to employment,
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege o employment because of .. . sex.” Wilcoxon v
f
Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347, 358; 597 NW2d 250 (1999). To establish a
hostile work environment sexual harassment cause of action, the plaintiff must prove the following
elements:
(1) the employee belongs to a protected group;
(2) the employee was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of
sex;
(3) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or
communication;
(4) the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in fact
did substantially interfere with the employee’s employment or created an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment, and
(5) respondeat superior. [Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 382-383; 501
NW2d 155 (1993).]
“[A]n employer may avoid liability under the CRA ‘if it adequately investigated and took
prompt and appropriate remedial action upon notice of the alleged hostile work environment.’. . . .
Such prompt and appropriate remedial action will permit an employer to avoid liability if the plaintiff
accuses either a co-worker, or a supervisor of sexual harassment.” Id. at 396, quoting Downer v
Detroit Receiving Hospital, 191 Mich App 232, 234; 477 NW2d 146 (1991). The employer has a
duty to investigate only when it has actual or constructive notice of the alleged harassment, i.e., the
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employer knew or should have known of the alleged harassment. Grow v W A Thomas Co, 236 Mich
App 696, 702-703; 601 NW2d 426 (1999); Downer, supra at 234-235.
After reviewing the record in the appropriate light, we conclude that a genuine issue of fact
exists with respect to whether East China and Pius had actual or constructive notice of the alleged
harassment before plaintiff’s attempted suicide. Further, even it were to be established that East China
and Pius did not have notice before the suicide attempt, it is undeniable that they did have actual notice
of plaintiff’s allegations after that event.
We also conclude that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to whether the response taken
by East China and Pius to the allegations was prompt and adequate under the circumstances. For
example, given the gravity and severity of the alleged sexual harassment, a trier of fact could reasonably
conclude that the giving of a written reprimand to Malloy and the reassignment of plaintiff to another
school in the district was not an “appropriate remedial action.” Indeed, a trier of fact could find that
Malloy should have been discharged from his job or at the very least should have been moved to
another employment location instead of plaintiff.
Plaintiff further argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of East
China and Pius regarding her quid pro quo sexual harassment cause of action. We disagree. As
recognized in Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702, 708; 545 NW2d 596 (1996),
the CRA sets forth two separate theories for a quid pro quo sexual harassment cause of action:
(i) Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment. Sexual
harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the following
conditions:
(i) Submission to the conduct or communication is made a term or condition
either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment, public accommodations or public
services, education, or housing.
(ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an
individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual’s employment, public
accommodations or public services, education, or housing. [MCL 37.2103(i)(i), (ii);
MSA 3.548 (103)(i)(i), (ii).]
Plaintiff’s cause of action has its genesis in subsection 103(i)(ii). In order to sustain this cause of
action, plaintiff must establish “(1) that she was subject to any of the types of unwelcome sexual conduct
or communication described the statute, and (2) that her employer or the employer’s agent used her
submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as a factor in a decision affecting her employment.”
Champion, supra at 708-709. Plaintiff may establish the second element by showing that she was
constructively discharged because of her response to the harassment. Id. at 710-711. “[C]onstructive
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discharge occurs only where an employer or its agent’s conduct is so severe that a reasonable person in
the employee’s place would feel compelled to resign.” Id. at 710.
We conclude that plaintiff failed to establish her quid pro quo sexual harassment cause of action
because she failed to show that Malloy was “in a position to offer tangible job benefits in exchange for
sexual favors or alternatively, threaten job injury for a failure to submit.” Id. at 713. It does not appear
that Malloy had the authority to hire or promote plaintiff, nor does it appear that he had the authority to
discharge or demote her. The only authority Malloy seemed to have over plaintiff was the ability to
assign her daily work duties and alter her work schedule. Moreover, plaintiff even testified that she
believed Pius, who hired her, was her boss and that Malloy was merely a coworker.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants East China and Pius regarding her retaliation cause of action. Again, we disagree.
Under subsection 701(a) of the CRA, MCL 27.2701(a); MSA 3.548(701)(a), a plaintiff can
establish a retaliation cause of action by showing that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity described
in the statute; (2) the defendant knew that she engaged in a protected activity; (3) the defendant took an
adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (4) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich
App 432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997). To establish a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must show that his participation in the protected
activity was a significant factor in the adverse employment action. Polk v Yellow Freight System, Inc,
801 F2d 190, 197 (CA 6, 1986).
Plaintiff argues that she has established her cause of action by showing that once she told
defendants that Malloy was sexually harassing her, they retaliated against her in several ways, including:
(1) ordering her not to return to the cheerleading coach position until she was evaluated by a
psychiatrist; (2) instructing the cheerleaders not to speak with her until she returned to the position; (3)
refusing to pay her medical bills, which resulted from her attempt to end her life; (4) transferring her to a
new job across the street at the elementary school; and (5) not rehiring her as a cheerleading coach for
St. Clair High School.
Even if plaintiff could establish that the alleged employment actions occurred, we conclude that
she has not shown that she has suffered any type of “adverse employment action” sufficient to sustain a
retaliation cause of action against defendants. For example, while there was clearly a causal connection
between plaintiff having told East China and Pius that Malloy was sexually harassing her and defendants
transferring her, it appears that this action was not taken for retaliatory purposes but rather to alleviate
her discomfort with having to work near Malloy.1 The other actions cited cannot be characterized as
adversely altering to the conditions of her employment. Additionally, other than the transfer, plaintiff has
failed to establish the requisite causal connection. For example, the record shows that East China did
1
This observation does not undermine our earlier conclusion that a reasonable tier of fact could have
found that the moving of plaintiff, not Malloy, to a new work location was not a prompt and adequate
response to the allegations of harassment.
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not rehire plaintiff to the cheerleading advisor position because, according to the teacher’s collective
bargaining agreement, if a qualified tenured teacher expressed an interest in the position, East China was
required to give them hiring preference. Plaintiff has failed to offer any proof that a qualified tenured
teacher did not express interest in the cheerleading coach position, which would suggest that defendants
may have been acting for retaliatory purposes.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
I concur in result only.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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